512 U.S. 573 (1994)
Terry Lee Shannon, a convicted felon, was stopped by a police officer at about 4 a.m. on August 25, 1990, on a street in Tupelo, Mississippi.1
After telling the officer that he did not want to live anymore, Shannon walked across the street, pulled a pistol from his coat, and shot himself in the chest.2 Shannon survived the suicide attempt and was indicted on a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.3
During his trial Shannon raised an insanity defense and requested that the district court instruct the jury regarding the consequences of a verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity.4 He asked the court to inform the jury that he would be committed.5 He further requested that the court inform the jury that it was required to commit him to a suitable hospital facility until such time as he no longer posed a substantial risk of bodily injury to another or serious damage to the property of another.6
The district court declined to give Shannon's proposed instruction.7 The court instead directed the jury to apply the law as instructed regardless of the consequence and admonished that punishment should not enter the jury's consideration or discussion.8 The jury ultimately returned a verdict of guilty.9
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed Shannon's conviction.10 The Fifth Circuit noted its pre-existing precedent against instructing juries on the consequences of an insanity acquittal and determined that the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 contained no statutory requirement for such an instruction.11
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to consider whether federal district courts are required to instruct juries with regard to the consequences of a not guilty only by reason of insanity verdict.12
Whether a federal district court is required to instruct the jury regarding the consequences to the defendant of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984?13
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 refers to the subject of jury instructions only once in its description of the possible verdicts a jury may return.14 Under the Act the jury shall be instructed to find the defendant guilty, not guilty, or not guilty only by reason of insanity.15 The text of the Act gives no indication that jurors are to be instructed regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict.16
No. Shannon requested the instruction under the IDRA after raising the insanity defense at trial.17 The statute's text does not support requiring it because the Act specifies only the three possible verdicts without any reference to consequences.18 Although Shannon contended that Congress modeled the IDRA on the D.C. Code and thereby adopted the Lyles practice of giving the instruction, the IDRA departed from the D.C. scheme in multiple significant respects.19 These differences include the standard of proof for the insanity defense and the timing and standards for commitment hearings.20
The differences render the interpretive canon inapplicable.21 A single passage of legislative history cannot override the plain statutory text.22
A federal district court is not required to instruct the jury regarding the consequences of an NGI verdict under the IDRA.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the Lyles rule should apply nationwide once Congress created a civil commitment procedure for insanity acquittees in all federal courts.24 He observed that the legislative history shows the Act's sponsors assumed the Lyles precedent would be followed.25 Stevens maintained that abandoning the established instruction exposes defendants to an obvious risk of injustice when jurors might convict out of fear that an insane defendant would otherwise go free.26
He concluded that a wiser approach would permit the defendant to choose between the general rule and the Lyles instruction rather than favoring the prosecution in every case.27
Whether such an instruction is required as a matter of general federal criminal practice?28
It is well established that when a jury has no sentencing function it should be admonished to reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed.29 The principle that juries are not to consider the consequences of their verdicts is a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system between judge and jury.30 The jury's function is to find the facts and to decide whether on those facts the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.31
No. Shannon contended that jurors unfamiliar with NGI consequences might wrongly assume an acquittee would be released immediately and therefore convict to prevent that outcome.32 In Shannon's trial however the district court instructed the jury to apply the law as instructed regardless of consequence and that punishment should not enter consideration or discussion.33 The Court relied on the presumption that jurors follow such instructions.34 An accurate description of the IDRA procedures would reveal only a mandatory period of confinement until a hearing within forty days.35
That information could itself prompt some jurors to convict to avoid possible early release.36 Extending the proposed instruction to other sentencing matters such as mandatory minimums or parole would quickly swallow the general rule against informing jurors of consequences.37 Congress conducted a comprehensive review of the insanity defense yet chose not to require the instruction.38
Such an instruction is not required as a matter of general federal criminal practice.39
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on this point as well.40 He stressed that the Lyles instruction has minimized the risk of injustice for decades by ensuring jurors understand that an NGI verdict means confinement rather than freedom.41 He noted that the general prohibition on consequence instructions was meant to shield defendants from improper considerations.42
Yet when jurors harbor misconceptions that could distort deliberations fairness requires a clarifying instruction.43 Stevens pointed out that numerous states and the American Bar Association endorse the practice.44 There is no reason to withhold the information from jurors when the defendant requests it.45