521 U.S. 811 (1997)
The Line Item Veto Act was passed by the Senate on March 27, 1996, by a vote of 69 to 31.1 All four appellee Senators voted against the bill.2 The House of Representatives passed the identical bill the next day by a vote of 232 to 177, with both appellee Congressmen voting nay.3 The President signed the Act on April 4, 1996, and it became effective on January 1, 1997.4
The appellees consist of six Members of the 104th Congress, including four Senators and two Congressmen.5 Shortly after the Act took effect, they filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.6 The complaint alleged that the Act unconstitutionally expanded the President's power and violated the requirements of bicameral passage and presentment.7
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of standing and ripeness.8 On April 10, 1997, it granted summary judgment to the appellees and declared the Act unconstitutional.9 The court also granted intervention to the National Treasury Employees Union and a group of Congressmen.10
Appellants filed a jurisdictional statement, and the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on April 23, 1997.11 The Court established an expedited briefing schedule and heard oral argument on May 27, 1997.12 The House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group and the Senate appeared as amici curiae urging reversal on the merits without taking a position on standing.13
Whether six Members of Congress who voted against the Line Item Veto Act have standing under Article III to challenge its constitutionality?14
Article III limits federal court jurisdiction to cases and controversies.15 A plaintiff must establish standing by showing a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent, fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.16 Legislative standing exists only in narrow circumstances where legislators' votes have been completely nullified, as recognized in Coleman v. Miller.17
No. The six appellees, consisting of four Senators and two Congressmen from the 104th Congress who voted against the Line Item Veto Act on March 27 and 28, 1996, have not demonstrated any personal, particularized injury.18 Their votes against the Act were given full effect when the bill passed by margins of 69 to 31 in the Senate and 232 to 177 in the House.19 The alleged harm arises solely from their status as Members of Congress.20 It consists of an abstract institutional diminution of legislative power that affects all Members equally rather than any concrete invasion of a legally protected interest personal to them.21
The appellees lack standing under Article III to maintain their challenge to the Line Item Veto Act.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Ginsburg
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment.23 He reasoned that the claimed injury to official legislative power is not sufficiently personal or concrete under Article III precedents.24 The dispute is an intrabranch controversy best resolved through the political process rather than judicial intervention.25
Although acknowledging that Coleman presented a closer question of official harm, Souter concluded that separation-of-powers principles counsel against recognizing standing here.26 A future private plaintiff injured by an actual cancellation would provide a more appropriate vehicle for review.27
Whether the Line Item Veto Act nullifies the votes of individual Members of Congress in the manner required for standing under Coleman v. Miller?28
Under Coleman v. Miller, state legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat a specific legislative action have standing if that action nonetheless takes effect on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.29 This narrow exception does not extend to claims of abstract dilution of institutional legislative power or changes in the effectiveness of future votes.30
No. Unlike the Kansas senators in Coleman, the appellees here voted against the Line Item Veto Act and lost in the ordinary legislative process.31 Their votes were counted and given full effect.32 The Act does not nullify any past votes or prevent future majorities from passing or repealing appropriations measures.33 It merely alters the post-enactment process in a manner that applies equally to all Members.34
The Line Item Veto Act does not nullify the appellees' votes within the meaning of Coleman v. Miller, and therefore that precedent does not confer standing.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Breyer
Justice Stevens dissented and would have found standing.36 He argued that the Act directly impairs the constitutional right of every Senator and Representative to vote on the precise text of measures that become law.37 This injury is distinct from the vote-nullification theory in Coleman.38
Because the Act creates truncated laws that no Member ever voted on, it denies the opportunity to cast votes guaranteed by Article I, Section 7.39 The result is an immediate and concrete harm to the legislators' official powers that requires no further presidential action to ripen.40
Whether Members of Congress suffer a concrete and particularized injury in their official capacities from the Act's changes to the legislative process?41
An injury in fact must be concrete, particularized, and personal rather than abstract or widely dispersed among all Members of Congress.42 Claims of institutional harm to the legislative branch as a whole, without any individual diminution of a personal right or discriminatory treatment, do not satisfy Article III requirements.43
No. The appellees allege that the Act alters the legal effect of their votes on future appropriations bills, divests them of their role in repealing legislation, and disrupts the constitutional balance of powers.44 These asserted harms are institutional in nature, shared equally by all Members of Congress, and do not single out the appellees for any unique disadvantage.45 Historical practice confirms that analogous interbranch disputes have not been litigated by individual legislators.46 The appellees remain free to seek legislative remedies such as repeal of the Act.47
Members of Congress do not suffer a concrete and particularized injury in their official capacities sufficient to establish standing from the Act's changes to the legislative process.48
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens' dissent and separately emphasized that the harm is sufficiently concrete because it systematically impedes the legislators' ability to perform their constitutional duties on a recurring class of legislation.49 He argued that the immediate and pervasive effect on the lawmaking process distinguishes this case from abstract disputes and aligns it with Coleman, where the Court recognized standing for official injuries arising from legislative procedures.50
Breyer further noted that Congress's explicit authorization of suit in the Act itself removes prudential barriers and underscores the justiciability of the controversy.51