412 U.S. 434 (1973)
Petitioner Strunk was found guilty in United States District Court of transporting a stolen automobile from Wisconsin to Illinois in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and was sentenced to a term of five years. The five-year sentence was to run concurrently with a sentence of one to three years that he was then serving in the Nebraska State Penitentiary pursuant to a conviction in the courts of that State.1
Prior to trial, the District Court denied a motion to dismiss the federal charge in which Strunk argued that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial.2 At trial, Strunk called no witnesses and did not take the stand; the jury returned a verdict of guilty.3
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that Strunk had in fact been denied a speedy trial due to a ten-month delay between return of the indictment and his arraignment.4 However, the court remanded the case to the District Court to reduce Strunk’s sentence by 259 days to compensate for the unnecessary delay.5
The Government had responded that Strunk had, after receiving the proper warnings, freely admitted his guilt to an FBI agent while incarcerated in the Nebraska Penitentiary and had stated that he intended to demand a speedy trial under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 20, but the Court of Appeals regarded this explanation as tenuous and also rejected the lack of staff personnel in the United States Attorney’s Office as a justification for the delay.6 Certiorari was granted on Strunk’s claim that once a judicial determination has been made that an accused has been denied a speedy trial, the only remedy available is reversal of the conviction, vacation of the sentence, and dismissal of the indictment. No cross-petition was filed by the Government.7
Whether, once a judicial determination has been made that an accused has been denied a speedy trial, the only remedy available to the court is to reverse the conviction, vacate the sentence, and dismiss the indictment?8
In light of the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain the only possible remedy.9
Yes. The Court of Appeals determined that Strunk had been denied a speedy trial due to the ten-month delay between return of the indictment and arraignment.10 The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the District Court to reduce Strunk’s sentence by 259 days rather than dismissing the charges.11 The rule requires that once the denial of a speedy trial is established without challenge, the conviction must be reversed, the sentence vacated, and the indictment dismissed because the facts show the speedy trial determination was resolved in Strunk's favor and no cross-petition questioned that holding.12
Given the unchallenged determination that Strunk was denied a speedy trial, the District Court judgment of conviction must be set aside, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to set aside its judgment, vacate the sentence, and dismiss the indictment.13