403 U.S. 384, 91 S. Ct. 1801, 29 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1971)
On November 9, 1966, two armed men entered a store in Jacksonville, Florida, and robbed the manager and a customer.1 During 1967 petitioner was tried and convicted in the state courts, after a jury trial, of the armed robbery of the manager, but the conviction was reversed on appeal because the trial judge neglected to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of larceny.2 In 1968 petitioner was retried on the same charge and acquitted.3
Subsequently, he was charged with robbing the customer.4 His motion to quash the information on double jeopardy grounds was overruled and a jury found petitioner guilty of armed robbery.5 Each of the three jury verdicts here involved was a general one.6 The trial court imposed a 30-year sentence and petitioner appealed to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.7
Prior to the adjudication of petitioner's appeal, this Court rendered its decision in Ashe v. Swenson.8 The District Court of Appeal declined to examine the record of the second trial, but simply held instead, as a matter of law, that while petitioner's acquittal at the second trial entitled him to invoke collateral estoppel, his conviction at the first trial gave rise to a double collateral estoppel.9 The Supreme Court of Florida, by a divided vote, declined review, and petitioner filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court.10
Whether the principle of collateral estoppel embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution for robbing a customer after an acquittal on a charge of robbing the manager during the same incident?11
The principle of collateral estoppel, which bars relitigation between the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trial, is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy and is fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, the rule requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.13
Yes. On November 9, 1966, two armed men entered a store in Jacksonville, Florida, and robbed the manager and a customer. During 1967 petitioner was tried and convicted after a jury trial of the armed robbery of the manager. The conviction was reversed on appeal because the trial judge neglected to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of larceny. In 1968 petitioner was retried on the same charge and acquitted by general verdict.
Subsequently he was charged with robbing the customer. His motion to quash on double jeopardy grounds was overruled. A jury found him guilty of armed robbery by general verdict. The District Court of Appeal declined to examine the record of the second trial. Instead it held as a matter of law that the first conviction created a double collateral estoppel preventing assertion of the acquittal. This approach is untenable. The acquittal on the manager robbery necessarily determined the identity issue against the state. The same disputed issue controls the customer robbery arising from the identical episode. Mutuality is not required under the collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy.
The principle of collateral estoppel embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the second prosecution.14
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Douglas
The robbery of the manager and the robbery of the customer grew out of one criminal episode. Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's disposition. For the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, he would also hold that on the facts of this case the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Florida from prosecuting petitioner for the robbery of the customer.
This view underscores that a single criminal episode should not give rise to successive prosecutions under the Double Jeopardy Clause.15
Whether a prior conviction can create a double collateral estoppel that prevents a defendant from asserting collateral estoppel based on a subsequent acquittal?16
Mutuality is not an ingredient of the collateral estoppel rule imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments upon the States.17 A prior conviction cannot create a double collateral estoppel that overrides a subsequent acquittal.18 This is because the state could not have used the first verdict to estop the defendant in the second trial and the acquittal controls the identity issue.19
No. The District Court of Appeal held that petitioner's conviction at the first trial gave rise to a double collateral estoppel that prevented him from contending the state failed to prove identity at the second trial.20 This holding is untenable. The acquittal at the second trial on the manager charge determined the identity issue. The state could not have introduced the first verdict to demand an instruction that petitioner was one of the robbers.
The same logic precludes using the first conviction to defeat the collateral estoppel effect of the acquittal in the prosecution for robbing the customer.
A prior conviction cannot create a double collateral estoppel that prevents a defendant from asserting collateral estoppel based on a subsequent acquittal.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented for the reasons given in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in Ashe v. Swenson. They maintained that the approach taken by the majority in applying collateral estoppel was incorrect. Their position aligns with the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the subsequent prosecution in these circumstances.
Separate offenses committed against different victims during one episode may be tried independently. The collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy does not extend to prevent a second prosecution after an acquittal on a related but distinct charge.22