666 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 2003)
On February 26, 2002, Jerrett Lee Anderson arrived at Blake Rogers' residence in Minneapolis and, at about 10:45 p.m., joined Rogers and a friend of Rogers in Rogers' bedroom.1 Anderson showed them a 12-gauge shotgun missing its rifle stock and stated that the shotgun had been stolen, after which Rogers' friend handled the weapon and all three noticed that it was loaded.2
As the shotgun was returned to Anderson, Rogers knelt in front of his stereo system inserting compact discs. Anderson then pointed the shotgun at Rogers, causing it to discharge and kill Rogers, after which Anderson and Rogers' friend fled the residence.3 Anderson had previously been adjudicated delinquent in 1998 for the crime of riot in the second degree, a crime of violence under Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2002).4
Anderson was charged with second-degree unintentional felony murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2002) and third-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a) (2002).5 The district court dismissed the second-degree felony-murder charge, ruling that felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen firearm are not proper predicate offenses.6 The state appealed the dismissal under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1.7
In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal, concluding that possession of a loaded, stockless shotgun pointed at the victim was inherently dangerous.8 Anderson appealed from that decision to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.9
Whether the offenses of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen firearm are proper predicate offenses for a charge of unintentional second-degree felony murder?10
The second-degree felony-murder statute in Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1), requires that the predicate felony involve a special danger to human life.11 This determination is made by examining both the elements of the underlying felony in the abstract and the circumstances under which the felony was committed.12 The standard was established in precedents such as State v. Nunn and State v. Cole.13 Although the 1981 amendment expanded the range of potential predicate felonies, the judicial limitation requiring special danger to human life remains in force.14
No. The offenses of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen firearm do not involve a special danger to human life when considered in the abstract.15 Simple possession of a firearm by a felon or of a stolen firearm does not inherently create the probability of death as a natural and probable consequence.16 This differs from traditional predicate felonies that involve violence or direct risk to persons.17 In this case, while Anderson did point the loaded shotgun at Rogers, the predicate offenses themselves fail the two-part inquiry because their elements do not require an act of violence.18
The district court correctly noted the distinction in imminency and probability of danger compared to traditional predicates.19 Therefore, these status-like offenses cannot support the unintentional second-degree felony murder charge under the established standard.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Gilbert dissents, arguing that the plain language of the statute applies to all felonies except the specified exceptions, and these offenses should qualify.23 He emphasizes the specific circumstances, including that Anderson possessed a loaded, shortened 12-gauge shotgun after being adjudicated delinquent for a crime of violence, and pointed it at the victim, making it inherently dangerous.24 Gilbert contends that the legislature recognized the danger of felons possessing firearms, and the majority's approach effectively amends the statute by excluding these felonies despite the clear legislative intent to include them within the felony-murder framework.25