427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976)
On September 24, 1971, at about 4:30 p.m., respondent Linda Agurs, who had been to the motel before, and James Sewell registered as man and wife and were assigned a room without a bath.1
Sewell was wearing a bowie knife in a sheath and carried another knife in his pocket. Less than two hours earlier he had possessed $360 in cash according to his estranged wife.2 About fifteen minutes later three motel employees heard Agurs screaming for help, forced entry into the room, and found Sewell on top of Agurs struggling for possession of the bowie knife with his bleeding hand grasping the blade while she held the knife.3
The employees separated the two, summoned authorities, and Agurs departed without comment before they arrived. Sewell was dead on arrival at the hospital.4 Circumstantial evidence indicated the parties had completed an act of intercourse, Sewell had gone to the bathroom down the hall, and the struggle occurred upon his return, with the contents of his pockets in disarray on the dresser and no money found.5
The following morning Agurs surrendered to the police. She received a physical examination revealing no cuts or bruises except needle marks on her upper arm. An autopsy of Sewell disclosed several deep stab wounds in his chest and abdomen plus defensive wounds on his arms and hands.6 At trial Agurs offered no evidence and her sole defense was the argument that Sewell had initially attacked her with the knife, supported by her screams for help, Sewell's position on top of her when help arrived, and his possession of two knives. The jury convicted her of second-degree murder after about twenty-five minutes of deliberation.7
Three months later defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial asserting discovery of Sewell's prior criminal record, including a 1963 guilty plea to assault and carrying a deadly weapon and a 1971 guilty plea to carrying a deadly weapon, both involving knives, which the prosecutor had not disclosed to the defense.8 The district court denied the motion after assuming the evidence was admissible but finding it not sufficiently material.9 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding the evidence material and requiring a new trial.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.11
Whether the prosecutor's failure to provide defense counsel with background information about the victim's prior criminal record deprived the defendant of a fair trial under Brady v. Maryland when the defense made no request for the material?12
Under the Due Process Clause, the prosecutor has a constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment.13 In cases involving no specific defense request, the evidence is material only if it creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist when evaluated in the context of the entire record.14
No. The established facts establish the following sequence.15
On September 24, 1971, at about 4:30 p.m., respondent Linda Agurs and James Sewell registered at a motel as man and wife in a room without a bath.16
Sewell carried a bowie knife in a sheath and another knife in his pocket, and he had possessed $360 in cash shortly before according to his estranged wife.17
About fifteen minutes later, motel employees heard Agurs screaming for help, forced entry, and found Sewell on top of Agurs struggling over the bowie knife with his bleeding hand grasping the blade while she held it.18
The employees separated them, Agurs left without comment, and Sewell was pronounced dead at the hospital.19
Circumstantial evidence showed the couple had completed intercourse, Sewell had gone to the bathroom down the hall, and the struggle began upon his return, with his pockets' contents disarrayed on the dresser and no money present.20
The next morning Agurs surrendered. Her examination showed only needle marks on her arm, while Sewell's autopsy revealed multiple deep stab wounds to the chest and abdomen plus defensive wounds on his arms and hands.21
At trial Agurs presented no evidence and argued self-defense solely on the basis of her screams, Sewell's position atop her when help arrived, and his possession of two knives.22
The jury convicted her of second-degree murder after roughly twenty-five minutes of deliberation.23
Three months later defense counsel moved for a new trial on the ground that Sewell's undisclosed prior convictions for assault and carrying deadly weapons, both involving knives, constituted material exculpatory evidence of his violent character.24
The district court assumed admissibility yet denied the motion, finding the record cumulative of the two knives already in evidence and inconsistent with Sewell's multiple wounds against Agurs's unscathed condition.25
The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court applied the materiality standard to the full record and concluded that the omitted convictions created no reasonable doubt.26
The trial judge's firsthand appraisal that guilt remained clear beyond a reasonable doubt was thorough and reasonable because the prior record added nothing of consequence to the violence already shown by the knives and the wound pattern.27
Therefore the nondisclosure did not deprive Agurs of a fair trial.28
The prosecutor's failure to disclose Sewell's prior criminal record did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial under the Due Process Clause.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the majority's materiality standard is too severe.30 It effectively equates prosecutorial withholding with evidence newly discovered from a neutral source.31 He argued that the defendant should prevail upon showing a significant chance that skilled counsel could have used the withheld evidence to induce reasonable doubt in enough jurors to avoid conviction.32
In his view the majority's rule usurps the jury's role by letting the judge decide whether the evidence actually creates doubt in the judge's own mind.33 This approach reduces the prosecutor's special obligation to serve justice to no special significance.34
Whether the significance of the defense counsel's failure to request the material affects the prosecutor's constitutional duty to volunteer exculpatory information?35
A specific defense request gives the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desires. Nondisclosure is seldom excusable if the subject matter is material. The absence of any request or the making of only a general request for Brady material does not alter the prosecutor's underlying constitutional duty. That duty arises whenever the evidence is obviously exculpatory.36
No. The established facts show that defense counsel made no request whatever for Sewell's criminal record.3738 The prior convictions were not obviously exculpatory on their face.39 They added only marginally to the evidence of Sewell's violent character already before the jury.40 Therefore the prosecutor's duty was not triggered in a manner that would require disclosure.41
The defense counsel's failure to request the material does not change the prosecutor's constitutional duty, which remains governed by the materiality standard applied to the entire record.42
Whether the standard by which the prosecution's failure to volunteer exculpatory material should be judged requires reversal of the conviction in this case?43
The proper standard of materiality for undisclosed exculpatory evidence in the absence of a specific request or prosecutorial misconduct is whether the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist when viewed in the context of the entire record. If the trial judge remains convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt after considering the evidence, reversal is not required.44
No. Applying that standard to the established facts, the district court evaluated Sewell's prior record against the full trial evidence, including the multiple stab wounds inflicted on Sewell while Agurs sustained no cuts or bruises and the quick jury verdict.45 The court concluded that the record was cumulative and did not undermine the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.46 The Supreme Court accepted that appraisal as reasonable and therefore held that the nondisclosure did not meet the constitutional threshold for reversal.47
The standard of materiality applied to the entire record does not require reversal of the conviction.48