580 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1978)
The Attorney General sued John T. Mitchell, his real estate company, and his agents under the Fair Housing Act seeking damages and an injunction to end racially discriminatory housing practices at a large apartment complex.1
The complex, located on eight acres, is comprised of 18 buildings with 12 apartments in each building. Between 1973 and 1975, ninety-five percent of all blacks renting in the complex were rented apartments in the same section comprised of four buildings at a remote end of the complex. Fifty-three percent of all black tenants were located in the same building within this section.2
Black tenants testified that they were shown apartments only in this section. Vacant apartments in the "white" section were not shown, offered, or made available to blacks. Blacks who requested apartments with different color carpeting or in a different location were told that no other vacancies existed when other apartments were in fact available. Blacks occasionally had to wait for an apartment in the section to be repaired or cleaned when other apartments in other sections were available for immediate occupancy.3
The district court granted the injunction after finding that the defendants had steered blacks into a separate section of the apartment complex. However, the court refused to allow the government to recover damages for the benefit of the injured parties.4 The United States appealed the refusal of the district court to allow the government to recover damages for the benefit of the injured parties. The defendants cross-appealed, challenging the finding that they had engaged in a pattern or practice of steering blacks to a special area of the complex. They also challenged the award of costs to the government.5
Whether the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of steering black tenants to a particular section of the apartment complex?6
Under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) an agent or owner may not refuse to sell or rent after a bona fide offer, refuse to negotiate for the sale or rent of a dwelling, or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any person because of race.7 Steering blacks to a particular group of apartments in a complex effectively denies access to equal housing opportunities.8 The Fair Housing Act prohibits not only direct discrimination but practices with racially discouraging effects.9 The government need only establish that race was a consideration and played some role in the real estate transaction.10 Statistics, although not dispositive, have critical, if not decisive significance.11 A significant discriminatory effect flowing from rental decisions is sufficient to demonstrate a violation of the Fair Housing Act.12
Yes. The district judge found significant evidence to show that the defendants had steered blacks to a particular section of the apartment complex.13 In one instance a black tenant was forced to move when his apartment became unhabitable.14 Although there were vacant apartments in the white section, he was not offered one of them.15
The fact that a large majority of Mitchell's black tenants were clustered in a defined area is highly probative of a section 3604(a) violation.16 Conduct that has the necessary and foreseeable consequence of perpetuating segregation can be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct in frustrating the national commitment to fair housing.17 The district court's decision based on statistical evidence and evidence of actions that effectively confined blacks to a section of the complex is therefore consistent with the requirements of section 3604(a).18 The district judge's finding that the government proved a pattern or practice of discrimination was not clearly erroneous.19
The district court's finding that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of steering was affirmed as not clearly erroneous.20
Whether the Attorney General may recover damages for the benefit of injured parties under 42 U.S.C. § 3613?21
Section 3613 authorizes the Attorney General to seek such preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchapter.22 The type of relief the Attorney General seeks to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 3613 differs from back pay relief under Title VII and from equitable monetary relief concomitant to an injunction.23 An action by the Attorney General for compensatory and punitive damages would be characterized as legal rather than restitution in equity.24 To broaden this limited grant of authority to include the power to seek legal damages would be a substantial departure from principles of equity and statutory interpretation.25
No. Although the district court granted the government an injunction and other affirmative relief, the court held that the Attorney General was not entitled to procure damages on behalf of the tenants injured by the defendants' conduct.26 The United States contends that 42 U.S.C. § 3613 permits the Attorney General to recover damages for private parties and that such damages are a necessary concomitant of full relief.27 The damages sought by the Attorney General are legal damages and have no restitutionary function.28
In Curtis v. Loether the Supreme Court considered whether a private party's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 3612 for compensatory and punitive damages carried a constitutional right to jury trial.29 The Court concluded that jury trial was mandated because a damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort.30 The court refused to analogize the Fair Housing Act remedy to Title VII's restitutionary back pay remedy, holding explicitly that the 42 U.S.C. § 3612 remedy had a compensatory rather than restitutionary purpose.31 As the court read 42 U.S.C. § 3613 the Attorney General is empowered to seek only equitable remedies.32 Like the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Long the court found no support in the language or legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 3613 for extending the powers of the Attorney General by implication.33
The district court correctly refused to allow the government to recover damages for the benefit of the injured parties under 42 U.S.C. § 3613.34
Whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding costs to the United States?35
The United States may, absent a statute, recover costs to the same extent as a private party.36 Rule 54(d) provides that costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.37 A party need not prevail on all issues to justify a full award of costs.38 A party who has obtained some relief usually will be regarded as the prevailing party even though he has not sustained all his claims.39 Cases from this and other circuits consistently support shifting costs if the prevailing party obtains judgment on even a fraction of the claims advanced.40 The court reviews an award of costs only to correct an abuse of the district court's discretion.41
No. Mitchell complains on appeal that court costs were wrongfully assessed and were excessive.42 The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs.43 Mitchell urges that the government prevailed only on the steering issue, losing both the refusal to let allegation and the plea for damages, and thus cannot be characterized as the prevailing party under Rule 54(d).44 A party need not prevail on all issues to justify a full award of costs, however.
The government prevailed on the steering issue and procured broad affirmative equitable relief.45 Mitchell complains that the costs were excessive because United States marshalls made two trips to subpoena witnesses when, because of proximity, both witnesses could have been served at once.46 The court declines to review the amount of costs when the court clearly acted within its power to award such costs.47
The district court's award of costs to the United States was affirmed.48