108 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1952)
On February 12, 1913, Thomas Jefferson Coolidge executed a deed of trust that established the terms for distribution of income and principal to his descendants.1 He died on November 17, 1920.2 Two petitions were filed under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231A seeking binding declarations as to the validity of the provisions relating to income and to gifts of principal by way of remainder in the deed of trust.3 In each case a decree was entered declaring that the life interests are valid, but that the gifts over of principal are invalid and void. Upon the termination of the trust the personal representatives of the settlor’s estate are to receive the principal and any unpaid accumulated income. The petitioners, the trustees, and numerous other persons interested in the trust or in the settlor’s estate appealed.4
The net income of the trust was payable one third semiannually to such of the issue of the settlor’s deceased son as shall be living at the time of each such semi-annual payment, and two thirds, divided into three parts payable semiannually, one part each to Marian A. Sargent and to Sarah L. Newbold and after their death to their respective issue, and one to the living issue of Eleonora R. Sears, who were the petitioner Eleonora R. Sears and Frederick R. Sears.5 The appeals relating to the life interests have been waived and withdrawn.6 The facts are undisputed and, for the most part, are embodied in a written stipulation in the Probate Court, with the evidence reported.7
Paragraph 5 of the trust instrument provides that the capital of the trust is to be distributed in equal shares to and among the settlor’s issue living at the time of distribution.8 Distribution is to take place upon whichever shall first happen of two events. One event is the death of the last survivor of those of the settlor’s children, grandchildren and great grandchildren who shall be living at his death. The other event is the attainment of fifty years by the youngest surviving grandchild of his who shall be living at his death. The second event first happened when William A. Coolidge, the youngest grandchild living at the settlor's death, attained the age of fifty years on October 21, 1951.9
At the time the settlor executed the deed of trust he was eighty-one years of age and had been a widower for twelve years.10 He then had two living children, Marian A. Sargent, who was aged fifty-nine and had been a widow for twenty years, and Sarah L. Newbold, who was then fifty-five years of age.11 During the preceding year there had died two of his children, T. Jefferson Coolidge and Eleonora R. Sears.12 The settlor then had ten living grandchildren: four were the minor sons of his deceased son, two were the children of his deceased daughter one being the petitioner Eleonora R. Sears and the other Frederick R. Sears, one was the child of Marian A. Sargent, and three were the children of Sarah L. Newbold.13 The oldest grandchild was thirty-five and the youngest was seven, and no further grandchildren were born in the settlor’s lifetime although the youngest of the ten died before the settlor.14
Paragraph 9 reserves to the settlor power at all times to make any additions to the trust property, to change and alter any or all of the trusts, to declare new uses and trusts of the property in any way or manner except such as will vest in himself the trust property or any beneficial interest therein, to name and appoint any other persons than those above specified or hereafter appointed as beneficiaries, whether by way of addition or substitution, and to appoint other trustees instead of or in addition to any or all of those above named, with every such change, alteration, nomination and appointment to be made by deed taking effect immediately upon delivery to any person acting as trustee.15
Whether the remainder interests in the trust violate the rule against perpetuities?16
Where a trust instrument contains two alternative conditions, of which the first might be too remote and the second, which actually occurs, is not too remote, the rule is not violated.17
No. The second event first happened when William A. Coolidge, the youngest grandchild living at the settlor's death, attained the age of fifty years on October 21, 1951.18 Because the attainment by the youngest grandchild of the age of fifty years was bound to occur within the period required by the rule against perpetuities, the remainder interests do not violate the rule.19
The remainder interests do not violate the rule against perpetuities.20
Whether the reference in paragraph 5 to the youngest surviving grandchild living at the settlor's death must be read to exclude grandchildren born after execution of the trust?21
The appellees argue, on the other hand, that it is not permissible thus to qualify the clause in paragraph 5, and for present purposes we accept their position on this point, and assume that the phrase "the youngest surviving grandchild of mine who shall be living at my death" is not to be interpreted as excluding grandchildren who might be born after the trust instrument was created.22
No. For present purposes the position of the appellees is accepted and the phrase in paragraph 5 is assumed not to be interpreted as excluding grandchildren who might be born after the trust instrument was created.23
The reference in paragraph 5 is not required to be read to exclude grandchildren born after execution of the trust.24
Whether the validity of the remainders may be determined using facts known at the settlor's death because of the power reserved in paragraph 9?25
A reserved power to alter trusts and appoint beneficiaries by deed is akin to a special power of appointment. When such a power remains unexercised the validity of default remainders may be judged by facts known at the moment the power ceases to be exercisable.26
Yes. The reserved power in paragraph 9 is at the very least akin to a power of appointment.27 It is reasonable to afford the same opportunity to examine facts at the time the power ceases as when the power is exercised.28 Upon the settlor's death on November 17, 1920, it could be seen for the first time that no further grandchildren had been born and there was to be no failure to vest within the period limited by the rule.29
The validity of the remainders may be determined using facts known at the settlor's death because of the power reserved in paragraph 9.30