444 U.S. 394 (1980)
In the early morning hours of August 26, 1976, respondents Clifford Bailey, James T. Cogdell, Ronald C. Cooley, and Ralph Walker, federal prisoners at the District of Columbia jail, crawled through a window from which a bar had been removed, slid down a knotted bedsheet, and escaped from custody.1 Federal authorities recaptured them after they had remained at large for a period of time ranging from one month to three and one-half months.2
Respondents' defense of duress or necessity centered on the conditions in the jail during the months of June, July, and August 1976, and on various threats and beatings directed at them during that period.3 The prosecution's case in chief against Bailey, Cooley, and Walker established that each respondent was in federal custody on August 26, 1976, that they had disappeared apparently through a cell window at approximately 5:35 a.m. on that date, and that they had been apprehended individually between September 27 and December 13, 1976.4 Respondents introduced evidence of frequent fires in the maximum-security cellblock, beatings and threats of death directed at Cooley and Bailey by guards, and inadequate medical attention for Walker's epilepsy.5
Respondent Cooley, who had eluded the authorities for one month, testified that his people had tried to contact the authorities but never got in touch with anybody and that the FBI would kill him when he was apprehended.6 Respondent Bailey, who was apprehended on November 19, 1976, stated that he had the jail officials called several times but did not turn himself in because he would still be under the threats of death and the FBI was telling his people that they were going to shoot him.7 Respondent Walker, apprehended on December 13, 1976, testified that he called the FBI three times, that an agent assured him the FBI would not harm him but could not promise he would not be returned to the D.C. jail, and that he last called in mid-October.8 Respondent Cogdell offered no testimony on his post-escape conduct beyond a possible assertion that he may have written letters.9
The District Court refused to submit to the jury any instructions on respondents' defense of duress or necessity.10 It did not charge the jury that escape was a continuing offense.11 The court ruled that respondents had failed as a matter of law to present evidence sufficient to support such a defense because they had not turned themselves in after they had escaped the allegedly coercive conditions.12 After receiving instructions to disregard the evidence of the conditions in the jail, the jury convicted Bailey, Cooley, and Walker of violating 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).13 Two months later Cogdell was convicted by a separate jury after the District Court ruled he could not present evidence of conditions at the jail absent testimony as to what he did after escape.14 By a divided vote the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed each respondent's conviction and remanded for new trials.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) requires the prosecution to prove that an escapee acted with the purpose of avoiding confinement?17
Section 751(a) requires the prosecution to prove only that an escapee knew his actions would result in leaving physical confinement without permission. The statute imposes no heightened mens rea of purpose to avoid confinement, consistent with the general rule that knowing conduct suffices for most crimes unless Congress specifies otherwise.18
No. The established facts demonstrate that respondents Bailey, Cooley, and Walker were in federal custody on August 26, 1976, disappeared through a cell window at approximately 5:35 a.m., and were later recaptured individually, while the district court instructed the juries that the government had to prove respondents knowingly and intentionally committed the act.19 These facts satisfy the knowledge element under the statute without any need to show purpose to avoid normal confinement conditions.20
The prosecution fulfills its burden under § 751(a) by demonstrating knowing departure from custody, so the Court of Appeals erred in imposing an additional purpose requirement.21
Whether a defendant, asserting a defense of duress or necessity to a charge of escape, must proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force?22
A defendant charged with escape who claims duress or necessity must offer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity lost its coercive force. Escape is a continuing offense and the absence of a reasonable legal alternative defeats the defense.23
Yes. The established facts show that respondent Cooley remained at large for one month with only vague reports that his people tried to contact authorities, respondent Bailey stayed out until November 19 with similar indirect contacts and expressed ongoing fear, respondent Walker last called the FBI in mid-October yet was not recaptured until December 13, and respondent Cogdell offered no testimony beyond a possible assertion that he may have written letters.24 None of these facts meets the minimum threshold of a bona fide surrender effort once any immediate threat ended.25
Because respondents failed to proffer the required evidence of a surrender effort, the district court properly withheld the duress or necessity defense from the juries.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender was plainly insufficient for Cooley, Bailey, and Cogdell. Vague references to anonymous intermediaries are so inherently incredible that a trial judge is entitled to ignore them. With respect to Walker, however, the question was much closer because he testified that he personally telephoned an FBI agent three times in an effort to negotiate a surrender.27
But since he remained at large for about two months after his last effort to speak with the FBI, Stevens was persuaded that even under his version of the facts Walker did not make an adequate attempt to satisfy the return requirement.28 Stevens joined the Court's construction of the federal escape statute while noting that prison conditions are more apt to prevail in state or county facilities.29
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Blackmun disagreed that the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force. The conditions that led to respondents' initial departure from the D.C. jail continue unabated. It is too much to demand that respondents return forthwith to the hell that obviously exceeds the normal deprivations of prison life and that compelled their leaving in the first instance.30
The escapee at least should be permitted to present to the jury the possibility that the harm that would result from a return to custody outweighs the harm to society from continued absence.31 Even under the Court's own standard, the defendant in an escape prosecution should be permitted to submit evidence to the jury to demonstrate that surrender would result in his being placed again in a life- or health-threatening situation.32 The very essence of a jury issue is a dispute over the credibility of testimony by interested witnesses and the meaning of ambiguous actions.33
Whether escape from federal custody under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) constitutes a continuing offense?34
Escape from federal custody under § 751(a) is a continuing offense. An escapee remains liable for failure to return to custody as well as for the initial departure, given the ongoing threat to society and the tolling of the statute of limitations while the escapee is at large.35
Yes. The established facts establish that each respondent left custody on August 26, 1976, and remained at large for periods ranging from one month to three and one-half months before recapture, with the indictment charging flight and escape on or about that date. These facts support treating the offense as continuing, so the district court's failure to instruct on that theory did not prejudice respondents whose evidence on surrender was legally insufficient anyway.36
Escape under § 751(a) is a continuing offense, and the Court of Appeals erred in finding a constitutional violation from the absence of such an instruction on these facts.37