411 U.S. 258, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1973)
In 1948 respondent Henderson, a twenty-year-old Black man whose formal education had ended at the sixth grade, was arrested in Davidson County, Tennessee, along with two others for the robbery of a Nashville liquor store and the attempted murder of an employee who was shot during the episode.1 Three weeks later the employee died, and a Davidson County grand jury returned a first-degree murder indictment against Henderson.2 Henderson signed a confession admitting his involvement in the robbery and shooting, though he had no attorney present when he signed it.3
Henderson's mother retained counsel to represent him in the criminal proceeding.4 The attorney's major effort was directed toward arranging a plea bargain under which Henderson would plead guilty to the murder charge and a petit jury would impose a sentence of ninety-nine years rather than the death penalty.5 Although Henderson initially expressed a desire to plead not guilty, he ultimately decided on the advice of counsel to enter the guilty plea, and the agreed-upon sentence was imposed.6
Many years later, after unsuccessful federal habeas petitions raising claims of a coerced confession and ineffective assistance of counsel, Henderson filed a state habeas petition alleging for the first time that Negroes had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him in 1948.7 After proceedings in the Tennessee trial and appellate courts, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Henderson had waived his claim by failing to raise it before pleading to the indictment.8
Henderson then filed the present petition for federal habeas corpus in United States District Court, asserting the denial of his constitutional right by reason of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from grand jury service.9 The State effectively conceded that such systematic exclusion had existed, and the District Court so found.10 At a state hearing, Henderson testified that his lawyer had not informed him of his constitutional rights with respect to the composition of the grand jury. He did not know how the grand jury was selected or that Negroes were systematically excluded. His attorney had not told him that he could challenge the indictment or that failure to challenge it would preclude him from later raising the issue.11 An unchallenged affidavit from the attorney who represented Henderson in 1948 stated that counsel did not know as a matter of fact that Negroes were systematically excluded from the Davidson County grand jury, and that therefore there had been no occasion to advise Henderson of any rights he had as to the composition or method of selection of that body.12
On the basis of this evidence, the Court of Appeals held that the record demonstrated no such waiver of constitutional rights as that term was defined in Johnson v. Zerbst. The court affirmed the District Court's order releasing Henderson from custody.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a state prisoner, pleading guilty with the advice of counsel, may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus by proving only that the indictment to which he pleaded was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand jury.14
Whether a state prisoner, pleading guilty with the advice of counsel, may later obtain release through federal habeas corpus by proving only that the indictment to which he pleaded was returned by an unconstitutionally selected grand jury?15
A guilty plea that is voluntarily and intelligently entered on the advice of counsel forecloses independent inquiry into antecedent constitutional violations such as discriminatory grand jury selection.16 The defendant may attack the plea only by showing that counsel's advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.17
No. Henderson entered a guilty plea on the advice of counsel who did not know that Negroes were systematically excluded from the Davidson County grand jury.18 Counsel therefore did not advise him of any rights regarding the composition of that body.19 The Court concludes that the guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.20 Henderson may not raise the grand jury claim independently.21
He must instead demonstrate that the advice to plead guilty fell outside the McMann standard of competence.22
A state prisoner who pleads guilty with the advice of counsel may not obtain release through federal habeas corpus by proving only that the indicting grand jury was unconstitutionally selected.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Douglas And Brennan
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissents from the majority's extension of the Brady trilogy to this situation.24 He argues that the guilty plea trilogy was premised on a notion of bargain and exchange.25 The defendant, with the help of counsel, must rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages of pleading guilty.26 Yet here the attorney never presented to Henderson the possibility of challenging the grand jury composition to secure a more favorable bargain.27 Marshall stresses that the facts establishing the constitutional violation were easily ascertainable with little inquiry.28 No Negroes had served on the grand jury and racial designations appeared on the lists.29 This made the attorney's failure to consider or consult on this claim fall below the standard of competence.30
He would affirm the Court of Appeals.31 Henderson demonstrated entitlement to relief on grounds of voluntariness and effective assistance of counsel.32 The majority's inflexible rule disregards the particular facts and circumstances of each case as required by Johnson v. Zerbst.33