510 U.S. 43 (1993)
In January 1985, Hawaii police officers executed a search warrant at the home of James Daniel Good and uncovered approximately 89 pounds of marijuana, marijuana seeds, vials containing hashish oil, and drug paraphernalia.1 About six months later, Good pleaded guilty to promoting a harmful drug in the second degree under Hawaii law.2 He received a sentence of one year in jail and five years' probation, along with a $1,000 fine, and was required to forfeit $3,187 in cash found on the premises.3
On August 8, 1989, more than four years after the search, the United States filed an in rem forfeiture action in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii seeking to forfeit Good's house and the four-acre parcel on which it stood under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).4 On August 18, 1989, a United States Magistrate Judge issued a warrant of arrest in rem based on an ex parte finding of probable cause supported by an affidavit describing Good's conviction and the evidence from the search.5 The Government seized the property on August 21, 1989, without providing prior notice to Good or conducting an adversary hearing.6 At the time, Good was renting the home to tenants for $900 per month, and the Government allowed the tenants to remain under an occupancy agreement while directing rents to the United States Marshal.7
Good filed a claim for the property and an answer asserting that the seizure violated due process and that the action was untimely.8 The District Court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment and ordered forfeiture of the property.9 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.10 It held unanimously that the ex parte seizure violated due process but divided on the timeliness issue under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 and 1621.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutional and timeliness questions.12
Whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real property without first affording the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard?13
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that individuals receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property interests.14 Exceptions exist only in extraordinary situations where a valid governmental interest justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.15 The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test guides the inquiry by weighing the private interest affected by the official action, the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards, and the Government's interest including the administrative burden that additional procedural requirements would impose.16
Yes. The seizure of Good's house and the four-acre parcel on which it was situated deprived him of protected property interests without prior notice or an adversary hearing.17 The private interest in maintaining control over one's home and receiving rents is of historic and continuing importance.18 The risk of erroneous deprivation is high because the ex parte proceeding requires only probable cause and affords no protection to innocent owners or other defenses.19
The Government's interest in immediate seizure is not pressing because real property cannot be moved or concealed and alternatives such as lis pendens or restraining orders suffice to protect its interests.20 No exigent circumstances were shown in this case where the property was rented to tenants and the Government permitted continued occupancy under an agreement.21
The ex parte seizure of Good's real property violated the Due Process Clause.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Scalia, J., And O'connor, J. As To Parts Ii And Iii
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the timeliness holding but dissented from the due process ruling.23 He argued that the Fourth Amendment provides the full measure of process due in forfeiture cases and that the majority's application of Mathews conflicts with historical practice and precedents like Gerstein and Graham.24 He noted that the Court has long sanctioned summary proceedings in civil forfeitures and that the decision casts doubt on settled law regarding seizure of property to enforce income tax liability.25
Justice O'Connor joined the timeliness holding but dissented on due process.26 She argued that the seizure complied with due process because Good had been convicted of a drug offense involving the property, the Government obtained a warrant before seizing it, and the residents were not dispossessed.27 She maintained that the distinction between real and personal property is not constitutionally relevant in forfeiture cases.28
She contended that the majority mischaracterized Calero-Toledo by focusing only on the movability of the yacht while ignoring other justifications such as the governmental interest and the fact that seizure was by government officials.29 O'Connor emphasized that the preforfeiture intrusion was minimal since Good was not living on the property and tenants remained.30 She concluded that the warrant hearing ensured probable cause and that postseizure hearing rights suffice to protect the owner's interests.31
Justice Thomas joined the timeliness holding but dissented on due process.32 He expressed sympathy for protecting property rights and concern over the breadth of forfeiture statutes but concluded that under the facts of this case, where Good was a convicted drug offender, no preseizure hearing was required.33 He preferred a fact-specific inquiry and cautioned against broad constitutional rules.34
Thomas noted that Good is not an innocent owner and that the conviction itself provides notice.35 He argued that the Court's approach disregards critical facts and reaches beyond the question presented by declaring many customs laws facially unconstitutional.36
Whether filing suit for forfeiture within the statute of limitations suffices to make the action timely?37
If a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction such as dismissal.38 The five-year statute of limitations in 19 U.S.C. § 1621 is the outer limit for filing forfeiture actions.39
Yes. The Government filed the in rem action on August 8, 1989, within the five-year statute of limitations after the January 1985 discovery of the drugs.40 The internal timing requirements of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1604 do not mandate dismissal because Congress did not specify that consequence for noncompliance.41 The Court of Appeals erred in holding that failure to comply with those provisions required dismissal of the action.42
Filing the forfeiture action within the statute of limitations makes the action timely, and noncompliance with other statutory timing directives does not require dismissal.43