459 U.S. 553, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1988)
In Madison, South Dakota, two police officers stopped the car driven by respondent Neville after observing him fail to stop at a stop sign.1 Upon asking Neville to exit the vehicle, the officers noted that he staggered and fell against the car for support, and they detected the smell of alcohol on his breath.2 Neville admitted that he did not possess a valid driver’s license because it had been revoked following a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated.3 The officers administered field sobriety tests, including touching his finger to his nose and walking a straight line, which Neville failed to perform successfully.4
The officers placed Neville under arrest and informed him of his Miranda rights, which he acknowledged understanding before agreeing to speak without counsel present.5 Reading from a printed card, the officers requested that Neville submit to a blood-alcohol test and advised him that refusal could result in the loss of his driver’s license for one year.6 Neville refused the test on three separate occasions, twice at the scene and once at the police station, each time stating that he was too drunk to pass the test.7
South Dakota statutes provide that refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test may be admissible as evidence at trial.8 Neville moved to suppress all evidence of his refusal.9 The trial court granted the motion.10 The State appealed the suppression order to the South Dakota Supreme Court, which affirmed the suppression.11 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the constitutional questions presented.12
Whether the admission into evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?13
The Fifth Amendment bars the state from compelling testimonial communications or testimony. Under Schmerber v. California, a blood-alcohol test produces physical evidence unprotected by the privilege. A refusal following a lawful request is not compelled where the state offers the suspect a choice between submitting to a safe and commonplace test or refusing with attendant penalties such as license revocation.14
No. Officers stopped Neville after he failed to stop at a stop sign, observed him stagger and smell of alcohol, and confirmed his license was revoked after a prior DWI conviction. After field sobriety tests failed, officers arrested Neville, read Miranda rights, and requested the blood-alcohol test three times while warning of license revocation for one year. Neville refused each time, stating he was too drunk to pass. South Dakota law expressly permits admission of refusal evidence.
The choice presented does not involve the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, nor any painful or violative alternative that would render refusal involuntary.15
Admission of evidence of Neville's refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol test does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens would have dismissed the writ because the South Dakota Supreme Court rested its judgment on an adequate and independent state constitutional ground.17 The state court held that the statute violated both the federal and state privileges against self-incrimination, and South Dakota precedent establishes that the state constitution is interpreted independently of federal law.18 Because the state ground is not shown to be dependent on federal law, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the federal questions.19
Whether admission of evidence of refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test without a specific warning that the refusal could be used against the defendant at trial violates the Due Process Clause?20
Due process forbids fundamental unfairness arising when the state implicitly assures a suspect that silence will carry no adverse consequences and then uses that silence against him at trial. Warnings that emphasize only license revocation for refusal, without creating any misleading assurance that refusal is consequence-free, do not render subsequent use of the refusal evidence fundamentally unfair.21
No. Officers read from a printed card advising Neville of the right to refuse and the one-year license revocation consequence, but did not state that refusal evidence could be introduced at trial. Neville nevertheless refused three times. Unlike Miranda warnings that create an implicit assurance against use of silence, the warnings here explicitly notified Neville of adverse consequences and contained no promise that refusal would be a safe harbor. The state therefore did not trick Neville into a choice it later exploited.22
Admission of evidence of refusal without a specific warning that the refusal could be used at trial does not violate the Due Process Clause.23