291 U.S. 97 (1934)
On April 9, 1931, James M. Kiley was shot to death at a gasoline station at Somerville, Massachusetts.1 Three men, Garrick, Donnellon and the petitioner Snyder, joined in the murder and in the attempted robbery that led to it.2 Garrick confessed to his part in the crime and became a witness for the state.3 Donnellon and Snyder were tried together and sentenced to be put to death.4
At the opening of the trial there was a motion by the Commonwealth that the jury be directed to view the scene of the crime.5 This motion was granted.6 Counsel for Snyder moved that his client be permitted to view the scene with the jury, invoking the protection of the federal constitution.7 This motion was denied.8 The jurors were then placed in charge of bailiffs duly sworn.9 Accompanied by these bailiffs and also by the judge, the court stenographer, the District Attorney and the counsel for the defendants, they went forth to make their view.10
The first stopping place was at the filling station, 13 Somerville Avenue.11 The District Attorney pointed out to the jurors the particular parts of the building that he wished them to observe.12 Counsel for Snyder called attention to the view from within the building looking out, and to the condition of the floor.13 After the visit to the station the jurors were taken a short distance away where they were asked to make note of the lay-out of the streets.14 The District Attorney stated that the middle pump was not there at the time of the homicide, and the judge stated the agreement to the jurors assembled on the walk.15
After the completion of the view, the group returned to the court house and the trial went on.16 Photographs and diagrams of the scene of the homicide were put in evidence by the Commonwealth and placed before the jury.17 Snyder took the stand and admitted that he was at the gasoline station at the time of the crime.18 In charging the jury the judge said that the view, the testimony given by the witnesses and the exhibits comprise the evidence that is before you.19 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction.20 A writ of certiorari brings the case here.21
Whether a view of the crime scene by the jury in the absence of a defendant who has demanded to be present constitutes a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment?22
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.23 Due process requires the presence of the defendant only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.24 A view is not a trial nor any part of a trial in the sense in which a trial was understood at common law.25 The Fourteenth Amendment does not assure to a defendant the privilege to be present at such a time when presence would be useless or the benefit but a shadow.26
No. Snyder's absence from the view bore no reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend against the charge because the place viewed was undisputed at trial, photographs and diagrams accurately represented the scene, and Snyder admitted his presence at the station during the crime.27 The only change noted was stipulated without objection, the view involved no witnesses to be confronted and no opportunity for cross-examination that Snyder could have exercised, his counsel attended and participated by pointing out features, and Snyder could have examined bailiffs or sought a later visit if needed.28 The procedure followed Massachusetts practice without thwarting a fair hearing.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Sutherland, And Mr. Justice Butler
Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the view formed part of the trial because the knowledge the jurors acquired constituted evidence that the jury was expressly instructed to consider in reaching its verdict.32 He maintained that the universal acceptance of the right of the accused to be present throughout the trial establishes that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the same fundamental fairness in state proceedings.33 Roberts emphasized that the view here went beyond a bare inspection, as the district attorney pointed out specific features in detail and the jury was told to use its observations in corroboration or contradiction of testimony.34
He rejected the notion that absence caused no harm, insisting that the constitutional right to presence at every stage where substantial rights may be affected cannot be measured by after-the-fact assessments of prejudice.35 Roberts concluded that the denial of Snyder's request deprived him of due process and the judgment should be reversed.36