381 U.S. 81 (1965)
The petitioner and Sol Simons were domiciled in New York when, in 1946, she obtained a New York separation decree that included an award of monthly alimony.1 Sol Simons moved to Florida in 1951 and, a year later, obtained there a divorce in an action of which the petitioner had valid constructive notice but in which she did not enter a personal appearance.2
Sol Simons died in Florida in 1960.3 Respondent Miami Beach First National Bank, the executor of his estate, offered his will for probate in the Probate Court of Dade County, Florida.4 The petitioner appeared in the proceeding and filed an election to take dower under Florida law rather than under the will, which made no provision for her.5
The respondent opposed the dower claim, asserting that since Sol Simons had divorced the petitioner she had not been his wife at his death and consequently was not entitled to dower under Florida law.6 The petitioner then brought an action in the Circuit Court for Dade County to set aside the divorce decree and to obtain a declaration that the divorce, even if valid to alter her marital status, did not destroy or impair her claim to dower.7 The action was dismissed after trial, and the Florida District Court of Appeal for the Third District affirmed at 157 So. 2d 199.8
The Supreme Court of Florida declined to review the case at 166 So. 2d 151.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 379 U. S. 877.10 During oral argument petitioner’s counsel advised the Court that she no longer challenged the judgment below insofar as it embodied a holding that the 1952 Florida divorce was valid and terminated the marital status of the parties.11
Whether a husband’s valid Florida divorce, obtained in a proceeding wherein his nonresident wife was served by publication only and did not make a personal appearance, unconstitutionally extinguished her dower right in his Florida estate?12
A valid ex parte divorce decree terminates the marital status of the parties under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.13 A state may apply its own law to extinguish inchoate dower rights upon divorce when the prior separation decree addressed only alimony that was fully performed until death.14 Neither Estin nor Vanderbilt requires preservation of dower as a property interest independent of ongoing marital status.15
No. The established facts show that in 1946 the petitioner obtained a New York separation decree awarding monthly alimony while the couple was domiciled in New York.16 Sol Simons moved to Florida in 1951 and obtained a 1952 divorce there after the petitioner received valid constructive notice but made no personal appearance.17 Sol Simons died in Florida in 1960, after which the respondent executor offered the will for probate in Dade County Probate Court and the petitioner elected dower under Florida law.18
The respondent opposed the election because the divorce had ended the marriage.19 The petitioner sued in Circuit Court to set aside the divorce or declare it ineffective as to dower; the trial court dismissed the action after trial, the District Court of Appeal affirmed at 157 So. 2d 199, and the Florida Supreme Court declined review.20 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari at 379 U. S. 877. At oral argument counsel conceded the divorce’s validity, leaving only the dower question.21
Under Florida law as applied to these facts, dower requires the claimant to be the legal wife at the husband’s death; the 1952 decree ended that status, extinguishing the inchoate right as confirmed in Pawley v. Pawley.22 The New York decree created no dower interest and imposed only an alimony obligation that Sol Simons fully satisfied until death, so Florida’s denial of dower violated neither full faith and credit nor due process.23 The Florida courts therefore acted within constitutional bounds.24
The Florida divorce did not unconstitutionally extinguish the petitioner’s dower right in her former husband’s Florida estate.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan joined the opinion but viewed it as a partial retreat from Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.26 He observed that the Court now permits an ex parte divorce to affect property rights by allowing Florida to extinguish dower, contrary to Vanderbilt’s first rule that such decrees can have no effect on property rights.27 Harlan noted that the second Vanderbilt rule concerning support awards by a later domicile state is not presented here because New York remained the petitioner’s domicile throughout and the New York decree created no additional property rights.28
He expressed hope that the remaining Vanderbilt rule would eventually be overruled in favor of the approach in his Vanderbilt dissent.29
Justice Black agreed completely with the Court’s judgment and opinion but wrote separately to reply to the suggestion that the decision marks a partial retreat from Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.30 He stated that today’s decision marks no retreat at all from the opinion or holding in Vanderbilt.31 Vanderbilt held that a wife’s right to support could not be cut off by an ex parte divorce.32
In the case before us, Mrs. Simons’ Florida dower was not terminated by the ex parte divorce.33 It simply never came into existence.34 No one disputes that the ex parte divorce was effective to end the marriage, so that after it Mrs. Simons was no longer Mr. Simons’ wife.35
Florida law grants dower only to a woman who is the legal wife of the husband when he dies.36 Mrs. Simons therefore had no property rights cut off by the divorce.37 Vanderbilt dealt with rights which a State did give to divorced wives, so it could not be thought to apply.38
Joined by Justice Goldberg
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Goldberg, dissented on the ground that the writ should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.39 He noted that after counsel conceded the divorce’s validity at oral argument, no federal question remained; the Full Faith and Credit issue disappeared once it was clear Sol Simons had complied with the entire New York decree, and the remaining questions concerned only Florida’s definition of dower under state law.40 Stewart concluded that the case presented no proper federal question for the Court to decide.41
Whether the Florida courts unconstitutionally denied the petitioner’s dower claim after the 1952 Florida divorce?42
No. The facts establish that the 1952 Florida divorce validly terminated the marriage after constructive notice to the petitioner.46 Because the petitioner was no longer Sol Simons’ wife when he died in 1960, she did not qualify for dower under the Florida statute that grants the right only to widows.47 The Florida courts applied this settled rule without violating any federal right.48
The Florida courts did not unconstitutionally deny the petitioner’s dower claim.49
Whether the Florida courts violated any constitutional duty to give effect to the New York decree in relation to the petitioner’s dower right?50
No. The New York decree awarded only monthly alimony, which Sol Simons paid until his death.53 The decree created no dower or equivalent property right under New York law, and the petitioner identified no such New York authority.54 Florida therefore honored the full measure of the New York judgment while applying its own law to the dower question.55
The Florida courts violated no constitutional duty to give effect to the New York decree.56