475 U.S. 134, 106 S. Ct. 976, 89 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1986)
In 1980, Sanford James McCullough was tried before a jury in the Randall County, Texas, District Court and convicted of murder.1 McCullough elected to be sentenced by the jury, as was his right under Texas law.2 The jury imposed a 20-year sentence.3 Judge Naomi Harney, the trial judge, then granted McCullough’s motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.4
Three months later, McCullough was retried before a jury, with Judge Harney again presiding. At this trial, the State presented testimony from two witnesses who had not testified at the first trial that McCullough rather than his accomplices had slashed the throat of the victim.5 McCullough was again found guilty by a jury.6 This time, he elected to have his sentence fixed by the trial judge.7
Judge Harney sentenced McCullough to 50 years in prison and, upon his motion, made findings of fact as to why the sentence was longer than that fixed by the jury in the first trial.8 She found that in fixing the sentence she relied on new evidence about the murder that was not presented at the first trial and hence never made known to the sentencing jury.9 The findings focused specifically on the testimony of two new witnesses, Carolyn Hollison McCullough and Willie Lee Brown, which had a direct effect upon the strength of the State’s case at both the guilt and punishment phases of the trial.10 In addition, Judge Harney explained that she learned for the first time on retrial McCullough had been released from prison only four months before the later crime had been committed.11 Finally, the judge candidly stated that, had she fixed the first sentence, she would have imposed more than 20 years.12
On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and resentenced McCullough to 20 years’ imprisonment.13 That court considered itself bound by this Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Pearce. It held that a longer sentence upon retrial could be imposed only if it was based upon conduct of the defendant occurring after the original trial.14 Petitioner sought review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and that court limited its review to whether the Texas Court of Appeals had authority to limit respondent’s sentence to 20 years.15 On petitioner’s motion for rehearing, the court concluded that under Pearce vindictiveness must be presumed even though a jury had fixed punishment at the first trial and a judge had fixed it at the second trial.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when the defendant in a state court received a greater sentence on retrial where the earlier sentence was imposed by the jury, the trial judge granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the defendant requested that in the second trial the judge fix the sentence, and the judge entered findings of fact justifying the longer sentence?18
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits increased sentences on retrial when motivated by vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.19 A presumption of vindictiveness arises to guard against apprehension of retaliation when the same judge imposes a more severe sentence after a new trial.20 The presumption does not apply in every case of an increased sentence.21 The presumption is inapplicable when different sentencers assess the sentences.22 The presumption is also inapplicable when the trial judge grants the new trial motion herself.23 An increased sentence may be justified by objective information such as new evidence not presented at the first sentencing.24
No. The facts of this case demonstrate that the Due Process Clause was not violated by the increased sentence.25
Applying the legal rule to these facts, the presumption of vindictiveness does not arise.26 The new trial was granted by the judge on her own motion due to prosecutorial misconduct.27 Different sentencers determined the sentences.28 The trial judge provided objective information in the form of new witness testimony and the defendant's recent release from prison to justify the longer sentence.29 These facts show no realistic motive for vindictiveness and affirmatively support the increased term.30
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the imposition of the increased sentence.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment reversing the lower court.32 He concluded that the possibility of vindictiveness was sufficiently remote that the Pearce presumption should not apply because Judge Harney granted the new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct.33 Brennan stressed that McCullough had not shown actual vindictiveness in the 50-year sentence.34
He emphasized that the circumstances of the judge granting the motion herself eliminated any realistic concern about retaliatory motivation. Brennan added that if the presumption had applied, the reasons offered by Judge Harney would have been inadequate to rebut it, aligning with the dissent on that point and underscoring that the majority's discussion of rebuttal distorted Pearce.
Justice Marshall dissented.35 He argued that the presumption of vindictiveness must apply because the same personal and institutional prejudices that concerned the Court in Pearce are present when a judge orders a retrial after granting a defense motion.36 Marshall maintained that new evidence from the retrial could always be cited to justify harsher sentences, thereby eviscerating Pearce protection.37
He concluded that the judge's findings regarding new witnesses and the defendant's release from prison were insufficient to rebut the presumption.38