409 U.S. 434 (1973)
Robert William Kras, an indigent resident of Brooklyn, New York, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter VII of the Bankruptcy Act in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York on May 28, 1971.1 He tendered only one dollar toward the fifty-dollar filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) and moved for leave to proceed without prepayment of the balance on grounds of indigency.2 Kras supported his motion with an affidavit detailing his financial circumstances, including unemployment since May 1969, reliance on public assistance totaling three hundred sixty-six dollars per month for his household, minimal assets consisting of clothing and household goods valued at fifty dollars, and liabilities exceeding six thousand dollars.3
Kras lived in a two-and-a-half-room apartment with his wife, two young children—one of whom suffered from cystic fibrosis and required hospital treatment—his mother, and her six-year-old daughter.4 His last steady employment ended when premiums he collected were stolen, and subsequent job searches failed due to unfavorable references.5 The household subsisted entirely on public assistance benefits that covered only rent and basic necessities, with no funds available for the filing fee even in installments.6
The District Court granted Kras leave to file without prepayment and later adjudged him a bankrupt on September 13, 1971, but stayed the discharge pending resolution of the constitutional challenge.7 The court held the fee requirement unconstitutional as applied to Kras.8 The United States intervened as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 2403 and took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.9
Whether the fifty-dollar filing fee required for a voluntary bankruptcy petition violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when applied to an indigent petitioner?10
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits denial of access to the sole effective means of resolving a dispute when the government monopolizes that means and the interest at stake is fundamental.11 This principle was established in Boddie v. Connecticut for divorce proceedings involving marriage and family life.12 The principle requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard but does not extend to every statutory benefit.13
No. The rule from Boddie does not apply because Kras's interest in a bankruptcy discharge is an economic benefit created by statute rather than a fundamental constitutional interest like marriage.14 The government does not hold an exclusive monopoly over debt adjustment, since private negotiations with creditors or installment payments under Chapter XIII remain available even if the fee poses a temporary barrier.15 Kras's affidavit showed reliance on $366 monthly public assistance for a household including a child with cystic fibrosis, unemployment since 1969, and assets limited to $50 in clothing and goods, yet the fee structure permits payments as low as $1.28 weekly over nine months, a sum within reach after the stay of creditor actions.16 The District Court granted leave to file without prepayment on May 28, 1971, and adjudged Kras a bankrupt on September 13, 1971, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fee requirement imposes no unconstitutional barrier to due process.
The filing fee is a statutory condition for processing the petition, not a price for the discharge itself, and Congress designed the system to be self-sustaining through user fees rather than general taxation.17
The fifty-dollar filing fee does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment when applied to an indigent petitioner like Kras.18
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Chief Justice Burger concurred fully with the majority.19 He stressed that the careful delineation of interests in Boddie v. Connecticut should not be overlooked by the dissenting opinions.20 The exclusivity of state control over marriage dissolution differs markedly from government involvement in debtor-creditor relations.21
In a bankruptcy proceeding the government through the court is no more than the overseer and administrator of the process.22 It is not the absolute and exclusive controller as with the dissolution of marriage.23 Private adjustments with creditors remain possible.24
Policy arguments for waiving fees for the indigent belong to Congress rather than to judicial expansion of constitutional doctrine.25 Congress had already created a commission to study bankruptcy reform.26
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the fee requirement denies an indigent access to the bankruptcy court.27 The bankruptcy court is the only forum in which the appellee can obtain the discharge he seeks.28 The fee requirement as applied to him effectively denies him access to that forum and constitutes a denial of due process.29
Douglas rejected the majority's distinction based on Chapter XIII installments.30 Kras had shown that he cannot afford even the installment payments from his public-assistance income.31 The Court's distinction therefore is illusory.32
The interest in a discharge is fundamental to the fresh start that is the essence of the bankruptcy laws.33 Douglas would affirm the judgment of the District Court.34
Whether the filing fee requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to indigents?35
Equal protection analysis under the Fifth Amendment applies rational-basis review to economic and social-welfare legislation such as bankruptcy fees.36 A classification survives if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.37 Wealth alone does not trigger heightened scrutiny absent a fundamental right or suspect classification.38
No. The fee requirement creates no irrational classification based on wealth; it applies uniformly to all petitioners and serves the legitimate purpose of making the bankruptcy system self-sustaining by shifting costs to users rather than taxpayers.39 Kras's circumstances, including $6,428 in liabilities and inability to save the fee despite $5 weekly net income after support obligations, do not render the uniform fee irrational because Congress could rationally conclude that those who invoke the system should contribute to its maintenance.40 The District Court found an equal-protection violation as applied, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that bankruptcy legislation operates in the field of economics where rational justification suffices and no suspect criterion or fundamental interest is implicated.41
The filing fee requirement does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to indigents.42
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Joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan, And Justice Marshall
Justice Stewart joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented on the view that the fee creates an impermissible wealth-based barrier to the only effective means of escaping government-enforced debt obligations.43 The violation of due process seems to me equally clear in the present case.44 Kras is making a good-faith attempt to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy and is in fact indigent.45
The debtor like the married plaintiffs in Boddie originally entered into his contract freely and voluntarily.46 Yet it is the Government that continues to enforce that obligation.47 Under our legal system that debt is effective only because the judicial machinery is there to collect it.48
The Government has thus truly pre-empted the only means for the indigent bankrupt to get out from under a lifetime burden of debt.49
Whether waiver of the bankruptcy filing fee for an indigent petitioner is constitutionally required?50
Waiver of a filing fee is constitutionally required only when access to the judicial forum is the exclusive means of vindicating a fundamental interest and the government monopolizes that forum.51 No such requirement exists for statutory economic benefits like bankruptcy discharges that lack fundamental constitutional status.52
No. Waiver is not required because the bankruptcy discharge is a legislatively created benefit rather than a fundamental right, and alternatives such as creditor negotiations or delayed filing after saving modest sums remain open.53 Kras's detailed affidavit established that public assistance covered only rent and necessities with no surplus for the fee, yet the Court held that the Constitution does not mandate free access to every statutory proceeding.54 The District Court ordered waiver and stayed discharge pending appeal, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that any change in fee policy for indigents must come from Congress.55
Waiver of the bankruptcy filing fee for an indigent petitioner is not constitutionally required.56
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Justice Marshall dissented that the majority's assumption that an indigent could save $1.28 weekly ignored the reality of households living on less than $19 per week as shown by census data.57 The majority improperly disregarded Kras's unchallenged affidavit.58 Marshall cannot treat the traditional notion that judges must accept unchallenged credible affidavits as true so cavalierly.59
He viewed the fee as denying access to the courts for adjudication of a statutory claim of right.60 Marshall criticized the majority for resting its conclusion on unfounded assumptions about how the poor manage scarce resources.61 It is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live.62