525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974)
Richard and Mary Anne Rodriguez married on May 24, 1969. Both were gainfully employed at the time. In their leisure time they participated in social and recreational activities. They were saving to buy their own home and planned to raise a large family.1
Only sixteen months after the marriage, Richard was struck on the head at work by a falling pipe weighing over 600 pounds. The blow caused severe spinal cord damage that left him totally paralyzed in both legs, totally paralyzed below the mid-point of the chest, and partially paralyzed in one arm. The injuries are permanent.2
The accident transformed Richard into a lifelong invalid confined to home and bedridden much of the time. Mary Anne gave up her job to provide his care on a 24-hour basis. Each night she must wake to turn him to minimize bedsores. Every morning and evening she must help him wash, dress, and move between bed and wheelchair. She must assist him with artificial inducement of bladder and bowel functions and must lift or support his body weight during many tasks. She is a constant witness to his pain and frustration. Because he has lost all capacity for sexual intercourse, that aspect of married life is wholly denied to her, and she is denied the opportunity to have children by him. These physical and emotional frustrations have made her nervous, tense, depressed, and caused trouble sleeping, eating, and concentrating.3
Richard and Mary Anne jointly filed an amended complaint against Richard's employer, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, and several subcontractors. The first cause of action sought damages for Richard's own injuries. The second cause of action alleged the consequences to Mary Anne and sought general damages in her own right, the reasonable value of the nursing care she furnishes, and compensation for loss of her earnings and earning capacity.4
Defendants filed general demurrers to the second cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, severed Mary Anne's cause of action, and entered a judgment of dismissal as to her.5 The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Mary Anne appealed.6
Whether California should continue to adhere to the rule that a married person whose spouse has been injured by the negligence of a third party has no cause of action for loss of consortium?7
The common law rule denying a spouse recovery for loss of consortium is a judge-made doctrine. Courts may overrule the rule when its original rationales have ceased to exist. The weight of authority in other jurisdictions supports recognition of the claim. Basic principles of negligence establish that the spouse's injuries are foreseeable and compensable.8
No. The severe and permanent injuries to Richard directly and foreseeably deprived Mary Anne of consortium elements including sexual relations, companionship, and the ability to bear children. These losses parallel the emotional trauma held compensable in Dillon v. Legg.9 The arguments that the injury is indirect, damages speculative, or double recovery inevitable are refuted because the facts show distinct personal harms to each spouse that procedural joinder and jury instructions can separate.10
The Deshotel rule therefore no longer governs.11
California should no longer adhere to the rule denying recovery and must recognize each spouse's cause of action for loss of consortium caused by negligent injury to the other spouse.12
Related opinions on this issue
Justice McComb dissents from the majority's decision to overrule Deshotel and West. He maintains that any change in the law denying the wife recovery for loss of consortium should be left to legislative action rather than judicial decree. This stance rests on the view that established common law tort rules require legislative intervention before courts may expand liability to encompass a spouse's separate claim for loss of consortium.
By adhering to the prior precedent, the dissent would preserve the denial of Mary Anne's cause of action pending any statutory reform by the Legislature.13