461 U.S. 499, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983)
On October 11, 1979, near East St. Louis, Illinois, a turquoise Cadillac forced an automobile carrying three young women and Randy Newcomb off the road.1 The five occupants of the Cadillac, later identified as respondents Napoleon Stewart, Gregory Williams, Gable Gibson, Kevin Anderson, and Kelvin Hasting, removed the women from the car.2 In Newcomb's presence, two of the respondents immediately raped one woman and forced her to perform acts of sodomy.3
The three women were then taken in the Cadillac to a vacant garage in St. Louis, Missouri, where they were raped and forced to perform deviant sexual acts.4 Two of the women were then taken to Stewart's home where Stewart and Williams took turns raping and sodomizing them.5 The third victim was taken in a separate car to another garage where the other respondents repeatedly raped her and compelled her to perform acts of sodomy.6 About 6 a.m., the three women were released.7
The women immediately contacted the St. Louis police and furnished descriptions of the five men, the turquoise Cadillac, and the locations of the sexual attacks.8 From these descriptions, the police immediately identified Stewart's home.9 With the consent of Stewart's mother, police entered the home, arrested Stewart, and found items of the victims' clothing and personal effects.10 The turquoise Cadillac was located, seized, and found to be registered to Williams.11 On the basis of the information gathered, the police arrested Williams, Gibson, Anderson, and Hasting, all of whom were later identified by the victims during police lineups.12
Respondents were charged with kidnaping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), transporting a woman across state lines for immoral purposes in violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, and conspiracy to commit the foregoing offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.13 At trial the defense relied on a theory of consent and, inconsistently, on the possibility that the victims' identification of the respondents was mistaken.14 None of the respondents testified.15
During the prosecutor's summation, the prosecutor stated that the defendants at no time ever challenged any of the rapes, whether or not that occurred, any of the sodomies, the kidnapping, the fact that the girls were in East St. Louis and they were taken across to St. Louis, the transportation of the victims from East St. Louis, Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, and the location or whereabouts of the defendants at all the relevant times.16 Defense counsel objected.17 The prosecutor acknowledged that defendants need not present evidence.18 The trial court confirmed that defendants do not have to put on evidence.19 A motion for a mistrial was denied.20 The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to each respondent on all counts.21
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions and remanded for retrial, 660 F.2d 301 (CA7 1980), citing its decision in United States v. Buege.22 The Court of Appeals declined to rely on the harmless-error doctrine.23 Respondents' remaining claims were disposed of in an unpublished order.24 The Government petitioned for rehearing, which was denied.25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.26
Whether a federal court of appeals may reverse criminal convictions on the basis of a prosecutor's comments without applying harmless-error analysis?27
The harmless-error doctrine announced in Chapman v. California requires reviewing courts to consider the trial record as a whole.28 Courts must ignore errors that are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, even when the error is of constitutional dimension such as a Griffin violation.29 The supervisory powers of the courts of appeals may not be exercised to reverse convictions when the error is harmless. The goals of implementing remedies, preserving judicial integrity, and deterring illegal conduct are not served by reversal in such circumstances.
No. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the convictions of the five respondents without applying the harmless-error analysis required by Chapman.30 The court instead focused on disciplining the prosecutor for what it perceived as continuing violations of Griffin and 18 U.S.C. § 3481 despite the clear evidence of guilt in this case.31 The evidence included the three victims' immediate contact with police after their release around 6 a.m., their descriptions leading to the identification of Stewart's home, the arrest of Stewart and recovery of victims' clothing and personal effects, the seizure of the turquoise Cadillac registered to Williams, and the lineups where all respondents were identified.32 Neutral witnesses such as Randy Newcomb testified to witnessing one rape.33 The garage owner observed two women with four men matching Anderson's description.34 Williams' fingerprints were found on the victims' car.35 The defense presented only scanty evidence on hairstyles, partial lineup failures, darkness affecting Newcomb's view, and Stewart's mother's testimony that the girls did not look scared, while advancing inconsistent theories of consent and mistaken identity.36 The prosecutor's remark, though assuming error, was at most attenuated.37 The overwhelming nature of the evidence made it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned guilty verdicts absent the remark.38
The Court of Appeals' approach of reversing to deter prosecutorial conduct failed to balance the interests in prompt administration of justice and the trauma to victims from a new trial more than four years later against the need to discipline the prosecutor, contrary to the requirements of the harmless-error rule.39
A federal court of appeals may not reverse criminal convictions on the basis of a prosecutor's comments without applying harmless-error analysis when the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that the prosecutor's closing argument was free of constitutional error.41 In this case the five defendants presented 16 witnesses, who raised questions about some portions of the Government's case but failed to deny or contradict other portions. The prosecutor properly identified the weaknesses in the defendants' presentations and invited inferences from the main focus of the evidence presented by the five defendants.42
He would not reach the supervisory power or harmless-error doctrine and would reverse on the absence of any Griffin violation.43
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the Court of Appeals' opinion on its face adopted a rule of automatic reversal for improper prosecutorial comment.44 The court did so without invoking its supervisory powers expressly or providing any explanation of why this might be an appropriate case for the exercise of such powers.45 Therefore the case should be vacated and remanded for application of the harmless-error test announced by Chapman to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt rather than speculating on the lower court's motives or reaching the supervisory power issue.46
Whether the prosecutor's summation remarks regarding the defense case required reversal of the convictions?47
Under Griffin v. California, prosecutorial comment on a defendant's failure to testify violates the Fifth Amendment.48 Such a violation is subject to harmless-error analysis under Chapman v. California.49 Reversal is not required if the reviewing court concludes that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on the whole record.50
No. The prosecutor's summation remarks that the defendants at no time ever challenged any of the rapes, whether or not that occurred, any of the sodomies, the kidnapping, the fact that the girls were in East St. Louis and taken across to St. Louis, the transportation of the victims from East St. Louis, Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, and the location or whereabouts of the defendants at all the relevant times did not require reversal of the convictions.51 Absent the allusion to the failure of the defense to proffer evidence to rebut the testimony of the victims, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty given the compelling case of guilt.52 The victims described in detail the repeated wanton acts during three hours in two States, negating any doubt as to identification.53 They immediately provided descriptions to police leading to prompt identifications in lineups.54
Newcomb witnessed the rape of one woman.55 The garage owner observed two women with four men.56 The automobile was a singular color registered to Williams.57 Property of two victims was found in Stewart's possession hours after the crimes with Williams' fingerprints on the car.58
The defense efforts on hairstyles, lineup identifications, darkness, and Stewart's mother's testimony presented patently inconsistent theories that could hardly have escaped the jurors' attention, making the error harmless.59
The prosecutor's summation remarks regarding the defense case did not require reversal of the convictions.60
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that the prosecutor's closing argument was free of constitutional error. In this case the five defendants presented 16 witnesses, who raised questions about some portions of the Government's case but failed to deny or contradict other portions. The prosecutor properly identified the weaknesses in the defendants' presentations and invited inferences from the main focus of the evidence presented by the five defendants.
He would not reach the supervisory power or harmless-error doctrine and would reverse on the absence of any Griffin violation.
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the Court of Appeals' opinion on its face adopted a rule of automatic reversal for improper prosecutorial comment. The court did so without invoking its supervisory powers expressly or providing any explanation of why this might be an appropriate case for the exercise of such powers. Therefore the case should be vacated and remanded for application of the harmless-error test announced by Chapman to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt rather than speculating on the lower court's motives or reaching the supervisory power issue.