543 U.S. 551 (2005)
Christopher Simmons was 17 years old and a junior in high school when he committed the murder of Shirley Crook in Missouri.1 Simmons planned the crime with two friends, Charles Benjamin and John Tessmer, discussing breaking into a home, tying up a victim, and throwing the victim off a bridge.2 On the night of the murder, Simmons and Benjamin entered Crook's home through an open window, bound her with duct tape, drove her to a state park, reinforced her bindings with electrical wire, wrapped her face in duct tape, and threw her from a railroad trestle into the Meramec River, where she drowned.3
Simmons was arrested the next day at his high school after bragging about the killing.4 Police read him his Miranda rights, and he waived his right to an attorney before confessing and agreeing to a videotaped reenactment at the crime scene.5 The State charged him with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and first-degree murder.6 Because Simmons was 17 at the time of the crime, he fell outside Missouri's juvenile court jurisdiction under Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 211.021 and 211.031 and was tried as an adult.7
At trial the State introduced Simmons' confession, the videotaped reenactment, and testimony about his advance planning and later bragging.8 The defense called no guilt-phase witnesses.9 The jury convicted Simmons of first-degree murder.10 In the penalty phase the State presented victim-impact testimony from Crook's family and proved three aggravating factors.11 The defense presented testimony from Simmons' family and a juvenile justice officer about his lack of prior record and family relationships, and both sides addressed his age as a mitigating factor.12 The jury recommended death, and the trial judge imposed it.13
Simmons obtained new counsel and moved for postconviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance because trial counsel had not presented evidence of his immaturity, impulsiveness, difficult home environment, substance abuse, and poor school performance.14 The trial court denied the motion.15 The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal and the denial of postconviction relief.16 Federal habeas relief was also denied.17 After this Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, Simmons filed a new state postconviction petition arguing that Atkins required the same categorical exemption for juvenile offenders.18 The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, set aside the death sentence, and resentenced Simmons to life imprisonment without parole.19 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
Whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed?21
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions and is determined by the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.22 Objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice, combined with the Court's independent judgment, establish whether a punishment is disproportionate.23
Yes. Christopher Simmons committed first-degree murder at age seventeen.24 The national consensus against executing juveniles under eighteen, shown by the increase in prohibiting states since Stanford and the infrequency of such executions, combines with juveniles' lesser culpability due to immaturity and susceptibility to influence.25 These factors render the death penalty disproportionate for Simmons and similarly situated offenders.26
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.27
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Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Stevens joined the opinion of the Court.28 He wrote separately to emphasize that the decision is fully consistent with his dissent in Stanford v. Kentucky.29 He argued that the execution of juvenile offenders is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.30
The evidence of a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty has only grown stronger since Stanford.31 The decision reaffirms the principle that the Eighth Amendment must be interpreted in light of the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.32
Whether a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders since Stanford v. Kentucky?33
Objective indicia of society's standards, including legislative enactments and state practice, demonstrate whether a national consensus has developed.34 The number of states prohibiting a practice, the consistency of the direction of change, and the infrequency of executions provide evidence of consensus.35
Yes. Since Stanford, five states have abandoned the juvenile death penalty through legislative or judicial action.36 This brings the total prohibiting states to thirty.37 No state that previously prohibited capital punishment for juveniles has reinstated it.38 Executions of juvenile offenders have become rare, with only three states carrying out such executions in the past decade.39 This consistent trend toward abolition, even amid popular anticrime legislation, establishes a national consensus against the practice.40
A national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders since Stanford v. Kentucky.41
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Justice O’Connor dissented.42 She argued that the objective evidence of a national consensus is insufficient and marginally weaker than in Atkins.43 At least eight states still have statutes setting sixteen or seventeen as the minimum age for capital punishment, and over seventy juvenile offenders remain on death row in twelve states.
The pace of legislative change has been slower than with the mentally retarded, and two states have expressly reaffirmed support for the practice by enacting statutes setting sixteen as the minimum age. In her view, the objective evidence standing alone was insufficient to dictate a categorical rule, and no genuine national consensus has emerged to justify overriding legislative judgments on this moral question.
Whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment?44
The death penalty is disproportionate when applied to a class of offenders whose culpability is diminished by reason of their characteristics.45 Juveniles' immaturity, susceptibility to outside pressures, and still-forming character mean they cannot reliably be classified among the worst offenders, rendering retribution and deterrence justifications inapplicable with full force.46
Yes. Three general differences between juveniles under eighteen and adults demonstrate diminished culpability.47 Juveniles' susceptibility to immature behavior makes their conduct less morally reprehensible.48 They are more vulnerable to negative influences and peer pressure.49 Their character is not as well formed.50 These traits create a greater possibility of reform, so even heinous crimes by juveniles do not reliably evidence irretrievable depravity.51 The penological justifications therefore apply with lesser force to offenders like Simmons.52
The death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juvenile offenders under the Eighth Amendment.53
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Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist And Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented.54 He contended that the Court's independent judgment usurps the role of legislatures in responding to the moral values of the people. The differences between juveniles and adults are matters of degree rather than kind, and some seventeen-year-olds can act with sufficient maturity and depravity to deserve death, as Simmons did in his premeditated, callous murder of Shirley Crook.
Individualized sentencing allows juries to weigh youth appropriately as a mitigating factor without a categorical prohibition. The studies cited by the Court do not justify preventing legislatures and juries from treating exceptional cases where a juvenile's crime reflects sufficient culpability for capital punishment.
Whether Stanford v. Kentucky should be overruled?55
Yes. The indicia of consensus have changed since Stanford.59 There is a consistent direction of abolition in additional states.60 Executions have become rare.61 Stanford's conclusions on both national consensus and disproportionality are undermined by these developments.62 Juveniles' diminished culpability makes the death penalty excessive.63 Atkins overruled Penry on similar grounds.64
Stanford v. Kentucky should be overruled.65
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Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas dissented.66 He argued that the decision is not supported by the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.67 The evidence of a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty is insufficient to justify a categorical prohibition.68
The Court's reliance on its own independent judgment is an exercise in judicial activism that improperly overrides legislative determinations and the precedent of Stanford v. Kentucky.69 The original understanding of the Eighth Amendment permits capital punishment for seventeen-year-old offenders, and the decision should not overrule Stanford.70