(1977)
The United States initiated a criminal contempt proceeding in 1971 against respondent corporations, two commonly owned linen supply companies, and their president, William B. Troy, alleging violation of a 1969 consent decree that had resolved an earlier antitrust suit.1
The District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the petitions, but the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal in 1973.2 Following that reversal, the Government filed a supplemental criminal contempt petition, and the matter proceeded to trial in February 1975.3
On February 21, 1975, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to the president but reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked with respect to the respondent corporations, resulting in the discharge of the jury.4 Six days later, on February 27, 1975, the respondent corporations filed motions for judgments of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).5 Two months afterward, on April 24, 1975, the District Court granted the motions and entered judgments of acquittal.6
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the United States could not appeal the judgments of acquittal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.7 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review that determination.8
Whether the United States may appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 from judgments of acquittal entered by a district court under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after a jury fails to reach a verdict?9
Section 3731 authorizes government appeals from district court judgments dismissing an indictment except when the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits further prosecution.10 The Double Jeopardy Clause bars government appeals from acquittals that resolve some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged because such an appeal would require a second trial.11 A judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(c) constitutes such a resolution when the court determines that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.12
No. The respondent corporations were tried for criminal contempt in the District Court for the Western District of Texas.13 After the jury was discharged as hopelessly deadlocked, the district court granted their Rule 29(c) motions and entered judgments of acquittal on the view that the Government had not proved facts constituting the offense.14 These judgments terminated the prosecution in which jeopardy had attached.15
A successful appeal by the United States would necessitate another trial devoted to resolving factual issues.16 The Double Jeopardy Clause therefore prohibits the appeal under section 3731.17
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the United States may not appeal the judgments of acquittal entered under Rule 29(c).18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment on statutory grounds rather than reaching the constitutional question.19 He explains that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 authorizes appeals from dismissals of indictments but contains no provision for appeals from acquittals.20
The legislative history, particularly the Senate Report, demonstrates that Congress sought to eliminate barriers to appeals from dismissals while confirming that no appeal would lie from an acquittal.21 The sponsor of the bill emphasized that the government could appeal any ruling dismissing a prosecution except where the ruling is an acquittal.22 Because the district court's action under Rule 29(c) was a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence, no appeal is authorized by the statute.23
Chief Justice Burger dissents, contending that the district court's order was entered after the jury had been discharged following a mistrial, at which point the respondents were no longer in jeopardy within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.24 He argues that the ruling was a legal determination on the sufficiency of the evidence, not a factual resolution by the trier of fact, and therefore should be subject to appellate review to protect the government's interest in a legally sufficient case.25
The case cannot be distinguished from United States v. Sanford, where a post-mistrial dismissal was appealable.26 By focusing on the label and timing of the order, the majority elevates form over substance and undermines the framework established in prior decisions such as Wilson, Jenkins, and Serfass.27