372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1963)
In December 1953 Jack Boone was murdered in Chicago.1
On January 1 1954 Charles Townsend a nineteen-year-old heroin addict was arrested by Chicago police shortly after 2 a.m. on information supplied by another suspect in custody.2 Townsend had injected heroin approximately ninety minutes before his arrest.3 He was taken to the second district station questioned for up to two hours and denied involvement.4
Later that evening after complaining of withdrawal symptoms a police doctor administered an injection containing one-eighth grain of phenobarbital and one-two-hundred-thirtieth grain of hyoscine at about 9:45 p.m.5 After the injection Townsend was questioned for about twenty-five minutes and then gave a statement confessing to the Boone murder and other crimes.6 The statement was transcribed by a court reporter beginning around 11:15 p.m.7 Townsend signed a transcription of the statement the following afternoon at the prosecutor's office.8 On January 4 he testified at a coroner's inquest and again admitted involvement in the Boone killing.9
At trial in 1955 Townsend moved to suppress the confession on the ground that it was involuntary.10 The trial judge held a hearing outside the jury's presence at which prosecution and defense witnesses gave sharply conflicting accounts of Townsend's condition after the injection and of the events surrounding the confession.11 The judge denied the motion to suppress and admitted the transcribed statement into evidence.12 Additional evidence on the same issues was presented to the jury.13 The jury convicted Townsend of murder and fixed the penalty at death.14 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.15
Townsend sought post-conviction relief in state court which was denied without an evidentiary hearing.16 After exhausting state remedies he filed a federal habeas petition in the Northern District of Illinois.17 The district court denied the writ without a hearing relying on the state-court record.18 The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari vacated the judgment and remanded.20 On remand the district court again denied relief without a hearing and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.21
Whether a confession induced by the administration of a drug having the properties of a truth serum is constitutionally inadmissible?22
The legal rule is that if an individual's will was overborne or if his confession was not the product of a rational intellect and a free will, the confession is inadmissible because it is coerced.23 These standards apply whether the confession is the product of physical intimidation or psychological pressure and are equally applicable to a drug-induced statement.24 It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession would be less the product of a free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having the effect of a truth serum.25
Yes. The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the injection of hyoscine, identical to scopolamine and known as a truth serum, caused Townsend to confess after the police doctor administered the combined dosage of phenobarbital and hyoscine to alleviate withdrawal symptoms.26 The established facts show that Townsend, a nineteen-year-old heroin addict who had injected heroin ninety minutes before arrest, complained of stomach pains and withdrawal at about nine o'clock, received the injection at nine forty-five, and within an hour gave a transcribed confession to the Boone murder beginning around eleven fifteen.27 Medical testimony established that the dosage could range between drowsiness and complete disorientation with partial or total amnesia for five to eight hours.28
Because the confession was brought about by a drug having the effect of a truth serum, it was not the product of a free will and therefore constitutionally inadmissible.29
A confession induced by the administration of a drug having the properties of a truth serum is constitutionally inadmissible.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Goldberg joined the opinion and added that the instructions given to the jury on credibility reflected an improper constitutional standard because they required loss of memory in addition to an overborne will before the confession could be disregarded.31 He noted that the trial judge's apparent view that inducement of amnesia was a prerequisite to disregard of the confession constituted error of constitutional dimension, and that the state appellate court's coherency test similarly failed to conform to the requisite test of whether the drug overbore the petitioner's will.32
Whether a federal district court must hold an evidentiary hearing in habeas corpus when the state trier of fact did not reliably find the facts after a full hearing?33
The legal rule is that where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.34 A federal evidentiary hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found the facts. The federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing if the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing, if the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole, if the fact-finding procedure was not adequate, if there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence, if the material facts were not adequately developed, or if for any reason the state trier of fact did not afford a full and fair fact hearing.35
Yes. Townsend received an evidentiary hearing at his original trial on the motion to suppress but the state trial judge rendered neither an opinion, conclusions of law, nor findings of fact and made no charge to the jury setting forth the constitutional standards governing admissibility of confessions.36 The established facts show that the Illinois Supreme Court opinion on direct appeal contained statements suggesting a coherency standard rather than the proper test of whether the confession was the product of a rational intellect and free will.37 Because the state trier made no express findings and the record does not reliably indicate application of correct constitutional standards, the federal district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing to ascertain the facts necessary to decide the ultimate constitutional question.38
A federal district court must hold an evidentiary hearing in habeas corpus when the state trier of fact did not reliably find the facts after a full hearing.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Clark, Harlan, And White
Justice Stewart dissented and stated that he strongly doubted the wisdom of cataloguing in advance a set of standards to compel district judges to grant evidentiary hearings.40 He argued that even under the standards elaborated by the Court, a de novo evidentiary hearing was not required in this case because the state proceedings clearly showed that the petitioner received a full and fair hearing on the factual foundation for his constitutional claim, with three medical experts and seventeen lay witnesses testifying on the properties of the drug and the circumstances of the confession.41
Whether the district court erred in denying Townsend's habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts regarding the circumstances and effects of the injection administered before his confession?42
The legal rule is that where an unresolved factual dispute exists, demeanor evidence is a significant factor in adjudging credibility, and questions of credibility are basic to resolution of conflicts in testimony.43 On the remand the district court must not merely hear new evidence and read the state-court record but must give the petitioner and the State the opportunity to present other testimonial and documentary evidence relevant to the disputed issues.44 A crucial fact not disclosed at the state-court hearing was that the substance injected has properties which may trigger statements in a legal sense involuntary, and this fact was vital to whether the confession was the product of a free will.45
Yes. The district court denied the petition without a hearing even though the parties disputed whether hyoscine is a truth serum, whether the police doctor willfully suppressed information about its identity and effects, and whether the injection caused Townsend to confess.46 The established facts show that prosecution witnesses testified Townsend appeared awake and coherent while defense witnesses described dizziness, sleepiness, and impaired vision after the injection, and that the identity of hyoscine with scopolamine and its characterization as a truth serum were not disclosed at the suppression hearing.47 Because the state trial judge made no findings and a crucial fact about the drug's properties was not developed, the district court erred in denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing.48
The district court erred in denying Townsend's habeas petition without an evidentiary hearing on the disputed facts regarding the circumstances and effects of the injection administered before his confession.49