60 P.3d 204
On a summer evening, Richard L. Riley and Edward F. Portalla opened fire on an unsuspecting crowd of young people who were socializing around a bonfire on the Tanana River near Fairbanks. Two of the young people were seriously wounded by the shots.1
Riley and Portalla were indicted on two counts of first-degree assault for recklessly causing serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument. They also faced six counts of third-degree assault for recklessly placing another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.2 The physical evidence did not reveal which of the defendants' weapons had fired the wounding shots.3 The bullet recovered from one victim was so deformed that it could not be matched to either weapon. The bullet that wounded the other victim passed through the body and was never recovered.4
At the close of Riley's trial the jurors were instructed that for each count of first-degree assault they should decide whether Riley acted as a principal by firing the wounding shot. If they could not decide beyond a reasonable doubt which man fired the shots, they were to decide whether Riley acted as an accomplice by aiding or abetting Portalla.5 The jurors found Riley guilty as an accomplice in the wounding of both victims. Riley was ultimately convicted of all eight charges.6
Riley appealed his two first-degree assault convictions.7 At sentencing Superior Court Judge Niesje J. Steinkruger treated Riley as a first felony offender. She imposed a composite term of sixteen years' imprisonment with six years suspended, requiring Riley to serve ten years.8
The judge found three aggravating factors under AS 12.55.155(c).9 Judge Steinkruger found that Riley was the leader of the criminal conduct and an extremely dangerous offender who lacked remorse and insight.10 The judge restricted Riley's eligibility for discretionary parole during the ten-year term.11
Whether the jury instruction on accomplice liability for first-degree assault was plainly erroneous because it failed to require proof that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury?12
No. Although the accomplice liability instruction was potentially ambiguous on whether Riley had to intend the result of serious physical injury, Riley's attorney clarified during summation that the State had to prove Riley's objective was for the victims to receive serious physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument.15 The prosecutor did not refute this characterization during rebuttal.16 Riley did not object at trial to the instruction.17 The parties' closing arguments cured any potential ambiguity in the instruction.18
Therefore, the instruction did not constitute obvious error under the Echols framework then in effect.19
The jury instruction on accomplice liability did not constitute plain error.20
Whether the decision in Echols v. State should be overruled regarding the culpable mental state required for accomplice liability when the underlying offense involves an unintended result?21
Under AS 11.16.110(2) a person is accountable as an accomplice if the person solicits, encourages, or assists another's conduct with intent to promote or facilitate that conduct.22 For crimes defined by an unintended result the accomplice must additionally possess the culpable mental state specified in the underlying statute with respect to that result.23
Yes. Echols misinterpreted the complicity statute and Alaska's pre-code decisions by requiring proof that the accomplice intended the prohibited result even when the underlying crime requires only recklessness or negligence.24 The correct rule is consistent with the common-law approach and the Model Penal Code commentary adopted by most states with similar statutes.25 The accomplice's intent applies to the dangerous conduct.26
The mental state for the result is evaluated separately under the underlying offense.27 Applied to these facts Riley intended to promote Portalla's act of shooting into the crowd and acted recklessly as to the possibility of serious physical injury.28 This satisfies the elements of first-degree assault under a complicity theory.29 The Echols requirement of intent to cause serious physical injury is therefore overruled.30
Echols v. State is overruled because accomplice liability for first-degree assault requires only that the accomplice intend to facilitate the dangerous conduct and act recklessly with respect to serious physical injury.31
Whether Riley's composite sentence of ten years to serve with a restriction on discretionary parole was excessive?32
No. These findings rest on Riley's role in initiating the unprovoked shooting at an unarmed group.36 Riley's continued lack of acceptance of responsibility supports the sentence.37 The high risk Riley poses to the public supports the sentence.38 The sentence and parole restriction are not clearly mistaken in light of the seriousness of the conduct and the sentencing criteria.39
Riley's composite sentence of ten years to serve with a restriction on discretionary parole was not excessive.40