310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d 470
The defendant and Cottie Brown had been involved in a consensual sexual relationship for approximately six months prior to June 1981.1 During this period, Brown sometimes left the apartment they shared to stay with her mother after conflicts, including instances where the defendant struck her, but she would return when he called.2 Brown testified that she often remained passive during their sexual relations and that the defendant had used violence when she refused his demands for money or other actions.3
On May 15, 1981, after the defendant struck Brown for refusing to give him money, she left the apartment and moved in with her mother.4 She had no further sexual relations with the defendant until June 15.5 The defendant called her several times and visited her at Durham Technical Institute, where they discussed their relationship, though Brown did not express a desire to end it out of fear of his anger.6
On June 15, 1981, Brown arrived at Durham Technical Institute by taxicab and encountered the defendant, who blocked her path, grabbed her arm, and stated she was going with him.7 They walked to the parking lot and then through the neighborhood, sometimes side by side, discussing their relationship.8 The defendant threatened to fix her face so her mother could see he was not playing, and later stated he had a right to make love to her again after she said the relationship was over.9 Brown followed him to the house of his friend Lawrence Taylor without further protest.10
At Taylor's house, after Brown stated she was not going to bed with the defendant, he undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her while she cried but did not physically resist.11 Brown testified she did not consent and submitted due to fear based on prior experiences.12 Afterward, they dressed, talked, and left; Brown later reported the incident to police the same day but did not initially disclose the sexual intercourse to her mother.13
The defendant moved at the close of the State's evidence for dismissal of both the kidnapping and second-degree rape charges based on insufficiency of the evidence.14 The trial court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.15
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of first-degree kidnapping?16
Kidnapping under G.S. 14-39(a) is the unlawful restraint, confinement or removal of a person without consent for a purpose such as facilitating the commission of a felony. When an indictment alleges intent to commit a particular felony such as second degree rape, the State must prove the defendant possessed that intent at the time of the removal.17
No. The established facts demonstrate that the defendant blocked Brown's path at Durham Technical Institute on June 15, 1981, grabbed her arm, and removed her toward the parking lot and then through the neighborhood, yet at the moment of removal he had no reason to believe she would refuse consensual intercourse given their six-month pattern of relations in which she often remained passive.18
The evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of first-degree kidnapping.19
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of second-degree rape?20
Second degree rape under G.S. 14-27.3 requires vaginal intercourse accomplished both by force and against the victim's will. In a prior continuing consensual relationship, the State must show clear communication of withdrawn consent. The State must also show actual or constructive force or threats on the date in question that were sufficient to overcome the victim's will regarding the specific act charged.21
No. Although the established facts show Brown told the defendant she was not going to bed with him, stated she did not consent, and submitted while crying, there was no substantial evidence that the defendant used or threatened force on June 15 related to the sexual intercourse itself.22
The evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction of second-degree rape.23