359 U.S. 236 (1959)
In March 1953 the petitioning unions sought from respondents, co-partners in the lumber and materials business in California, an agreement to retain in their employ only workers who were already union members or who applied for membership within thirty days.1 Respondents refused, stating that none of their employees had shown a desire to join a union and that they could not accept the arrangement until a union had been designated by the employees as collective bargaining agent.2 The unions then began peacefully picketing respondents' place of business and exerting pressure on customers and suppliers to stop dealing with respondents, with the sole purpose of compelling execution of the proposed contract.3
Respondents filed suit in the Superior Court for the County of San Diego seeking an injunction and damages.4 After hearing, the trial court found the facts as described above.5 The court enjoined the unions from picketing and other pressures until one of them had been properly designated as collective bargaining agent.6 The court also awarded respondents $1,000 in damages for losses sustained.7
At the time the state-court suit was filed, respondents had begun a representation proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board.8 The Regional Director declined jurisdiction, presumably because the amount of interstate commerce involved did not meet the Board's monetary standards.9
The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. It held that the Board's declination of jurisdiction empowered the state courts to act. The court also found that the unions' conduct constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act and was not privileged under California law.10 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for consideration of whether the damages award could be sustained under California law.11
On remand the California Supreme Court set aside the injunction. However, it sustained the award of damages. The court grounded the award in general tort provisions of the California Civil Code sections 1677 and 1708 as well as state labor relations statutes in the California Labor Code sections 923 and 1115-1118.12 The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari to determine whether the California court had jurisdiction to award damages arising out of the peaceful union activity.13
Whether the National Labor Relations Act precludes a state court from awarding damages for peaceful union activities that are arguably protected by section 7 or constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8 when the National Labor Relations Board has not adjudicated the status of those activities?14
When an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.15
Yes. The conduct at issue consists of peaceful picketing and economic pressure by unions seeking a union-security agreement after the employer refused on the ground that employees had not designated a bargaining agent.16 The trial court found that the sole purpose of the activity was to compel execution of the proposed contract.17 The court enjoined the conduct until proper designation occurred and awarded one thousand dollars in damages for losses sustained.18
After the Regional Director declined jurisdiction in the parallel representation proceeding because interstate commerce did not meet Board monetary standards, the California Supreme Court sustained the damages award under general tort provisions of the Civil Code and specific state labor statutes.19 Because the activity is arguably within the compass of sections 7 or 8 and the Board has never adjudicated its status, state jurisdiction is displaced regardless of the form of relief.20 The obligation to pay compensation is designed to govern conduct and therefore creates the same risk of conflict with uniform federal policy as an injunction would.21
The state remedy cannot be saved by the fact that the Board declined jurisdiction or by the absence of violence, as the governing consideration remains the potential frustration of national labor policy when two law-making sources regulate the same conduct.
The National Labor Relations Act precludes the state court from awarding damages arising out of the peaceful union activity.22
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Justice Harlan concurred in the result on the narrow ground that the unions' activities may fairly be considered protected under the Taft-Hartley Act.23 He emphasized that the threshold question in every preemption case is whether the conduct is or may fairly be regarded as federally protected activity.24 Harlan would have sustained a state damages judgment if the conduct were unprotected even if prohibited by federal law.25
He parted from the majority by adhering to the distinction drawn in Laburnum and Russell between damages and injunctions.26 He rejected the suggestion that states lose power when conduct is neither protected nor prohibited.27
Whether the National Labor Relations Board's declination of jurisdiction in a representation proceeding leaves state courts free to award damages for such union activities?28
The failure of the National Labor Relations Board to assert jurisdiction or to define the legal significance of a particular activity does not give the States the power to act, because allowing the States to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy.29
No. The Regional Director's declination of jurisdiction in the representation proceeding, based solely on the amount of interstate commerce, did not restore state authority over the peaceful picketing and pressure.3031 The Supreme Court had already held in the companion Guss case that Board refusal to exercise jurisdiction does not leave the States free to regulate activities they would otherwise be preempted from regulating.32
On remand the California court nevertheless sustained the damages award under state tort and labor statutes, but the absence of any Board determination that the activity is neither protected nor prohibited keeps the matter within the primary competence of the federal agency.33 The risk of conflicting standards of substantive law and differing remedial schemes remains the same whether the Board declines jurisdiction or simply fails to act.34
State power to award damages is therefore displaced even though the Board never reached the merits of the unfair-labor-practice question.35
The National Labor Relations Board's declination of jurisdiction does not leave state courts free to award damages for the union activities.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred that the Board's declination of jurisdiction does not authorize state courts to award damages for the union activities. He referenced the Court's earlier decision in this case along with Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.37 Harlan maintained that state remedies must be withheld until the National Labor Relations Board has determined whether the conduct is protected or prohibited under the federal Act.38
He observed that the delays inherent in Board proceedings or outright refusals to exercise jurisdiction often leave parties injured by nonviolent conduct without any effective remedy, whether federal or state.39 This position reflects his view that primary jurisdiction remains with the Board even in the absence of a merits determination.40