446 U.S. 291 (1980)
On the night of January 12, 1975, Providence taxicab driver John Mulvaney disappeared after being dispatched to pick up a customer.1 His body was discovered four days later buried in a shallow grave in Coventry, Rhode Island.2 He had died from a shotgun blast aimed at the back of his head.3
On January 17, 1975, shortly after midnight, taxicab driver Gerald Aubin reported to the Providence police that he had been robbed by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun.4 He had dropped off his assailant near Rhode Island College in the Mount Pleasant section of Providence.5 While at the police station Aubin identified the respondent from a picture on a bulletin board.6 A photo array confirmed the identification and prompted a search of the area.7
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on January 17, Patrolman Lovell arrested the respondent in Mount Pleasant after he approached the patrol car.8 The respondent was advised of his Miranda rights by Lovell, Sergeant Sears, and Captain Leyden upon their successive arrivals.9 The respondent stated that he understood those rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer.10 He was placed in a caged wagon for transport to the central police station accompanied by Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna.11 Captain Leyden instructed the officers not to question, intimidate, or coerce him.12
While en route to the central station, Patrolman Gleckman initiated a conversation with Patrolman McKenna concerning the missing shotgun.13 He stated that he frequented the area and that there was a school for handicapped children nearby so that God forbid one of them might find the weapon and hurt themselves.14 McKenna concurred that it was a safety factor.15 Williams overheard the remarks about a little girl possibly picking up the gun.16 The respondent then interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.17 After radioing back, the vehicle returned to the scene where the respondent again received Miranda warnings and led the police to a nearby field, pointing out the shotgun under some rocks by the side of the road.18
On March 20, 1975, a grand jury returned an indictment charging the respondent with the kidnapping, robbery, and murder of John Mulvaney.19 Before trial the respondent moved to suppress the shotgun and the statements he had made to the police regarding it.20 After an evidentiary hearing the trial judge denied the motion and the evidence was introduced at trial, resulting in a jury verdict of guilty on all counts.21 On appeal the Rhode Island Supreme Court in a 3-2 decision set aside the conviction.22 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address for the first time the meaning of interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona.23
Whether the conversation between the police officers in the respondent's presence constituted interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona?24
The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.25 That is to say, the term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.26
No. The conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no express questioning of the respondent Innis.27 It was in form nothing more than a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from the respondent was invited.28 Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded that the respondent was subjected to the functional equivalent of questioning.29 There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were aware that the respondent was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped children.30
Nor is there anything to suggest that the police knew that the respondent was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest.31 Given that the entire conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks, the officers should not have known that it was reasonably likely that Innis would respond by incriminating himself.32 The Rhode Island Supreme Court therefore erred in equating subtle compulsion with interrogation.33
The conversation between the police officers in the respondent's presence did not constitute interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona.34
Related opinions on this issue
I would prefer to reverse the judgment for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977).
Given that judgment and the Court's opinion in Brewer, I join the opinion of the Court in the present case.35 This concurrence indicates that while Justice White maintains his view from the Brewer dissent, he accepts the application of the Brewer precedent to the facts of this case involving whether the officers' conversation constituted interrogation under Miranda.36
Since the result is not inconsistent with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), I concur in the judgment.37
The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures.38 I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date.39 I fear, however, that the rationale in Parts II-A and II-B of the Court's opinion will not clarify the tension between this holding and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), and our other cases.40
It may introduce new elements of uncertainty.41 Under the Court's test, a police officer, in the brief time available, apparently must evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused.42 Few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated.43
Even a psychiatrist asked to express an expert opinion on these aspects of a suspect in custody would very likely employ extensive questioning and observation to make the judgment now charged to police officers.44 Trial judges have enough difficulty discerning the boundaries and nuances flowing from post-Miranda opinions, and we do not clarify that situation today.45
Joined by Justice Brennan
I am substantially in agreement with the Court's definition of interrogation within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).46
In my view, the Miranda safeguards apply whenever police conduct is intended or likely to produce a response from a suspect in custody.47 I am utterly at a loss, however, to understand how this objective standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the conclusion that there was no interrogation.48 The simple message of the talking back and forth between Gleckman and McKenna was that they had to find the shotgun to avert a child's death.49
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a suspect than the assertion that if the weapon is not found an innocent person will be hurt or killed.50 And not just any innocent person, but an innocent child, a little girl, a helpless, handicapped little girl on her way to school.51 Gleckman's remarks would obviously have constituted interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to respondent.52
The result should not be different because they were nominally addressed to McKenna.53
An original definition of an old term coupled with an original finding of fact on a cold record makes it possible for this Court to vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.54 As the Court recognizes, Miranda makes it clear that, once respondent requested an attorney, he had an absolute right to have any type of interrogation cease until an attorney was present.55 The Court, however, takes a much narrower view.56
It holds that police conduct is not the functional equivalent of direct questioning unless the police should have known that what they were saying or doing was likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.57 This holding represents a plain departure from the principles set forth in Miranda.58 Under my view of the correct standard, the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court should be affirmed because the statements made within Innis' hearing were as likely to elicit a response as a direct question.59
However, even if I were to agree with the Court's much narrower standard, I would disagree with its disposition of this particular case because the Rhode Island courts should be given an opportunity to apply the new standard to the facts of this case.60