492 U.S. 361 (1989)
On January 7, 1981, Kevin Stanford, approximately 17 years and 4 months old, and an accomplice robbed a gas station in Jefferson County, Kentucky, where 20-year-old Barbel Poore worked as an attendant.1 During and after the robbery they repeatedly raped and sodomized Poore before driving her to a secluded area and shooting her pointblank in the face and back of the head.2 The proceeds consisted of roughly 300 cartons of cigarettes, two gallons of fuel, and a small amount of cash.3
After his arrest a Kentucky juvenile court conducted hearings under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 208.170 and transferred Stanford for trial as an adult, citing the seriousness of the offenses and unsuccessful prior juvenile treatment attempts.4 Stanford was convicted of murder, first-degree sodomy, first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen property and received a death sentence plus 45 years in prison.5 The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence.6
On July 27, 1985, Heath Wilkins, approximately 16 years and 6 months old, stabbed to death 26-year-old Nancy Allen, a mother of two working at her convenience store in Avondale, Missouri, during a planned robbery in which he intended to kill whoever was behind the counter.7 Wilkins stabbed Allen multiple times in the chest and neck after she assisted with the cash register and begged for her life.8 Wilkins and his accomplice took liquor, cigarettes, rolling papers, and approximately $450 in cash and checks.9
A Missouri juvenile court certified Wilkins for adult trial under § 211.071 based on the crime's viciousness, his maturity, and prior delinquent acts.10 Wilkins pled guilty to first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and carrying a concealed weapon.11 The trial court found beyond reasonable doubt that the murder was committed during a robbery and involved depravity of mind.1213 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on mandatory review.14
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these consolidated cases.15
Whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed by individuals who were sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the offense?16
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, a determination informed by objective indicia of contemporary societal standards such as the enactments of state legislatures authorizing capital punishment and the behavior of sentencing juries, rather than by the Court's independent assessment of proportionality or penological effectiveness.17
No. Kevin Stanford committed murder at age seventeen years and four months during a gas station robbery that included repeated rape and sodomy of the victim before her execution-style shooting.18 A Kentucky juvenile court transferred him for adult trial under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 208.170 based on offense seriousness and failed prior rehabilitation.19
Heath Wilkins committed murder at age sixteen years and six months by repeatedly stabbing a convenience store clerk during a planned robbery intended to eliminate the witness.20 A Missouri juvenile court certified him for adult trial under § 211.071 citing the crime's viciousness and his maturity.21
Fifteen states decline to impose capital punishment on sixteen-year-olds and twelve decline to impose it on seventeen-year-olds.22 Yet a majority of the thirty-seven capital-punishment states authorize it for crimes committed at those ages.23 This pattern is comparable to the one upheld in Tison v. Arizona.24
Juries imposed only forty-five death sentences on offenders under eighteen between 1982 and 1988 out of 2,106 total sentences.25 Given the undisputed fact that a far smaller percentage of capital crimes are committed by persons under 18 than over 18, the discrepancy in treatment is much less than might seem.26
These facts demonstrate the absence of the national consensus necessary to classify the punishment cruel and unusual.27
The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed by individuals who were sixteen or seventeen years of age at the time of the offense.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.29 She concluded that a majority of states permitting capital punishment authorize it for crimes committed at age sixteen or above.30 This pattern made it sufficiently clear that no national consensus forbids the practice for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders.31
Unlike the circumstances in Thompson v. Oklahoma, she found no need to require explicit statutory specification of a minimum age.32 She nevertheless maintained that the Court retains a constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment.33 For that reason she declined to join Parts IV-B and V of the plurality opinion.34
Joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, And Justice Stevens
Justice Brennan dissented.35 He concluded that the execution of offenders under eighteen is disproportionate to their reduced culpability as a class.36 The punishment also fails to measurably advance retribution or deterrence.37
A majority of states refuse to authorize the death penalty for juveniles, jury verdicts imposing it are rare, respected professional organizations reject it, and international opinion overwhelmingly disapproves the practice.38 In his view the Court must bring its own judgment to bear after examining all relevant indicia of contemporary standards rather than stopping at legislative enactments alone.39