326 Md. 270, 604 A.2d 489 (1992)
Dana Ashley Hawkins was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County.1 The indictment charged in the first count that she willfully and with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought did kill and murder Dell Rose Noble.2 It charged in the eighth count that she did willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly aid, harbor and assist Wayne Pickney and others after the commission of a felony, to wit murder, to hinder his apprehension, detection, trial or punishment.3
During the State's direct examination of Trooper James L. Mitchell, the officer recounted his interrogation of Hawkins at the police station.4 After describing how he confronted her about not telling the truth, Mitchell stated that he went into Sergeant Bane's office and told him what had happened.5 Bane then came back into the polygraph suite and placed Hawkins under arrest.6
Sergeant Paul D. Bane later testified on direct examination that after Hawkins became very emotional and began crying upon her arrest.7 It was necessary for Trooper Mitchell and him to physically carry the defendant from the area next to the polygraph room to a cell area where she was placed. At that point defense counsel moved for a mistrial.8 The trial judge held the motion sub curia, researched the law, and denied it at the close of all the evidence.9
The jury returned verdicts of guilty of first-degree felony murder and guilty of accessory after the fact to murder.10 The court imposed concurrent life sentences on each conviction, suspending all but fifteen years on the murder count and all but ten years on the accessory count.11 The Court of Special Appeals vacated both judgments and remanded the case for a new trial.12 The State then petitioned for a writ of certiorari and Hawkins filed a conditional cross-petition, both of which the Court of Appeals granted.13
Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial when two experienced police officers testified in a manner that permitted the jury to infer that Hawkins had taken and failed a polygraph test?14
Evidence of the defendant’s willingness or unwillingness to submit to a lie detector examination is inadmissible.15 Mention of polygraph tests at a criminal trial raises the specter of reversal.16 Not all references warrant reversal.17 The question is one of prejudice to the defendant.18 The decision whether to grant a mistrial rests in the discretion of the trial judge whose exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless it has been clearly abused.19
No. The references to polygraph were inadvertent blurts by the officers without any indication that Hawkins had taken or failed a test.20 The trial judge found no prejudice after observing the demeanor and context.21 The judge was in the best position to evaluate prejudice as he was physically on the scene.22
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for mistrial, and Hawkins received the fair trial to which she was entitled.23
Whether, where a jury is not instructed that an accessory after the fact may not be present for the commission of the offense and the jury finds the defendant guilty of both the substantive crime and accessoryship, the appropriate remedy is to vacate only the accessoryship conviction?24
A verdict of guilty of the murder and a verdict of guilty of accessory after the fact are inconsistent because an accessory after the fact may not be a principal in the substantive felony.25 Where there is a conviction for only one offense and an erroneous instruction on that offense, the judgment is ordinarily vacated.26 Where multiple offenses are involved, the remedy for an error in the instructions on one of the offenses depends upon the degree to which the erroneous instruction taints each individual conviction.27
Yes. Although the evidence was sufficient to sustain both the murder and accessory after the fact convictions, the verdicts were legally inconsistent under Maryland common law. The trial court's instructions on accessory after the fact were defective because they did not direct the jury to refrain from considering that charge if it convicted Hawkins of murder.28 This error caused prejudice solely to the accessory after the fact verdict, as the murder verdict was proper in all respects and remained unaffected.29
The appropriate remedy is to vacate only the judgment entered on the accessory after the fact conviction while affirming the judgment on the murder conviction.30