451 U.S. 204 (1981)
In early January 1978, a confidential informant contacted a Drug Enforcement Administration agent in Detroit, Michigan, suggesting he could locate Ricky Lyons, a federal fugitive wanted on drug charges.1 On January 14, 1978, the informant provided a telephone number in the Atlanta, Georgia area where Lyons could be reached within the next 24 hours.2 Two days later, the Detroit agent relayed this information to DEA Agent Kelly Goodowens in Atlanta, who obtained the corresponding address from Southern Bell Telephone Company and learned of a six-month-old arrest warrant for Lyons.3
On January 18, 1978, Goodowens and eleven other officers went to the address to search for Lyons.4 They encountered Hoyt Gaultney and petitioner Gary Steagald outside the house, frisked them, and determined neither was Lyons.5 The officers then entered the house after Gaultney's wife answered the door and stated she was alone; one agent searched the house while she was guarded.6 Although Lyons was not found, the agent observed what appeared to be cocaine, leading Goodowens to send for a search warrant while conducting further searches that uncovered additional evidence and ultimately 43 pounds of cocaine pursuant to the warrant.7
Petitioner Steagald was arrested and indicted on federal drug charges.8 Prior to trial, he moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the agents lacked a search warrant for the house.9 At the suppression hearing, Agent Goodowens testified there had been no physical hindrance to obtaining a search warrant but believed the arrest warrant for Lyons sufficed.10 The District Court denied the motion, petitioner was convicted, and a divided Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion in United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (1979).11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.12
During the proceedings below, the Government represented that the house was petitioner's residence, acquiesced in characterizations of the search as one of a third party's home, and argued that petitioner's connection with the home established his constructive possession of the cocaine; after certiorari was granted, the Government sought to challenge petitioner's expectation of privacy and urged a remand to the District Court.13
Whether the Government may challenge at this stage of the litigation petitioner's assertion that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched home?14
The Government may lose its right to raise factual issues before this Court when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the litigation.15
No. During the proceedings below the Government represented that the house was petitioner's residence, acquiesced in characterizations of the search as one of a third party's home, and argued that petitioner's connection with the home established his constructive possession of the cocaine.16 After certiorari was granted the Government sought to challenge petitioner's expectation of privacy and urged a remand to the District Court.17 The Magistrate's report characterized the issue as whether an arrest warrant was sufficient to justify the search of the home of a third person, and the Government never sought to correct this characterization on appeal.18
The Government has lost its right to challenge petitioner's assertion that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched home.19
Whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer may legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant?20
Absent exigent circumstances or consent, the entry into a home to conduct a search or make an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant.21 An arrest warrant protects the subject's interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure but does not protect a third party's privacy interest in his home; a search warrant is required to safeguard that distinct interest.22
No. On January 18, 1978, Goodowens and eleven other officers went to the address to search for Lyons without obtaining a search warrant.23 They encountered Gaultney and petitioner outside the house and determined neither was Lyons.24 The officers then entered the house after Gaultney's wife answered the door.25 One agent searched the house while she was guarded and observed what appeared to be cocaine.26
The agents conducted further searches that uncovered 43 pounds of cocaine.27 The agents had only an arrest warrant for Lyons and believed it sufficed.28 That warrant embodied no judicial determination regarding the home of the third party and left the decision to search entirely to the unfettered discretion of the police.29
The search of petitioner's home violated the Fourth Amendment.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice White
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the existence of a valid arrest warrant is highly relevant to the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.31 He reasoned that the government's compelling interest in apprehending fugitives who are inherently mobile outweighs the limited additional intrusion on third-party privacy interests.32 The arrest warrant assures the occupants that the officers are present on official business and limits the scope of the search to areas where the suspect might hide.33
In his view the majority's requirement of a separate search warrant imposes an excessive burden on law enforcement that will frustrate the apprehension of fugitives without sufficient constitutional justification.34