469 U.S. 91, 105 S. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1984)
The petitioner Steven Smith was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a 9-year prison term.1 Shortly after his arrest, 18-year-old Steven Smith was taken to an interrogation room at the Logan County Safety Complex for questioning by two police detectives.2
The session began with the detectives advising Smith of his Miranda rights, during which Smith responded to the advisement of the right to counsel by stating "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that."3 The detectives continued reading the remaining Miranda warnings and asked Smith whether he wished to talk to them at that time without a lawyer being present.4
Smith replied "Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really," and after the officer explained that he could stop at any time, Smith stated "All right. I'll talk to you then."5 Smith then told the detectives that he knew in advance about the planned robbery but had not participated.6 Upon further questioning Smith admitted "I committed it" and later stated "I wanta get a lawyer," at which point the detectives terminated the interrogation.7
Smith moved at trial to suppress his incriminating statements, but the trial judge denied the motion.8 A transcript of the interrogation was introduced as part of the State's case in chief, and Smith was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a 9-year prison term.9 The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Fourth District affirmed the conviction, concluding that Smith's statements considered in total showed he was undecided about exercising his right to counsel.10
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in a 4-3 vote, holding that Smith's statements considered in total were ambiguous and did not effectively invoke his right to counsel.11 The United States Supreme Court granted Smith's petition for a writ of certiorari.12
Whether an accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel?13
Under Miranda and Edwards an accused in custody who expresses a desire to deal with police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel is made available.14 Courts determine whether the right was invoked by examining the initial request without reference to later responses.15 Invocation and waiver remain entirely distinct inquiries that must not be merged.16
No. The Illinois Supreme Court examined Smith's later replies of "Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really" and "All right. I'll talk to you then" to conclude that his statements considered in total were ambiguous and did not effectively invoke counsel.17 The established facts show that Smith responded "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that" immediately upon learning of the right to counsel during the Miranda warnings.18
Nothing in any prior statement created ambiguity around that request.19 The Illinois Appellate Court itself acknowledged the statement appears clear and unequivocal.20 Because the initial request stood clear on its face, the detectives were required to cease questioning at once.21 The subsequent responses cannot be used to cast retrospective doubt on its clarity.22
An accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that the trial judge implicitly concluded that petitioner's initial statement was not a clear request.24 The judge reached this conclusion after observing the demeanor of the officers and listening to the tape of the interrogation.25 The entire five-minute colloquy should be considered together to decide whether the right was clearly asserted.26
The facts do not fit the Edwards pattern because the officers never terminated questioning and later resumed it.27 Instead they continued the same brief session.28 Common sense permits the trier of fact to assess the full flavor of the exchange rather than isolating seven words.29
Whether Steven Smith's statement "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that" during the administration of Miranda warnings constituted a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel?30
An accused invokes the right to counsel when at any stage of the process he indicates in any manner that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking.31 When nothing preceding the request or inherent in the request itself renders it ambiguous, the statement must be treated as a clear invocation requiring immediate cessation of questioning.32
Yes. The established facts establish that after the detective advised Smith of the right to have a lawyer present, Smith replied "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that."33 The Illinois Appellate Court expressly recognized that this statement appears clear and unequivocal.34
The established facts confirm that Smith's only prior remark about a lawyer merely reinforced rather than undermined the request.35 Because the request was unambiguous on its face, the detectives were obligated to stop the interrogation at that moment instead of completing the warnings and pressing for a response.36
Steven Smith's statement "Uh, yeah. I'd like to do that" constituted a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.37