393 U.S. 374 (1969)
In 1960 the petitioner was indicted in Harris County, Texas, upon a charge of theft. He was then and remained a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.1
Shortly after the state charge was filed, the petitioner mailed a letter to the Texas trial court requesting a speedy trial. In reply, he was notified that he would be afforded a trial within two weeks of any date he might specify at which he could be present.2
For the next six years the petitioner continued periodically to ask that he be brought to trial by letters and more formal so-called motions. The State took no steps to obtain the petitioner's appearance in the Harris County trial court. In 1967 the petitioner filed in that court a verified motion to dismiss the charge against him for want of prosecution. No action was taken on the motion.3
The petitioner then brought a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Texas asking for an order to show cause why the pending charge should not be dismissed. Mandamus was refused in an informal and unreported order of the Texas Supreme Court. The petitioner sought certiorari in this Court. The Court granted certiorari after inviting and receiving a memorandum from the Solicitor General of the United States.4
Most of the facts have been stipulated. On May 5, 1960, the sheriff of Harris County notified the warden at Leavenworth that a warrant for the petitioner's arrest was outstanding and asked for notice of the minimum release date, which was January 6, 1970.5
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, imposes a duty on a State to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring to trial an accused who is incarcerated in a federal prison and who has repeatedly demanded a speedy trial on a pending state charge?6
The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.7 This right is made applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 When a person under state criminal charge is serving a prison sentence imposed by another jurisdiction and has repeatedly demanded trial, the State is under a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him before the court for trial.9
Yes. The established facts show that the petitioner was indicted in Harris County, Texas, in 1960 while imprisoned in a federal penitentiary in Kansas and that he promptly requested a speedy trial.10
He continued to demand trial periodically for six years through letters and motions, yet the State took no steps to obtain his appearance in the Harris County court.11 The Solicitor General's memorandum confirms that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum would have produced the petitioner for trial, but Texas made no such effort.12
These facts establish that the State failed to discharge the constitutional duty imposed by the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.13
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial therefore imposes upon the State the duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring the petitioner to trial under these circumstances.14
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurs in the opinion and judgment of the Court.15 He would make it absolutely clear to the Supreme Court of Texas that so far as the federal constitutional question is concerned its judgment is set aside only for the purpose of giving the petitioner a trial.16 If a trial is given the case should not be dismissed.17
Black's concurrence underscores that the federal constitutional violation requires only that Texas afford the petitioner his day in court.18 The remand does not authorize dismissal of the charge on speedy trial grounds once a trial is provided.19
Justice White joins the opinion of the Court.20 He understands its remand of the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion to leave open the ultimate question whether Texas must dismiss the criminal proceedings against the petitioner.21 The Texas court's erroneous reliance on the fact of incarceration elsewhere prevented it from reaching the other facets of this question.22
Those facets may now be adjudicated in the manner permitted by Texas procedure.23 White thus preserves the possibility that state courts could still evaluate prejudice or other considerations before deciding whether dismissal is warranted.24
Justice Harlan agrees that a State may not ignore a criminal accused's request to be brought to trial merely because he is incarcerated in another jurisdiction.25 He requires that the State must make a reasonable effort to secure his presence for trial.26 This much is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he would rest decision of this case on that ground and not on incorporation of the Sixth Amendment's speedy-trial provision into the Fourteenth.27 He believes the State is entitled to more explicitness from the Court as to what is to be expected on remand.28
This case is one of first impression, and under these circumstances Texas should not automatically forfeit the right to try the petitioner.29 If the State still desires to bring him to trial, it should do so forthwith.30 At trial, if the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he has in fact been prejudiced by the State's delay, the burden should then shift to the State to prove the contrary.31