495 U.S. 575, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 109 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1990)
In January 1988, Arthur Lajuane Taylor pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 At the time of his plea, Taylor had four prior convictions: one for robbery, one for assault, and two for second-degree burglary under Missouri law from 1963 and 1971.2
The Government sought sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).3 Taylor conceded that the robbery and assault convictions qualified under the statute but maintained that the burglary convictions did not.4 The District Court sentenced Taylor to fifteen years' imprisonment without possibility of parole.5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence by a divided vote. It relied on its earlier decision that burglary under the enhancement statute means whatever a state chooses to define it to be.6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning the definition of burglary for purposes of the enhancement provision.7
Taylor's two burglary convictions arose under Missouri statutes in effect in 1963 and 1971.8 Missouri then maintained seven different second-degree burglary statutes, all requiring entry into a structure but varying as to the type of structure and means of entry. One statute covered breaking and entering any booth, tent, boat, vessel, or railroad car.9
The formal notice of punishment enhancement submitted to the District Court stated only that Taylor had been convicted of burglary in the second degree. It did not identify which of the seven statutes formed the basis for the convictions.
Whether the term "burglary" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) incorporates whatever definition a state chooses to adopt or instead carries a uniform federal meaning?10
No. The Court rejected the state-law approach as implausible because it would produce arbitrary results where identical conduct triggers enhancement or not depending solely on the label chosen by the state of conviction.13 The statute's text refers to convictions for crimes having specified elements rather than crimes labeled burglary by any particular state.14 Applying the rule to the established facts, Taylor's Missouri second-degree burglary convictions from 1963 and 1971 could not be evaluated under varying state definitions without undermining the nationwide application of the federal enhancement provision.15
The term "burglary" carries a uniform federal meaning independent of the definitions adopted by the States' criminal codes.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion except for Part II.17 He maintained that the statutory term "burglary" possesses a generally accepted contemporary meaning that must be given effect and may not be modified by the rule of lenity.18 Legislative history cannot be used to alter that meaning when the text is clear.19
It would be odd to consult such materials only to discern a more extensive punitive intent beyond the plain meaning, as any broader intent would still require application of the rule of lenity.20 The detailed examination of legislative history serves only to demonstrate close and careful consideration but does not change the result derived from the statutory language itself.21
Whether "burglary" for purposes of § 924(e) incorporates the common-law definition of the offense?22
A statutory term is not given its common-law meaning when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with the statute's purpose of targeting career offenders who commit property crimes carrying inherent risk of injury to persons.23
No. The contemporary understanding of burglary has diverged substantially from the common-law elements of breaking and entering a dwelling at night with intent to commit a felony.24 Only a few states retain anything close to the common-law definition.25 Restricting the predicate offense to that narrow category would nullify the term's effect in the statute.26 Applying the rule to the established facts, Taylor's convictions arose under Missouri statutes that were broader than common-law burglary and included entry into structures such as boats or railroad cars.27
The term "burglary" does not incorporate the common-law definition of the offense.28
Whether a sentencing court applying the enhancement provision must look only to the statutory elements of a prior conviction or may examine the underlying facts of the offense?29
The sentencing court must generally apply a formal categorical approach looking only to the statutory definition of the prior offense.30 In a narrow range of cases the court may consult the charging paper and jury instructions to determine whether the jury necessarily found the elements of generic burglary.31
Yes. The statutory language refers to a person who has three previous convictions for crimes that have as an element the use of force or that are burglary.32 It does not refer to crimes that in a particular case involved the conduct at issue.33 The legislative history confirms Congress adopted a categorical approach without any suggestion that enhancement would turn on the facts of each defendant's prior crimes.34
Applying the rule to the established facts, the sparse record did not identify which of Missouri's seven second-degree burglary statutes supported Taylor's convictions.35 The formal notice of enhancement stated only that he was convicted of burglary in the second degree.36
A sentencing court must look only to the statutory elements of the prior conviction, subject to a narrow exception permitting review of charging documents and jury instructions.37
Whether an offense constitutes "burglary" under § 924(e) if its elements substantially correspond to unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building or structure with intent to commit a crime?38
Burglary under the statute means the generic contemporary definition containing at least the elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.39
Yes. This generic meaning aligns with the 1984 statutory definition that Congress did not intend to replace and with the definitions in a majority of state criminal codes.40 The Court concluded that Congress singled out burglary for inclusion because of its inherent potential for harm to persons and its frequent commission by career criminals.41
Applying the rule to the established facts, Taylor's prior convictions could qualify for enhancement only if the Missouri statutes under which he were convicted substantially corresponded to this generic definition.42 Alternatively, the charging papers and jury instructions could show that the jury necessarily found those elements.
An offense constitutes burglary under the enhancement statute if its statutory definition substantially corresponds to the generic contemporary meaning of unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building or structure with intent to commit a crime.43