312 U.S. 100, 312 U.S. 657
The United States secured an indictment against appellee in the district court for southern Georgia.1 It charged him with violation of section 15(a)(1), (2) and (5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.2
The indictment alleged that appellee, in the State of Georgia, is engaged in acquiring raw materials which he manufactures into finished lumber with the intent, when manufactured, to ship it in interstate commerce to customers outside the State.3 He does in fact so ship a large part of the lumber so produced.4
There are counts charging the shipment in interstate commerce from Georgia to points outside the State of lumber in the production of which appellee employed workmen at less than the prescribed minimum wage or in excess of the prescribed maximum hours without payment of overtime.5 Other counts charge the employment by appellee of workmen in the production of lumber for interstate commerce at wages of less than 25 cents an hour or for more than the maximum hours per week without payment of the prescribed overtime wage.6 Still another count charges appellee with failure to keep records showing the hours worked each day and week by each of his employees as required by section 11(c) and the regulations of the administrator.7
Appellee demurred to the indictment.8 The district court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment.9 The case comes here on direct appeal under the statutes authorizing review when the judgment sustaining the demurrer is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded.10
The case was argued on December 19 and 20, 1940 and decided on February 3, 1941, as amended February 17, 1941.11
Whether Congress has constitutional power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum, or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage exceed a prescribed maximum?12
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed by the Constitution.13 Congress may prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of articles produced under substandard labor conditions even if the motive or consequence is to restrict use within the states of destination.14
Yes. The prohibition of shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the constitutional authority of Congress.15 The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to make effective the Congressional conception of public policy.16 Interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, a competition injurious to the commerce and to the States.17 The United States obtained an indictment against the appellee in the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia charging violations of sections 15(a)(1), (2), and (5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.18 The indictment alleged that the appellee manufactured lumber in Georgia with intent to ship it interstate and did ship a large part of it.19
Counts charged shipment of lumber produced with employees paid below the minimum wage or working excess hours without overtime.20 The district court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. The Supreme Court granted review on direct appeal and reversed.21
Congress possesses the constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit such shipments.22
Whether Congress has power to prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods for interstate commerce at other than prescribed wages and hours?23
The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to those intrastate activities which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power over it as to make regulation of them an appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end.24 Where the effect is substantial, Congress may legislate to regulate or prohibit those intrastate activities.25
Yes. The means adopted by section 15(a)(2) are so related to interstate commerce and so affect it as to be within the reach of the commerce power.26 Congress recognized that competition by a small part may affect the whole and that the aggregate effect of many small producers may be great.27 The appellee was engaged in acquiring raw materials which he manufactured into finished lumber with the intent when manufactured to ship it in interstate commerce to customers outside the State.28 He did in fact so ship a large part of the lumber so produced.29
The indictment charged employment of workmen in the production of lumber for interstate commerce at wages of less than 25 cents an hour or for more than the maximum hours per week without payment of the prescribed overtime wage.30 The obvious purpose of the Act was not only to prevent the interstate transportation of the proscribed product but to stop the initial step toward transportation.31
Congress has power to prohibit such employment under the Commerce Clause.32
Whether, in connection with such prohibitions, Congress can require the employer subject to them to keep records showing the hours worked each day and week by each of his employees, including those engaged in the production and manufacture of goods, to wit, lumber, for interstate commerce?33
Since Congress may require production for interstate commerce to conform to wage and hour conditions, it may require the employer as a means of enforcing the law to keep records showing whether he has in fact complied with it.3435 The requirement for records even of intrastate transactions is an appropriate means to the legitimate end.36
Yes. Sections 15(a)(5) and 11(c) require records of wages and hours as an incident to the wage and hour provisions.37 Congress may require production for interstate commerce to conform to those conditions.38 It may require the employer as a means of enforcing the law to keep records showing whether he has in fact complied with it. The indictment contained a count charging appellee with failure to keep records showing the hours worked each day and week by each of his employees as required by section 11(c) and the regulations of the administrator.39 It alleged that appellee unlawfully failed to keep such records of employees engaged in the production and manufacture of goods to wit lumber for interstate commerce.40
The district court quashed the indictment in its entirety upon the broad grounds that the Act is unconstitutional.41
Congress may require such record-keeping as an appropriate means to enforce the wage and hour provisions.42