955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998)
On June 24, 1990, Ruth and Wayne Shulman were injured when the car in which they and two other family members were riding on Interstate 10 in Riverside County flew off the highway and tumbled down an embankment into a drainage ditch, coming to rest upside down. Ruth was pinned under the car, and both she and Wayne had to be cut free using the jaws of life.1
A Mercy Air rescue helicopter was dispatched to the scene carrying flight nurse Laura Carnahan, a medic, the pilot, and Joel Cooke, a video camera operator employed by defendants Group W Productions, Inc., and 4MN Productions. Cooke roamed the accident scene videotaping the rescue while Carnahan wore a wireless microphone that picked up her conversations with Ruth and the other rescue personnel.2
Cooke's tape was edited into a nine-minute segment that was broadcast on September 29, 1990, as part of the television program On Scene: Emergency Response. The segment showed Ruth's extrication from the vehicle, her statements during the rescue including repeated questions about whether she was dreaming and declarations that she just wanted to die, the transmission of her vital signs during helicopter flight, and her arrival at the hospital; Wayne appeared only fleetingly and was never heard.3
Neither plaintiff consented to the filming, recording, or broadcast. After the segment aired, Wayne telephoned Ruth in her hospital room to tell her Channel 4 was showing their accident; she viewed the broadcast and later described feeling shocked and exploited. The accident left Ruth a paraplegic.4
Ruth and Wayne sued the producers for invasion of privacy, asserting claims based on intrusion by the videotaping and recording and on publication of private facts by the broadcast. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeal reversed in part, and the Supreme Court of California granted review.5
Whether the broadcast material depicting the plaintiffs' rescue and medical treatment was of legitimate public concern?6
The dissemination of truthful, newsworthy material is not actionable as a publication of private facts under California common law.7 Newsworthiness exists when facts disclosed about a person involuntarily involved in an event of public interest bear a logical relationship to the newsworthy subject and are not intrusive in great disproportion to their relevance.8 Courts give substantial deference to editorial judgment.9
Yes. The subject of automobile accidents and emergency rescue services is of legitimate public concern because such events affect travelers and involve critical public services.10 The specific depictions of Ruth Shulman's extrication, her statements of confusion and despair, and her vital signs during helicopter transport were substantially relevant to the segment's focus on the challenges faced by flight nurse Carnahan in treating a traumatized patient, as the broadcast highlighted the demands of emergency care without disproportionate sensationalism.11
The broadcast material was newsworthy as a matter of law, so summary judgment was proper on the publication of private facts claim for both plaintiffs.12
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Baxter
Justice Brown dissented on the publication of private facts issue.13 She argued that the traditional Kapellas factors should apply instead of the plurality's logical-relationship test.14 Under those factors the broadcast had minimal social value because it showed Ruth's disorientation and despair.15
The depth of the broadcast's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs was substantial.16 Ruth did not voluntarily accede to public notoriety.17 The plurality's new test sacrifices the constitutional right to privacy on the altar of the First Amendment.18
Therefore triable issues exist and summary judgment was improper on her private facts claim.19
Whether the defendants' videotaping and recording of events inside the rescue helicopter intruded on the plaintiffs' seclusion?20
The tort of intrusion requires an intentional intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter where the plaintiff has an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion.21 The intrusion must also be highly offensive to a reasonable person, considering the degree, setting, and motives of the intruder.22
Yes. Plaintiffs had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of the rescue helicopter, which functions as an airborne ambulance where social custom and analogy to hospital rooms recognize privacy.23 Defendants' decision to film and record inside the helicopter without consent raises a triable issue on whether the conduct was highly offensive. A jury could find it showed a lack of sensitivity to the patients' need for seclusion during emergency transport.24
Triable issues of fact exist on the intrusion claim regarding the helicopter, so summary judgment was improper.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Mosk
Justice Chin concurred in part and dissented in part on the helicopter intrusion claim.26 He concluded that no triable issue exists because defendants' conduct was not highly offensive to a reasonable person.27 The recording occurred during newsgathering of a legitimate public event without interference with rescue efforts.28
It involved only innocuous conversations in settings where others could hear.29 The conduct was motivated by a desire to accurately depict the rescue rather than harassment or prurient interest.30 Therefore summary judgment should have been granted on the intrusion claim as well.31
Whether the placement of a microphone on the flight nurse to record conversations at the accident scene constituted an intrusion into private communications?32
The tort of intrusion requires an intentional intrusion into a private place, conversation, or matter where the plaintiff has an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion. The intrusion must also be highly offensive to a reasonable person, considering the degree, setting, and motives of the intruder. Medical conversations carry a traditional expectation of privacy.33
Yes. Ruth had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in her conversations with Nurse Carnahan and other rescuers at the accident scene.34 Medical communications during emergency treatment traditionally carry an expectation of confidentiality under both common law and statutes such as the physician-patient privilege and the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. By placing a wireless microphone on Carnahan to amplify and record those conversations without Ruth's knowledge or consent, defendants may have intruded on a zone of privacy.35
A jury could find the conduct highly offensive given Ruth's vulnerable state and the calculated advantage taken of her confusion.36
Triable issues of fact exist on the intrusion claim regarding the microphone at the accident scene, so summary judgment was improper.37
Whether the media defendants had a constitutional privilege to intrude on the plaintiffs' seclusion and private communications in the course of newsgathering?38
The press enjoys no special constitutional privilege under the First Amendment to intrude tortiously into private places, conversations, or matters merely because the information sought may be newsworthy.39 Generally applicable laws such as the intrusion tort and Penal Code section 632 apply to newsgathering.40 Any burden on the press must be shown to be impermissibly severe before an exception arises.41
No. Defendants had no constitutional privilege to intrude by filming inside the helicopter or recording Ruth's medical conversations.42 The press is subject to generally applicable tort and criminal laws when gathering news.43 Enforcement here would not eviscerate press freedom or deprive reporters of indispensable tools, as newsgathering on accidents and rescues does not depend on secret recordings of private medical communications or entry into occupied ambulances.44
No constitutional privilege protects the defendants' conduct, so the intrusion claims may proceed.45
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Mosk
Justice Kennard concurred in the judgment on the intrusion claim.46 She noted the tension between the publication of private facts tort and First Amendment doctrine but agreed that the intrusion claim raises no such conflict because the tort does not punish publication itself.47 She emphasized that case-by-case adjudication remains appropriate to reconcile privacy and press interests without adopting a broad newsworthiness rule that could suppress truthful speech based on content.48
The intrusion analysis therefore properly proceeds to trial.49