334 U.S. 343 (1948)
In 1930, Margaret E. Sherrer and Edward C. Sherrer were married in New Jersey.1 From 1932 until April 3, 1944, they lived together in Monterey, Massachusetts.2 On April 3, 1944, Margaret Sherrer left Massachusetts with the two children of the marriage, ostensibly to spend a vacation in Florida.3 Shortly after her arrival, she informed her husband that she did not intend to return, obtained housing accommodations in Florida, placed her older child in school, and secured employment for herself.4
On July 6, 1944, at Margaret Sherrer's direction, a bill of complaint for divorce was filed in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida alleging extreme cruelty as grounds and that she was a bona fide resident of Florida.5 Edward Sherrer received notice by mail, retained Florida counsel who entered a general appearance and filed an answer denying the allegations including the allegation as to her Florida residence.6 On November 14, 1944, hearings were held in the divorce proceedings at which Edward Sherrer appeared personally to testify with respect to a stipulation relating to custody of the children, and throughout the proceedings he was represented by counsel who failed to cross-examine or introduce evidence in rebuttal.7
The Florida court entered a decree of divorce on November 29, 1944, after specifically finding that Margaret Sherrer was a bona fide resident of the State of Florida and that the court had jurisdiction.8 On December 1, 1944, Margaret Sherrer married Henry A. Phelps in Florida, and they lived together as husband and wife in Florida until February 5, 1945, when they returned to Massachusetts.9
In June 1945, Edward Sherrer instituted an action in the Probate Court of Berkshire County, Massachusetts, alleging that he is the lawful husband of Margaret Sherrer, that the Florida decree is invalid, and that her subsequent marriage is void, and praying that he be permitted to convey his real estate as if sole and that the court declare he was living apart from his wife for justifiable cause.10 The Probate Court resolved the issues of fact adversely to Margaret Sherrer's contentions, found that she was never domiciled in Florida, and granted Edward Sherrer the relief requested.11 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the decree on the grounds that it was supported by the evidence and that the requirements of full faith and credit did not preclude the Massachusetts courts from reexamining the finding of domicile made by the Florida court.12
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and in Coe v. Coe to consider the contention of petitioners that Massachusetts has failed to accord full faith and credit to decrees of divorce rendered by courts of sister States.13
Whether the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings?14
The requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the decree.15
Yes. Edward Sherrer participated in the Florida proceedings by entering a general appearance, filing pleadings placing in issue the very matters he sought subsequently to contest in the Massachusetts courts, personally appearing before the Florida court and giving testimony in the case, and by retaining attorneys who represented him throughout the entire proceedings.16 He was given full opportunity to contest the issue of Margaret Sherrer's domicile.17 The Florida decree is assumed valid in Florida and not susceptible to collateral attack there.18
The Massachusetts courts erred in permitting the Florida divorce decree to be subjected to attack on the ground that petitioner was not domiciled in Florida at the time the decree was entered.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Murphy
Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the decision disregards a law that for a century has expressed the social policy of Massachusetts in a domain which under the Constitution is peculiarly the concern of the States.20 He argued that a judgment implies the power of the State to deal with the subject-matter and that domicile is the basis of power to dissolve a marriage.21 Frankfurter maintained that the State's interest in the family relations of its citizens cannot be bartered away by the parties through an arranged contest in another State.22
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not foreclose Massachusetts from insisting it is not bound by proceedings lacking the power that domicile alone gives.23
Whether a finding of the requisite jurisdictional facts made in divorce proceedings in which the defendant appeared and participated may be subjected to collateral attack in the courts of a sister State?24
A finding of the requisite jurisdictional facts made in divorce proceedings in which the defendant appeared and participated may not be subjected to collateral attack in the courts of a sister State when the defendant was accorded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues and the decree is not susceptible to such attack in the rendering State.25
No. The Florida court made a specific finding that Margaret Sherrer was a bona fide resident of Florida after Edward Sherrer appeared personally, was represented by counsel, and had the opportunity to litigate the domicile issue.26 The doctrine of res judicata applies to such adjudications of jurisdiction where the parties had full opportunity to litigate and the decree is final in Florida.27
The finding of domicile by the Florida court may not be subjected to collateral attack in Massachusetts.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Murphy
Justice Frankfurter contended that the opportunity of the parties to litigate jurisdiction in Florida does not foreclose Massachusetts from raising the question later.29 He emphasized that the State's interest in the marital status of its domiciliaries is independent and cannot be abrogated by private arrangement in another State, even if a contest over jurisdiction occurred.30 The home State retains the power to determine whether the asserted domicile was a sham because the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not permit parties to foreclose the State's vital interest through their private litigation.31