411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 127, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973)
In the summer of 1968 Mexican-American parents whose children attended elementary and secondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School District in San Antonio Texas brought a class action.1 They sued on behalf of schoolchildren throughout the state who were members of minority groups or who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base.2 Named as defendants were the State Board of Education the Commissioner of Education the State Attorney General and the Bexar County Board of Trustees.3 The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. A three-judge court was impaneled in January 1969.4
The Texas system of financing public education originated with the state's first constitution in 1845.5 It evolved through constitutional amendments permitting local school districts to levy ad valorem taxes for school buildings and maintenance.6 These local revenues were supplemented by distributions from the state's Permanent School Fund established in 1854 and the Available School Fund.7
In the late 1940s the legislature enacted the Minimum Foundation School Program.8 Under the program the state supplies approximately 80 percent of the cost of teacher salaries operating expenses and transportation.9 Each district contributes the remaining 20 percent through a Local Fund Assignment.10 The assignment is calculated by an economic index reflecting relative taxpaying ability.11 Every district also levies additional local property taxes beyond the assignment to supplement its foundation grant.12
For the 1967-1968 school year the Edgewood Independent School District had an average assessed property value of $5960 per pupil and a median family income of $4686.13 It raised $26 per pupil through local taxation at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed valuation.14 It received $222 per pupil from the Foundation Program and obtained $108 in federal funds for a total of $356 per pupil.15 By comparison the Alamo Heights Independent School District had an assessed property value exceeding $49000 per pupil and a median family income of $8001.16 It raised $333 per pupil locally at a rate of $0.85 per $100 received $225 from the Foundation Program and $36 in federal funds for a total of $594 per pupil.17 Similar disparities in per-pupil expenditures existed throughout the state.18 They were largely attributable to differences in the amount of taxable property within each district.19
In December 1971 the three-judge District Court rendered judgment holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The State appealed.21 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1972 to consider the constitutional questions presented.22
Whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of any suspect class?23
A wealth classification is suspect only when it results in absolute deprivation of a benefit for a definably indigent class or when personal wealth forms the basis for denial in the traditional sense recognized in prior cases.24
No. The Texas system does not operate to the disadvantage of any suspect class.2526 The poorest families are not necessarily concentrated in the poorest property districts.27 This is shown by the Edgewood Independent School District with an average assessed property value of $5,960 per pupil and median family income of $4,686 compared to the Alamo Heights Independent School District with over $49,000 per pupil and $8,001 median income.28 The system provides every child a free public education through the Minimum Foundation School Program without absolute deprivation.29
The Texas system does not operate to the disadvantage of any suspect class.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart joined the majority opinion.30 He emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality in educational expenditures.31 The clause does not require that all citizens receive equal services from the State.32
It requires only that the State not discriminate invidiously among persons.33 The Texas system is not invidious.34 It is a rational attempt to balance the desire for local control with the need to provide a basic education for all children.35
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Marshall dissented.36 He argued that the Court today decides that a State may constitutionally vary the quality of education which it offers its children in accordance with the amount of taxable wealth located in the school districts within which they reside.37
The Court's decision is a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity.38 The Texas system systematically denies poor children the opportunity for an education equal to that afforded their wealthier counterparts.39 The Court refuses to apply strict scrutiny even though wealth is a suspect classification when used in this context.40
Whether the Texas system of financing public education impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution?41
A right is fundamental for equal protection purposes only if it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. This includes rights deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.42
No. The Texas system does not impinge upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.4344 Education is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under the Federal Constitution.45 Nor is it implicitly protected.46 It is not a right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.47 Education remains an important interest.48
The Texas system does not impinge upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority's conclusion that education is not a fundamental right.49 He argued that education is of paramount importance in our society because it is essential to the exercise of other constitutional rights.
This includes the right to participate in the electoral process and the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment. This close nexus between education and constitutionally protected interests renders education a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes.50 Consequently, the Texas system must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Since even the State concedes that the scheme cannot survive such scrutiny, Brennan concluded that it is constitutionally invalid.51
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Marshall dissented, contending that the majority's refusal to apply strict scrutiny represents an abrupt departure from the mainstream of decisions concerning educational financing schemes.52
He maintained that education is a fundamental right and that wealth constitutes a suspect classification when used to allocate educational resources.53 The Court ignores the realities of the Texas system, which systematically denies poor children the opportunity for an education equal to that afforded their wealthier counterparts.54 Marshall would affirm the District Court because the scheme deprives children of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens and lacks any substantial justification.55
Whether the Texas system of financing public education bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose?56
Under the rational basis standard a state financing system need only be shown to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose such as promoting local control of education.57
Yes. The Texas system of financing public education bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.5859 It is rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of promoting local control of education.60 Local control allows citizens to participate in the governance of their schools.61 It allows them to tailor educational programs to local needs.62 The system encourages local districts to supplement the foundation grant with local funds.63 This fosters greater community involvement and support for the schools.64
The Texas system of financing public education bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred separately to emphasize that the Equal Protection Clause confers no substantive rights but merely measures the validity of classifications created by state laws.65
He noted that the clause is offended only by laws that are invidiously discriminatory or wholly arbitrary.66 The Texas system has not created objectively identifiable classes based on suspect criteria, nor does it rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the state's objective of local control.67 Therefore, under the established presumption of constitutional validity, the judgment of the District Court must be reversed.68
Joined by Justices Douglas And Brennan
Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.69 He argued that the Texas system is unconstitutional because it bears no rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose.70
Although local control is a permissible goal, the system fails to provide a meaningful option to property-poor districts like Edgewood to increase expenditures, as their low tax base makes it impossible to raise additional funds through property taxation.71 The means chosen by the State are not rationally related to maximizing local initiative, rendering the scheme arbitrary and violative of equal protection.72 White would affirm the District Court's judgment.73