65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 480 N.E.2d 679 (1985)
Plaintiffs Richard E. and Margaret Schultz were domiciled in Emerson, New Jersey, with their sons Richard, age 13, and Christopher, age 11.1 In 1978 the boys attended Assumption School, an institution owned and operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark.2 By agreement with the Archdiocese, defendant Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc., an Ohio corporation, supplied teachers for the school, including Brother Edmund Coakeley.3
Coakeley also served as scoutmaster of Boy Scout Troop 337, a locally chartered troop sponsored and approved by defendant Boy Scouts of America, Inc., a federally chartered corporation then maintaining its national headquarters in New Brunswick, New Jersey.4 In July 1978 Coakeley took Christopher to Pine Creek Reservation, a Boy Scout camp located in upstate New York near Foresport in Oneida County, where the complaint alleges he sexually abused the boy.5 The complaint further alleges that Coakeley continued the abuse after Christopher returned to Assumption School in New Jersey that fall.6
He made similar threats during a scout trip to the same New York camp on Memorial Day weekend in 1978 when he abused Richard.7 As a result of these acts both boys allegedly suffered severe psychological, emotional and mental pain.8 Christopher committed suicide by ingesting drugs on May 29, 1979.9
The complaint sets forth four causes of action. Richard E. Schultz, as administrator of Christopher's estate, seeks damages for wrongful death and for pre-death injuries. As father and natural guardian he seeks damages for Richard's personal injuries. The parents also seek damages for their own injuries, including destruction of family life, medical expenditures, mental anguish and psychological harm.10 They charge both corporate defendants with negligence in assigning Coakeley to positions of trust and in failing to dismiss him despite actual or constructive notice of prior similar misconduct at another Boy Scout camp.11
Plaintiffs had previously sued the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark in New Jersey; that action was dismissed.12 In the present New York action against Boy Scouts of America and the Franciscan Brothers, defendants moved for summary judgment asserting New Jersey charitable immunity and collateral estoppel from the prior judgment.13 Special Term granted the motions, severed the causes of action and dismissed the complaint. A divided Appellate Division affirmed.14
Whether New Jersey or New York law governs the claims against Boy Scouts of America, Inc.?15
Under New York choice-of-law rules for tort actions, when the conflicting rules are loss-distributing in nature such as charitable immunity, the law of the parties' common domicile applies rather than the law of the place of the tort.16
Yes. Plaintiffs Richard E. and Margaret Schultz were domiciled in Emerson, New Jersey, and defendant Boy Scouts of America, Inc. maintained its national headquarters in New Brunswick, New Jersey at the time of the events, making the parties codomiciliaries of New Jersey.17 The alleged negligent hiring and supervision by the Boy Scouts constituted a loss-distributing rule in conflict with New York's rule of charitable nonimmunity.18
New York's interests as forum and locus of some tortious conduct are insufficient to override the common-domicile interest in enforcing New Jersey's charitable immunity statute when the issue is loss allocation rather than conduct regulation.19 The court therefore applied New Jersey law to the claims against Boy Scouts of America, Inc.20
New Jersey law governs the claims against Boy Scouts of America, Inc.21
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Jasen dissented from the majority's application of New Jersey law to the claims against Boy Scouts of America. He argued that New York's interests as the locus-forum in applying its rule of charitable nonimmunity are overriding, especially given the heinous nature of the alleged tortious conduct.22
New York has a paramount interest in deterring serious tortious misconduct within its borders regardless of the parties' domiciles. This interest is particularly vital where the tortious misconduct involves sexual abuse and exploitation of children.23
Whether New Jersey or New York law governs the claims against Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc.?24
When parties are domiciled in different jurisdictions with conflicting loss-distribution rules and the locus of the tort is a third jurisdiction, the law of the place of the tort applies. This rule applies unless displacing it will advance the substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.25
Yes. Plaintiffs were domiciled in New Jersey while defendant Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc. was an Ohio corporation.26 The third Neumeier rule therefore applied.27 Application of New Jersey law advances that state's interest in enforcing the loss-distribution decisions of its domiciliaries and in promoting charitable activities within its borders.28
Application of New Jersey law does not frustrate New York's interests because New York has no significant contacts with the parties sufficient to implicate its own law.29 Application of New Jersey law also reduces forum shopping and provides certainty for litigants whose reasonable expectation was that New Jersey law would apply.30
New Jersey law governs the claims against Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, Inc.31
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Jasen dissented from the majority's application of New Jersey law to the claims against Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis. He argued that New York's interests as the locus-forum in applying its rule of charitable nonimmunity are overriding. The defendants permitted the tort-feasor to take the children into New York.32
New York has a paramount interest in deterring serious tortious misconduct within its borders regardless of the parties' domiciles. This interest is particularly vital where the tortious misconduct involves sexual abuse and exploitation of children.
Whether New Jersey's charitable immunity statute should be enforced in this action despite New York's public policy?33
The public policy exception to choice of law permits a forum to refuse to apply otherwise applicable foreign law only when the foreign law is repugnant to fundamental principles of justice expressed in the forum's Constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions and when there are sufficient contacts between the forum, the parties, and the transaction to implicate the forum's public policy.34
No. Although New York abolished charitable immunity in Bing v. Thunig and enforcement of New Jersey's statute might run counter to New York public policy, the contacts between New York, the parties, and the transactions were not substantial enough to implicate New York's public policy.35 The only New York contacts were isolated instances of tortious conduct at a Boy Scout camp, while the parties were New Jersey domiciliaries and the defendants' charitable activities were centered in New Jersey.36 The public policy exception therefore does not apply.37
New Jersey's charitable immunity statute should be enforced in this action.38
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Jasen dissented on the ground that New Jersey's charitable immunity statute is anachronistic, obsolete, and senseless. This court held in Bing v. Thunig that the rule was inherently incongruous, contrary to both good morals and sound law, out of tune with modern day needs, unfair and confused.39
New York should refuse to apply it on public policy grounds because the alleged misconduct was sexual abuse of children committed in New York. This court has previously refused to apply foreign laws repugnant to New York public policy when sufficient contacts exist.40
Whether plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the effect of New Jersey's charitable immunity statute by the prior New Jersey judgment against the Archdiocese?41
Collateral estoppel applies when the issue was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination was essential to the judgment, and the party to be precluded had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.42
Yes. The issue whether New Jersey's charitable immunity statute bars claims for negligent hiring and supervision was actually litigated and determined by a final judgment in the prior New Jersey action against the Archdiocese.43 That determination was essential to the judgment dismissing the complaint.44 Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before New Jersey's highest court and vigorously pursued their claims there.45
Because New Jersey law governs and the public policy exception does not apply, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the statute's effect.46
Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the effect of New Jersey's charitable immunity statute by the prior New Jersey judgment against the Archdiocese.47