481 U.S. 412 (1987)
The Federal Government sued real estate developer Edward L. Tull for dumping fill material without a permit on wetlands adjacent to navigable waters on Chincoteague Island, Virginia.1
The original complaint alleged violations at three sites: Ocean Breeze Mobile Homes Sites, Mire Pond Properties, and Eel Creek.2 The Government later amended the complaint to allege additional fill placement in a manmade waterway named Fowling Gut Extended on the Ocean Breeze property.3
The Government sought temporary or permanent injunctive relief and civil penalties not to exceed $10,000 per day during the period of violation, demanding a maximum of $22,890,000.4 When the complaint was filed, almost all of the property at issue had been sold by Tull to third parties, rendering injunctive relief impractical except with regard to a small portion of the land.5
Tull made a timely demand for a trial by jury, which the District Court denied.6 The court then conducted a 15-day bench trial.7 Tull did not dispute that he had placed fill at the locations alleged and did not deny his failure to obtain a permit, but he contended that the property in question did not constitute wetlands, presenting triable issues of fact through disputes between experts on the composition and nature of the fillings.8
The District Court concluded that Tull had illegally filled wetland areas on all properties in question and imposed civil penalties of $35,000 for the Ocean Breeze Mobile Homes Sites, $35,000 for the Mire Pond Properties, $5,000 for Eel Creek, and a suspended $250,000 fine conditioned on restoration of Fowling Gut Extended, along with separate injunctive relief on portions still owned by Tull.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment over a dissent.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the jury trial question and a conflict between circuits.11
Whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial on liability in an action by the Federal Government seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act?12
The Seventh Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury in suits at common law.13 To determine whether a statutory cause of action requires a jury trial, courts compare the action to 18th-century English actions in courts of law versus equity and examine whether the remedy is legal or equitable in nature.14 Civil penalty actions were historically treated as actions in debt triable by jury in courts of law.15 Remedies that punish culpable conduct rather than merely restore the status quo are legal remedies available only in courts of law.16
Yes. The Clean Water Act action for civil penalties is analogous to an action in debt, a common-law form tried in courts of law that required a jury.17 The remedy authorized by 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) is punitive. It authorizes consideration of retribution and deterrence in addition to restitution.
This is shown when the District Court imposed fines despite Tull realizing no profit on the Mire Pond and Eel Creek properties. Although the subject matter resembles public nuisance, the legal character of the penalty remedy controls, so the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial on liability.18
The Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial on liability.19
Whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial on the amount of civil penalties in such an action?20
Although the Seventh Amendment requires a jury for determining liability in actions for civil penalties, it does not require a jury to determine the amount of the penalty.21 The assessment of civil penalties is not a fundamental element of the jury trial right preserved by the Seventh Amendment.22 Congress may delegate the highly discretionary calculation of penalties to trial judges because Congress itself may fix penalties by statute.23
No. The determination of the amount of civil penalties is traditionally performed by judges and does not involve the substance of the common-law right to jury trial.24 Congress intended judges to perform the calculations under the Clean Water Act after liability is established, taking into account multiple factors such as the seriousness of violations, prior violations, good-faith efforts, and economic impact.25 Since the jury right on liability is preserved but the penalty amount is for the court, no jury is required for the amount.26
The Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a right to a jury trial on the amount of civil penalties.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joins the disposition and Parts I and II regarding liability but dissents from Part III on the penalty amount.28 He maintains that the right to a jury trial on whether a civil penalty of unspecified amount is assessable necessarily includes the right to jury determination of the amount itself.29 The fact that Congress could have fixed the amount by statute does not permit removing the amount question from the jury when Congress chooses not to fix it.30
He observes that even punitive damages are assessed by the jury once liability is found and that the proper common-law analogue remains an action for debt in which the jury decides the sum.31 Scalia concludes that the Government, having elected civil proceedings, must accept jury assessment of the amount and would reverse for jury determination of both liability and penalty amount.32