393 U.S. 410 (1969)
William Spinelli was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 18 U.S.C. § 1952 of traveling in interstate commerce from an Illinois suburb to St. Louis, Missouri, with the intent to conduct gambling activities prohibited by Missouri law.1
At every appropriate stage in the lower court proceedings, Spinelli challenged the constitutionality of the search warrant that authorized the FBI search uncovering the evidence used to convict him.2 The District Court denied his pretrial suppression motion on the ground that he lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment objection.3 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the standing ruling but held that the warrant was issued without probable cause.4 After an en banc rehearing, the Court of Appeals sustained the warrant and affirmed the conviction by a vote of six to two.5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, later limiting the writ to the question of the constitutional validity of the search and seizure.6 The warrant issued on August 18, 1965, rested on an affidavit by FBI Special Agent Robert L. Bender that set forth surveillance observations, telephone records, Spinelli's reputation, and a report from a confidential informant.7
On four of five days in August 1965, agents observed Spinelli driving across bridges from Illinois into St. Louis between 11 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. On four days, his car was seen parked in the lot used by residents of the apartment building at 1108 Indian Circle Drive between 3:30 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. On August 12, Spinelli was followed into the building.8 On August 13 he was seen entering the second-floor southwest corner apartment known as Apartment F.9
Telephone company records showed that Apartment F contained two telephones listed under the name of Grace P. Hagen with the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136.10 The affidavit stated that Spinelli was known to the affiant and to other federal and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers.11 It further reported that a confidential reliable informant had informed the FBI that Spinelli was operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of those two telephones.12
Spinelli was arrested outside the apartment after agents saw him leave, lock the door, and enter the hallway; he surrendered his key, and the search then proceeded.13 The evidence obtained supported his conviction for the interstate gambling offense.14
Whether the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant contained sufficient information to establish probable cause under the Fourth Amendment?15
Under the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas, an affidavit relying on an informant's tip must provide the underlying circumstances from which the informant drew the conclusion that criminal activity was occurring.16 The affidavit must also supply reasons supporting the informant's credibility or the reliability of the information.17 Independent corroboration may be considered but must render the tip as trustworthy as one that satisfies Aguilar's requirements on its own.18
No. The established facts show that the Bender affidavit contained surveillance of Spinelli crossing bridges and parking near the apartment building.19 It also included telephone company records confirming two phones in Apartment F.20 The affidavit added a bare assertion of Spinelli's reputation as a gambler.21 Finally, it contained an informant's tip that Spinelli was using those specific phones for bookmaking.22
The tip supplied no details on how the informant learned of the gambling operation or why the informant should be deemed reliable.23 The surveillance and telephone records corroborated only innocent activity and the existence of the phones, without verifying any criminal conduct.24 The reputation statement amounted to an unilluminating assertion of suspicion.25 These elements together failed to meet Aguilar's standards or to supply the further support needed to elevate the tip to probable cause.26
The affidavit did not contain sufficient information to establish probable cause.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White concurred in the judgment of reversal while noting tension between Draper and the Aguilar-Nathanson line.28 He observed that the informant's verified details about the two telephones and Spinelli's use of the apartment might have justified a warrant under a Draper approach.29 Verification of material facts can enhance the reliability of the remaining unverified criminal allegation.30
Nevertheless, he joined the majority opinion to avoid an equally divided Court and pending fuller reconsideration of the precedents.31
Justice Black dissented, arguing that the affidavit was more than ample to show probable cause.32 He maintained that the detailed surveillance of Spinelli's repeated visits to the apartment containing two telephones, combined with the reliable informant's tip and Spinelli's known reputation as a bookmaker, supplied a sufficient factual basis for the magistrate's independent judgment.33 Black criticized the majority for expanding Aguilar beyond its holding and for substituting its own view for that of the magistrate and the en banc Court of Appeals.34
Justice Fortas dissented on the ground that the unusually detailed affidavit, when read in a commonsense manner, supplied adequate facts to support the warrant.35 He emphasized that the surveillance showing Spinelli's regular use of the apartment, the presence of the two identified telephones, and Spinelli's reputation as a known bookmaker provided the additional circumstances that Aguilar itself indicated would present an entirely different case.36 Fortas concluded that the majority erred in finding the affidavit constitutionally inadequate.37
Justice Stewart dissented for substantially the reasons stated by Justices Black and Fortas.38 He concluded that the warrant was supported by a sufficient showing of probable cause and would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.39 Stewart joined the dissents because the detailed surveillance, the informant's tip identifying the specific telephones used for wagering, and Spinelli's established reputation as a bookmaker together supplied the magistrate with an adequate factual foundation under the Fourth Amendment.40
Whether Spinelli had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search warrant and the resulting seizure of evidence?41
A defendant has standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge a search if he can show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched.42 This may be established by evidence that he exercised control over the location such as possessing a key and being observed locking the door upon departure.43
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that agents observed Spinelli leave the apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive, lock the door, and enter the hallway before surrendering his key to the agents upon arrest.44 These actions establish that Spinelli had a possessory interest and control over Apartment F sufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy.45 The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that this conduct conferred standing even though the arrest occurred just outside the premises rather than inside.46
Spinelli had standing to challenge the search warrant.47