414 U.S. 573 (1974)
Alexander Gaudet, a longshoreman, suffered severe injuries while working aboard the S.S. Claiborne, a vessel owned by Sea-Land Services, Inc., while the vessel was docked in navigable waters in New Orleans, Louisiana.1 Gaudet sued Sea-Land in personam in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that the vessel was unseaworthy and that Sea-Land was negligent in failing to provide a safe place to work.2 A jury awarded Gaudet $175,000, which was reduced by 20 percent for his contributory negligence, resulting in a recovery of $140,000 for his permanent disability, physical agony, and loss of earnings.3
Some 18 months after the termination of that action, Gaudet died, allegedly as a result of the injuries sustained aboard the vessel.4 His widow, the respondent, then brought the present action in the same district court, again invoking its admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.5 The complaint repeated the allegations of unseaworthiness and negligence, alleged that Gaudet's death resulted from the injuries, and sought damages for wrongful death including loss of support, loss of society, and funeral expenses.6
The district court granted Sea-Land's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the prior judgment barred the wrongful death action.7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.9
Whether a maritime wrongful death action may be maintained after the decedent has recovered damages for his injuries during his lifetime?10
Under the general maritime law as recognized in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, the wrongful death remedy is independent of the decedent's personal injury claim.11 A single tortious act produces two distinct harms, one to the decedent and one to the dependents.12 A prior recovery therefore does not bar the widow's suit.13
Yes. Alexander Gaudet recovered $140,000 in his personal injury action against Sea-Land Services, Inc. The recovery followed a jury verdict that was reduced by 20 percent for contributory negligence.1415 The action was based on unseaworthiness and negligence while the vessel was docked in New Orleans navigable waters.16 Some eighteen months later Gaudet died from those injuries.17
His widow brought a separate action in the same district court.18 She sought damages for loss of support, loss of society, and funeral expenses.19 The maritime wrongful death action addresses harms to the dependents that could not accrue until death.20 It rests on a distinct cause of action.21
The prior judgment therefore does not operate as res judicata to preclude the widow's suit.22
The maritime wrongful death action may be maintained after the decedent has recovered damages for his injuries during his lifetime.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Burger, C. J., And Stewart And Rehnquist, Jj.
Justice Powell dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.24 He argued that the majority's decision conflicts with the long line of cases under the Jones Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, beginning with Mellon v. Goodyear.25 Those decisions hold that a decedent's recovery or settlement during his lifetime bars any subsequent wrongful death action by his dependents.26
Powell emphasized that this rule rests on sound policy grounds, including the avoidance of double recovery and the promotion of finality in litigation.27 He further contended that the holding undermines the uniformity of admiralty law, creating anomalous results depending on whether a seaman's injuries occur on land or at sea.28 In his view, the majority improperly disregarded established precedent and congressional policy embodied in the maritime wrongful death statutes.29
Whether damages for loss of society are recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action?30
In a maritime wrongful death action the widow may recover damages for loss of society.31 The remedy must be shaped by the humane and liberal character of maritime law.32 It must also follow the policy of the Death on the High Seas Act and state statutes.33 A majority of those statutes permit recovery for loss of society.34
Yes. The respondent sought damages for loss of society in addition to loss of support and funeral expenses.35 Loss of society embraces love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection.36 Permitting recovery aligns the maritime remedy with the majority of state wrongful death statutes.37 It fulfills admiralty's special solicitude for the dependents of those who venture upon the sea.38
Damages for loss of society are recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Burger, C. J., And Stewart And Rehnquist, Jj.
Justice Powell dissented from the allowance of loss of society damages.40 He observed that the holding repudiates the congressional purposes expressed in the Death on the High Seas Act and the Jones Act.41 Both statutes limit recovery to pecuniary losses, and the traditional admiralty view has long excluded nonpecuniary damages such as loss of society.42
Powell noted that most lower courts applying Moragne had correctly concluded that such damages are not recoverable, consistent with the guidance in that decision to draw analogy from the federal statutes rather than fashion an entirely new body of law.43 In his view, the majority's expansion of damages conflicts with the pecuniary-loss limitation that Congress imposed in the principal maritime wrongful death statutes.44
Whether funeral expenses are recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action?45
Funeral expenses are recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action.46 This applies when the decedent's dependents have paid them or are liable for their payment.47 The rule follows general maritime law prior to The Harrisburg.48 It also follows the practice under a majority of state wrongful death statutes.49
Yes. The widow sought damages for funeral expenses.50 The court found no persuasive reason not to follow the earlier admiralty rule.51 That rule permitted recovery of funeral expenses.52 Those expenses are a loss unique to the dependents.53 The loss arises only upon the decedent's death.54 It is therefore not included in the decedent's own recovery for personal injuries.55
Funeral expenses are recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Burger, C. J., And Stewart And Rehnquist, Jj.
Justice Powell would not have reached the damages question because he maintained that no cause of action exists once the decedent has recovered during his lifetime.56 He viewed the majority's entire approach as disregarding a major body of maritime and state law that uniformly treats a prior recovery by the decedent as a bar to any subsequent wrongful death suit.57 Powell argued that the decision nullifies limitations built into the congressional enactments governing maritime wrongful death and creates a serious risk of duplicative recoveries that the established rule had prevented.58
In his judgment, the majority's expansion of both the right of action and the elements of damages was unsound as a matter of principle and inconsistent with the uniformity that Moragne had sought to achieve.59