480 U.S. 294 (1987)
In 1980 DEA agents investigating Robert Lyle Carpenter's purchases of chemicals and equipment used to manufacture amphetamine and phenylacetone installed beeper tracking devices in several items and followed signals to a 198-acre ranch in the Cedar Creek area of Austin, Texas, owned by respondent Ronald Dale Dunn.1 The ranch was completely encircled by a perimeter fence with several interior fences of posts and barbed wire; the ranch residence and a small greenhouse were surrounded by their own fence, while two barns stood approximately 50 yards outside that fence, the larger barn featuring a wooden fence enclosing its front, locked waist-high wooden gates, and netting material stretched from the ceiling to the top of the gates.2
On the evening of November 5, 1980, agents crossed the perimeter fence and one interior fence without a warrant, smelled phenylacetic acid coming from the direction of the barns, crossed additional barbed-wire and wooden fences to reach the larger barn, stood under its overhang at the locked gate, and used a flashlight to peer through the netting, observing what appeared to be a phenylacetone laboratory; they returned twice on November 6 to confirm the observations.3
On November 6 a federal magistrate issued a search warrant, and on November 8 agents executed it, arrested Dunn and Carpenter, and seized chemicals, equipment, and bags of amphetamines from the barn and ranch house.4 The District Court denied Dunn's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entries and he was convicted of conspiracy and related drug offenses.5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction in 1982, holding the barn within the curtilage. After the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States, the Fifth Circuit first altered its reasoning to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn. It then recalled its judgment and ultimately reinstated the original 1982 opinion concluding the barn lay inside the curtilage. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.6
Whether the area near a barn located approximately 50 yards from a fence surrounding a ranch house is within the curtilage of the house for Fourth Amendment purposes?7
The Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house but not open fields.8 Curtilage questions are resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.9 The central consideration is whether the area harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.10
No. Applying the four factors to the established facts shows that the barn area is not within the curtilage.11 The barn was located 50 yards from the house's fence and 60 yards from the house itself. This substantial distance supports no inference of curtilage status.12 The barn did not lie within the fence surrounding the house. It stood as a distinct portion of the ranch separate from the residence.13 Objective data indicated the barn was not used for intimate home activities. Aerial photographs showed a truck backed up to the barn. Agents smelled strong odors of phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running upon approach.14
Respondent did little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the open fields. The interior fences served only to corral livestock rather than to shield the area from view.15
The barn and the area around it lay outside the curtilage of the house, and the DEA agents' entry onto the property and their observation through the window of the barn did not violate the Fourth Amendment.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion except for the paragraph headed Third in Part II.17 He argued that it is not especially significant that the law enforcement officials possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home.18 What is significant is that the barn was not being so used, whether or not the law enforcement officials knew it.
The officers' perceptions might be relevant to whether intrusion upon curtilage was nevertheless reasonable. But they are no more relevant to whether the barn was curtilage than to whether the house was a house.19
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, arguing that the barnyard invaded by the agents lay within the protected curtilage of Dunn's farmhouse and that the agents infringed upon Dunn's reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn and its contents.20 He contended that the majority's application of the four-factor test overlooked the role a barn plays in rural life. The majority ignored extensive state and federal authority holding that a barn clustered with other outbuildings near the residence is part of the curtilage.21
Brennan further maintained that the typical use of a barn is domestic. Evidence gathered after the intrusion is irrelevant. Dunn took elaborate measures to ensure privacy by locking gates and covering the front with netting.
Looking into the barn from a vantage point inaccessible to the public invaded a reasonable privacy interest.22