357 F.2d 606
In June 1963 Charles Freeman engaged in a transaction involving the sale of heroin to federal narcotics agent Coursey in Manhattan.1 On the evening of June 24, after introduction by informant Lockhart, Freeman provided a sealed brown paper bag containing heroin at the Gold Rail bar in exchange for partial payment of $130, with the $100 balance paid later that evening in a taxi.2 On August 1 Freeman again sold a brown paper bag of heroin to Coursey for $235 inside the men's room of Marvin's Bar after being introduced by a second informant, Alfred Roach.3 Field tests performed immediately after each transaction and subsequent chemical analyses confirmed the presence of heroin.4
Freeman was arrested by agents at his mother's apartment in Harlem.5 He was informed of the charges, told to dress, and taken to a government car and then to Narcotics Bureau Headquarters.6 At Narcotics Bureau Headquarters, Agent Wilkocki testified that Freeman admitted selling heroin to Coursey on both dates.7 Freeman denied making any inculpatory statements and claimed he had requested and been denied permission to call an attorney on three occasions.8
At a bench trial before Judge Tenney in the Southern District of New York, Freeman admitted participating in the transactions but testified he had acted only as a conduit for the informants and had turned over all money received.9 His principal defense was lack of criminal responsibility arising from a mental condition.10 Defense expert Dr. Herman Denber, who examined Freeman the day before trial, testified that Freeman was a long-term narcotics addict and alcoholic who suffered from toxic psychosis, delusions, hallucinations, epileptic convulsions, amnesia, and organic brain damage from repeated head trauma and prize-fighting knock-outs.11
Government expert Dr. Robert Carson testified that Freeman remained able to distinguish right from wrong despite his substance use.12 The record showed Freeman was thirty-five years old, had been addicted to narcotics for approximately fifteen years, had sought treatment unsuccessfully at Lexington Federal Hospital in 1959 and at Metropolitan Hospital in 1961-1963, and had five prior New York convictions for narcotics possession between 1951 and 1960.13 Prior to trial Freeman had been examined at Bellevue Hospital from June 19 to 23, 1965, and by Dr. Carson at the Federal House of Detention; both found him competent to stand trial, although Dr. Carson noted dulling of thinking processes consistent with chronic drug and alcohol damage.14
Judge Tenney applied the M'Naghten rules and convicted Freeman on both counts, imposing concurrent five-year sentences.15 Freeman appealed to the Second Circuit; his appeal was not limited to the responsibility question but also claimed error in the introduction of inculpatory statements.16
Whether the M'Naghten Rules, even when supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, should continue to serve as the standard for determining criminal responsibility in federal prosecutions in the Second Circuit?17
The M'Naghten Rules permit acquittal only when the accused labored under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act or that it was wrong.18 The irresistible impulse test adds acquittal when the defendant was unable to control conduct despite knowing it was wrong.19 These tests are deficient because they focus exclusively on the cognitive aspect of personality.20 They ignore gradations of incapacity.21 They unduly restrict expert psychiatric testimony.22
No. The court held that the M'Naghten Rules are inadequate under modern psychiatric understanding because they treat the mind as compartmentalized and prevent full presentation of evidence on mental disease affecting the entire personality.23 In this case the trial court applied M'Naghten, restricting Dr. Denber to testimony on whether Freeman knew right from wrong even though the expert described toxic psychosis, delusions, hallucinations, and organic brain damage from fourteen years of addiction and repeated trauma.24 Dr. Carson likewise testified under the same constraints while acknowledging some limitations on Freeman's capacity.25 Because the conviction rested on this rigid standard, reversal is required.26
The M'Naghten Rules, even when supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, should not continue to serve as the standard for determining criminal responsibility in federal prosecutions in the Second Circuit.27
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Judge Waterman concurred in the result.28 He finds it difficult to cast aside the traditional belief that one who plans and executes acts according to plan should be held responsible.29 He recognizes that modern views hold one's will may be so meaninglessly exerted as to lack any causal relationship to conduct.30 He therefore joins in promulgating the ALI standard for the time being.31
Modern beliefs validated by empirical studies require the judiciary to modernize judge-made rules relating intent-activation to conduct.32 This continues the process of judicial adaptation to new discoveries.33 He notes that further emendation may be needed as new discoveries emerge in the future.34
Whether the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code formulation of criminal responsibility should be adopted as the governing test in this Circuit?35
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.36 The terms mental disease or defect do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.37
Yes. The court concluded that the ALI formulation is the soundest yet devised because it treats the mind as a unified entity, employs the word substantial to recognize gradations rather than absolutes, and uses appreciate rather than know to encompass moral understanding.38 In this case the evidence of Freeman's fifteen-year addiction, failed treatment attempts at Lexington and Metropolitan Hospitals, toxic psychosis, brain damage, and prior convictions would be fully explorable under the ALI test, permitting the fact-finder to assess whether he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness or conform conduct without the artificial limits imposed by M'Naghten.39
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code formulation of criminal responsibility should be adopted as the governing test in this Circuit.40
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Waterman joined the adoption of Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code.41 He stated that it correctly reflects current understanding of the determinants of conduct.42 Modern beliefs validated by empirical studies require the judiciary to modernize judge-made rules relating intent-activation to conduct.
This continues the process of judicial adaptation to new discoveries. He concurred for the time being while noting that further judicial emendation may prove necessary as the scope of expert inquiry into the control of conduct continues to advance.43
Whether the defendant adequately preserved for appeal his objection to the application of the M'Naghten test at trial?44
An objection is preserved when the colloquy between counsel and the court sufficiently enlightens the trial judge as to the point raised, even without elaborate offers of proof, particularly when further showing would have been futile given the court's announced adherence to existing precedent.45
Yes. The court found the objection preserved because defense counsel inquired whether Freeman would be considered responsible under a strict interpretation of M'Naghten.46 When the government objected, Judge Tenney immediately declared that the court was following the M'Naghten rule in this case.47 Counsel then promptly agreed to restrict his questions to that standard.48
This exchange made clear that counsel sought to elicit evidence relevant under broader tests and that the judge understood the issue being raised, rendering further offers of proof an exercise in futility.49
The defendant adequately preserved for appeal his objection to the application of the M'Naghten test at trial.50
Whether statements made by the defendant to federal agents after his arrest were properly admitted into evidence?51
Admissibility of post-arrest statements made without counsel must be resolved ad hoc on the particular facts, considering whether the statements responded to interrogation, any requests for counsel and their denial, the accused's mental condition, and the surrounding circumstances and atmosphere.52
No. The court declined to decide whether the statements were properly admitted into evidence at this time.53 The facts differ materially from prior cases because Freeman made disclosures in response to interrogation after an alleged denial of permission to call counsel on three occasions.54 His questioned mental condition noted in the psychiatric reports may be a further distinguishing feature that the trial judge should weigh on remand.55
It is unnecessary to decide whether the statements were properly admitted into evidence at this time.56