135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015)
On March 27, 2012, just after midnight, Nebraska police officer Morgan Struble observed a Mercury Mountaineer veer slowly onto the shoulder of State Highway 275 for one or two seconds before returning to the road.1 Struble pulled the vehicle over at 12:06 a.m. and approached the passenger side, where driver Dennys Rodriguez explained that he had swerved to avoid a pothole.2 Rodriguez produced his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, and Struble asked him to accompany him to the patrol car for safety reasons, but Rodriguez chose to remain in his vehicle.3 Struble then ran a records check on Rodriguez and questioned the front-seat passenger, Scott Pollman, about their travel plans from Omaha to Norfolk.4
Struble completed a records check on Pollman and called for a second officer while beginning to write a warning ticket for the traffic violation.5 By 12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Struble had finished explaining the warning to Rodriguez, returned all documents, and informed the occupants that the reasons for the stop were complete.6 At that point, Struble asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his drug-sniffing dog around the vehicle, but Rodriguez refused.7 Struble then directed Rodriguez to exit the vehicle and wait in front of the patrol car until the backup officer arrived.8
Approximately seven or eight minutes after issuing the warning, the second officer arrived at 12:33 a.m. Struble retrieved his dog Floyd and led it around the Mountaineer twice, during which the dog alerted to the presence of drugs.9 A search of the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine.10 Rodriguez was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska on one count of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1).11
Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Struble lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him for the dog sniff after completing the traffic stop.12 The Magistrate Judge found no reasonable suspicion but recommended denial of the motion under Eighth Circuit precedent treating the seven- to eight-minute extension as a de minimis intrusion.13 The District Court adopted those findings and denied the motion, leading Rodriguez to enter a conditional guilty plea and receive a five-year sentence.14
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the delay constituted an acceptable de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s personal liberty and declining to address whether reasonable suspicion existed.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals on whether police may routinely extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff.16
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a police officer to extend an otherwise completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, to conduct a dog sniff?17
A traffic stop is a seizure whose tolerable duration is determined by its mission to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.18 Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are or reasonably should have been completed.19 Ordinary inquiries incident to the stop, such as checking licenses, registration, and warrants, serve roadway safety.20 A dog sniff, by contrast, detects evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing and is not part of the traffic mission or a permissible safety precaution.21 An officer may not prolong the stop, even for a de minimis period, to conduct a dog sniff absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily required to justify detaining an individual.22
No. Officer Struble completed all traffic-related tasks by 12:27 or 12:28 a.m. when he finished explaining the warning and returned all documents to Rodriguez and Pollman.23 At that point he asked permission to walk his dog around the vehicle.24 When Rodriguez refused, Struble detained him for an additional seven or eight minutes until the second officer arrived at 12:33 a.m. and the dog alerted.25 Because the dog sniff is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop and serves no safety purpose tied to the stop's mission, the seven- or eight-minute extension without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment.26
The Fourth Amendment does not permit a police officer to extend an otherwise completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, to conduct a dog sniff. The judgment of the Eighth Circuit is therefore reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy joined the Court's opinion in full.28 He wrote separately to clarify the limited scope of the decision.29 Justice Kennedy noted that the opinion does not address whether reasonable suspicion of a violation of law is a necessary or sufficient condition for an officer to prolong a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff.30
The Court has not decided that question in this case.31 Justice Kennedy emphasized that he does not understand today's opinion to resolve or decide that particular issue.32 His concurrence underscores that the majority's holding is confined to the absence of reasonable suspicion.33
Justice Thomas dissented.34 He argued that the stop was executed in a reasonable manner consistent with Caballes.35 The overall duration was twenty-nine minutes.36
Officer Struble performed ordinary traffic-stop tasks plus a safety-motivated call for backup.37 He further argued that the officer possessed reasonable suspicion based on the overwhelming odor of air freshener.38 The passenger's extreme nervousness also contributed.39
Rodriguez's implausible explanation for driving onto the shoulder and Pollman's suspicious account of traveling two hours late at night to view a vehicle sight unseen supported the suspicion.40 Justice Thomas contended that the majority's new rule produces arbitrary results that turn on an individual officer's efficiency.41 It improperly imports Terry limitations into probable-cause traffic stops.42
Justice Alito dissented.43 He argued that the question decided was hypothetical because Officer Struble in fact possessed reasonable suspicion.44 This rendered the seven- or eight-minute extension lawful.45
He argued that the holding is arbitrary because it hinges on the sequence of tasks rather than overall reasonableness.46 The officer reasonably waited for backup before conducting the sniff to protect officer safety.47 The same sniff could lawfully have occurred earlier while records checks were still pending.48
Justice Alito concluded that the rule will have little practical effect and rests on no sound Fourth Amendment principle.49