433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977)
On May 8, 1973, Amtrak railroad officials in San Diego observed respondents Gregory Machado and Bridget Leary load a brown footlocker onto a train bound for Boston.1 Their suspicions were aroused when they noticed that the trunk was unusually heavy for its size, and that it was leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor of marihuana or hashish.2 Because Machado matched a profile used to spot drug traffickers, the railroad officials reported these circumstances to federal agents in San Diego, who in turn relayed the information, together with detailed descriptions of Machado and the footlocker, to their counterparts in Boston.3
When the train arrived in Boston two days later, federal narcotics agents were on hand.4 Though the officers had not obtained an arrest or search warrant, they had with them a police dog trained to detect marihuana.5 The agents identified Machado and Leary and kept them under surveillance as they claimed their suitcases and the footlocker, which had been transported by baggage cart from the train to the departure area.6 Machado and Leary lifted the footlocker from the baggage cart, placed it on the floor and sat down on it.7
The agents then released the dog near the footlocker.8 Without alerting respondents, the dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance inside.9 Respondent Chadwick then joined Machado and Leary, and they engaged an attendant to move the footlocker outside to Chadwick’s waiting automobile.10 Machado, Chadwick, and the attendant together lifted the 200-pound footlocker into the trunk of the car, while Leary waited in the front seat.11 At that point, while the trunk of the car was still open and before the car engine had been started, the officers arrested all three.12 A search disclosed no weapons, but the keys to the footlocker were apparently taken from Machado.13
Respondents were taken to the Federal Building in Boston; the agents followed with Chadwick’s car and the footlocker.14 As the Government concedes, from the moment of respondents’ arrests at about 9 p. m., the footlocker remained under the exclusive control of law enforcement officers at all times.15 The footlocker and luggage were placed in the Federal Building, where, as one of the agents later testified, “there was no risk that whatever was contained in the footlocker trunk would be removed by the defendants or their associates.”16 At the Federal Building an hour and a half after the arrests, the agents opened the footlocker and luggage.17 They did not obtain respondents’ consent; they did not secure a search warrant.18 Large amounts of marihuana were found in the footlocker.19
Respondents were indicted for possession of marihuana with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841 (a) (1), and for conspiracy, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846.20 Before trial, they moved to suppress the marihuana obtained from the footlocker.21 The District Court rejected the Government's justifications for the warrantless search.22 A divided Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the suppression of the seized marihuana.23 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 814 (1976).24
Whether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open a locked footlocker that they have lawfully seized at the time of the arrest of its owners, when there is probable cause to believe the footlocker contains contraband?25
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy.26 It generally requires a judicial warrant for the search of personal property such as a locked footlocker, even when the property has been lawfully seized with probable cause.27 Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a carefully delineated exception such as exigent circumstances or a search incident to arrest under Chimel v. California.28
Yes. The agents had probable cause to believe the footlocker contained contraband and lawfully seized the 200-pound double-locked footlocker at the time of the arrests.29 The subsequent search occurred an hour and a half later at the Federal Building after the footlocker had been reduced to the exclusive control of law enforcement officers.30 There was no risk that its contents could be removed or destroyed by respondents or their associates.31
The double-locked footlocker manifested a clear expectation of privacy in its contents as a repository of personal effects.32 That expectation is substantially greater than the diminished privacy interest associated with automobiles.33 No exigent circumstances existed that would have made obtaining a warrant impracticable.34 The search was too remote in time and place to qualify as incident to arrest under the Chimel standard because the respondents were securely in custody and could not access the footlocker.35
A search warrant was required, the warrantless search of the footlocker was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and the judgment affirming suppression of the evidence is affirmed.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to underscore that the Government’s extreme position limiting the Warrant Clause to dwellings was deeply distressing.37 The Department of Justice should not appear to subvert constitutional liberties by advancing such arguments.38 He further observed that the alternative courses suggested by the dissent were not obviously constitutional under existing precedent.39
This was particularly true given the heavy, securely locked nature of the footlocker and the limited immediate-control area recognized in Chimel.40
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice Rehnquist.41 He contended that the Court should adopt a clear rule permitting warrantless searches of any movable property seized from a person lawfully arrested in a public place.42 Drawing on United States v. Robinson and automobile-search precedents, he argued that custodial arrest itself justifies the lesser invasion of searching containers in the arrestee’s possession.43
Practical considerations make obtaining a warrant unnecessary in most cases.44 The majority’s approach produces fortuitous outcomes depending on the precise timing of the arrest, thereby complicating rather than clarifying Fourth Amendment doctrine for law enforcement.45