419 U.S. 522 (1975)
Billy J. Taylor was indicted by the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish for aggravated kidnapping.1 On April 12, 1972, Taylor moved the trial court to quash the petit jury venire drawn for the special criminal term beginning with his trial the following day, alleging that women were systematically excluded from the venire.2
The Twenty-second Judicial District comprises the parishes of St. Tammany and Washington.3 The State stipulated that 53% of the persons eligible for jury service in these parishes were female and that no more than 10% of the persons on the jury wheel in St. Tammany Parish were women.4 During the period from December 8, 1971, to November 3, 1972, 12 females were among the 1,800 persons drawn to fill petit jury venires in St. Tammany Parish.5 In the present case, a venire totaling 175 persons was drawn for jury service beginning April 13, 1972, and there were no females on that venire.6
Taylor's motion to quash the venire was denied.7 After being tried, convicted, and sentenced to death, Taylor sought review in the Supreme Court of Louisiana.8 The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with the service of women on juries were valid.9
Taylor appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction to consider whether the Louisiana jury-selection system deprived him of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial.10
Whether a male defendant has standing to object to the exclusion of women from his jury venire?11
Yes.14 Taylor, a male, moved to quash the petit jury venire on the ground that women were systematically excluded from the venire and that he would therefore be deprived of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial by jury of a representative segment of the community.15 The State stipulated that 53% of the persons eligible for jury service were female.16 There is no rule that claims such as Taylor's may be made only by defendants who are members of the group excluded from jury service.17
Taylor has standing to raise the claim that the exclusion of women deprived him of the kind of factfinder to which he was constitutionally entitled.18
Whether the Louisiana jury-selection system deprived the defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial?19
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury trial, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the jury be drawn from a venire constituting a fair cross section of the community. The systematic exclusion of women, who constitute 53% of eligible jurors, violates this requirement.20
Yes. The Louisiana jury-selection system operated to exclude women from jury service, resulting in no women on the venire from which the petit jury was drawn.21 This systematic exclusion of women, a distinctive group constituting 53% of eligible jurors, violates the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment.22
The Louisiana jury-selection system deprived Taylor of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury trial.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist dissented.24 He argued that the majority's decision invalidates a jury-selection system approved in Hoyt v. Florida without any showing that the appellant was unfairly treated or prejudiced.25 He contended that prior cases established only that due process and equal protection prohibit jury-selection systems likely to result in biased or partial juries.26
He also argued that Duncan v. Louisiana does not require the fair-cross-section rule in this context.27 Rehnquist would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana because the defendant made no claim of prejudice or bias.28