323 U.S. 134 (1944)
Seven employees of the Swift and Company packing plant at Fort Worth, Texas, brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act to recover overtime, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees, totalling approximately $77,000.1 The District Court rendered judgment denying this claim wholly, 53 F. Supp. 1020, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.2 136 F. 2d 112.
It is not denied that the daytime employment of these persons was working time within the Act.3 Two were engaged in general fire-hall duties and maintenance of firefighting equipment of the Swift plant.4 The others operated elevators or acted as relief men in fire duties.5 They worked from 7:00 a. m. to 3:30 p. m., with a half-hour lunch period, five days a week.6 They were paid weekly salaries.7
Under their oral agreement of employment, however, petitioners undertook to stay in the fire hall on the Company premises, or within hailing distance, three and a half to four nights a week.8 This involved no task except to answer alarms, either because of fire or because the sprinkler was set off for some other reason.9 No fires occurred during the period in issue, the alarms were rare, and the time required for their answer rarely exceeded an hour.10 For each alarm answered the employees were paid in addition to their fixed compensation an agreed amount, fifty cents at first, and later sixty-four cents.11 The Company provided a brick fire hall equipped with steam heat and air-conditioned rooms.12 It provided sleeping quarters, a pool table, a domino table, and a radio.13 The men used their time in sleep or amusement as they saw fit, except that they were required to stay in or close by the fire hall and be ready to respond to alarms.14
It is stipulated that they agreed to remain in the fire hall and stay in it or within hailing distance, subject to call, in event of fire or other casualty, but were not required to perform any specific tasks during these periods of time, except in answering alarms.15 The trial court found the evidentiary facts as stipulated.16 It made no findings of fact as such as to whether under the arrangement of the parties and the circumstances of this case the fire-hall duty or any part thereof constituted working time.17 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.18
Whether the time spent by employees in the fire hall subject to call to answer fire alarms constitutes hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act?19
No principle of law found either in the statute or in Court decisions precludes waiting time from also being working time.20 Whether in a concrete case such time falls within or without the Act is a question of fact to be resolved by appropriate findings of the trial court.21 This involves scrutiny and construction of the agreements between the particular parties, appraisal of their practical construction of the working agreement by conduct, consideration of the nature of the service, and its relation to the waiting time, and all of the surrounding circumstances.22 Facts may show that the employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged.23
No. The District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred when they concluded that the time the seven employees spent in the fire hall subject to call does not constitute hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act.24 The established facts show that the employees worked daytime shifts that are conceded to be working time.25 They then undertook under an oral agreement to remain in or near the company fire hall three and a half to four nights each week, ready to answer alarms that proved rare and brief.26 The lower courts operated under the incorrect understanding that waiting time cannot qualify as working time.27
This error prevented proper factual analysis of the parties' arrangement, the compensation structure for alarms, the amenities provided, and the degree of freedom the employees actually enjoyed during on-call periods.28 The established facts further reveal that the company furnished sleeping quarters and recreational facilities.29 The employees could sleep or pursue personal activities until an alarm sounded.30 Separate pay was provided only for answered alarms.31
These circumstances require the trial court to determine whether the employees were engaged to wait or merely waited to be engaged.32 The court must apply the multi-factor inquiry to the specific employment relationship rather than a categorical exclusion of all inactive periods.33
The time spent by the employees in the fire hall subject to call may constitute hours worked under the Fair Labor Standards Act depending on the factual findings.34 The judgment denying the claim is reversed with remand for further proceedings consistent with the principle that waiting time can be working time.35
Whether the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the Administrator under the Fair Labor Standards Act are entitled to weight when courts determine what constitutes working time?36
The rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.37 The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.38
Yes. The Administrator's rulings, interpretations, and opinions under the Fair Labor Standards Act are entitled to weight as a body of experience and informed judgment when courts determine what constitutes working time, even though they are not controlling.39 The Administrator has developed a flexible approach that examines the degree to which an employee is free to engage in personal activities during periods of idleness and the number of consecutive hours the employee remains subject to call.40 The Administrator has concluded in this case that sleeping and eating time should be excluded while other on-call time should be included.41
The District Court referred to the Administrator's Bulletin yet allowed its analysis to be restricted by the erroneous legal premise that waiting time cannot be work.42 Proper application of the standard requires the trial court to give the Administrator's views the respect warranted by their thoroughness, reasoning, and consistency.43 The trial court must still conduct an independent examination of the particular facts of the employment arrangement at the Swift plant.44
The rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the Administrator under the Fair Labor Standards Act are entitled to weight, though not controlling, when courts determine what constitutes working time.45 The lower courts should have given them appropriate consideration in evaluating the employees' on-call periods.46