440 U.S. 567 (1979)
Aubrey Scott was charged with theft in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 16-1 (1969) for shoplifting merchandise valued at less than $150.1
The Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for such an offense at a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both.2 Scott had a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, without counsel and without notice of entitlement to retain counsel or, if indigent, to have counsel provided.3 He was found guilty as charged and sentenced to pay a $50 fine.4
Scott's conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate appellate court and then by the Supreme Court of Illinois.5 Scott was found to be indigent at the time of his initial appeal.6 An attorney was appointed for him and he was provided a free transcript of his trial for use on the appeal.7 The Illinois courts and the parties assumed his indigency at the time of trial for purposes of this case.8
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state and lower federal courts regarding the proper application of its decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin.9 The trial in this case occurred about four months before Argersinger was decided.10
Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require a state to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment when the defendant receives only a fine upon conviction?11
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.12
No. Applying the actual imprisonment standard from Argersinger to the facts of this case, the Court held that because Scott received only a fine, the constitutional requirement for appointed counsel was not triggered.13
The central premise that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment warranted adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the right to appointment of counsel.14
Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable costs on the States.15
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is accordingly affirmed because the facts establish that no imprisonment occurred and therefore no right to appointed counsel attached under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require the appointment of counsel when the defendant is not sentenced to imprisonment.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment but expressed continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule.17
He noted that the drawing of a line based on whether there is imprisonment, even for overnight, can have the practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in which conviction can have more serious consequences.18
Powell observed that the rule tends to impair the proper functioning of the criminal justice system in that trial judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before knowing anything about the case except the charge, all too often will be compelled to forgo the legislatively granted option to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction.19
Preserving this option by providing counsel often will be impossible or impracticable, particularly in congested urban courts where scores of cases are heard in a single sitting, and in small and rural communities where lawyers may not be available.20
He joined the opinion mindful of stare decisis but with the hope that in due time a majority will recognize that a more flexible rule is consistent with due process and will better serve the cause of justice.21
Joined by Marshall And Stevens, Jj.
Justice Brennan dissented arguing that the plain wording of the Sixth Amendment and the Court's precedents compel the conclusion that Scott's uncounseled conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and should be reversed.22
He maintained that the right to counsel should extend to any offense for which imprisonment is authorized because the authorized penalty is a better predictor of the stigma and other collateral consequences that attach to conviction of an offense.23
Brennan emphasized that the authorized imprisonment standard more faithfully implements the principles of the Sixth Amendment identified in Gideon and avoids the problems of administration inherent in the actual imprisonment standard, such as time-consuming consideration of the likely sentence in each individual case before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal treatment, and apparent and actual bias.24
He pointed out that the standard has not produced havoc in the substantial number of States that already provide counsel in all cases where imprisonment is authorized and that those States include a large majority of the country's population and a great diversity of urban and rural environments.25
Justice Blackmun dissented stating that for substantially the reasons stated by Justice Brennan in Parts I and II of his dissenting opinion, he would hold that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments extends at least as far as the right to jury trial secured by those Amendments.26
He would hold that an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment.27
On this approach, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois upholding petitioner Scott's conviction should be reversed since he was convicted of an offense for which he was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.28
This resolution would provide the bright line that defendants, prosecutors, and trial and appellate courts all deserve and, at the same time, would reconcile on a principled basis the important considerations that led to the decisions in Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger.29
Whether the decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin extends the right to appointed counsel to cases in which imprisonment is authorized by statute but not actually imposed?30
Argersinger v. Hamlin delimited the constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings by adopting actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel rather than the mere authorization of imprisonment.31
No. The Court concluded after reviewing the language and intentions of Argersinger that the decision did indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings by focusing on actual imprisonment.32
Even were the matter res nova, the central premise of Argersinger that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.33
In the facts of this case, although imprisonment was authorized by the Illinois statute up to one year, Scott received only a $50 fine, so the extension urged by the petitioner was rejected as an unwarranted expansion that would create confusion and impose substantial costs on the States.34
Argersinger does not extend the right to appointed counsel to cases where imprisonment is authorized but not imposed.35