514 U.S. 765 (1995)
Respondent Elem was convicted of second-degree robbery in a Missouri court.1 During jury selection, he objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike two black men from the jury panel.2
The prosecutor explained that he struck juror number twenty-two because of his long curly unkempt hair, mustache, and goatee.3 The prosecutor further explained that he struck juror number twenty-four for similar facial hair and because the juror had been the victim of a supermarket robbery involving a sawed-off shotgun.4
The state trial court overruled the objection without explanation.5 On direct appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the explanation constituted a legitimate hunch and that the circumstances failed to raise an inference of racial discrimination.6
Elem filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.7 The district court denied the petition, concluding that the state courts' determination of no purposeful discrimination was a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness.8 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.9
Whether the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit erred by combining Batson's second and third steps into one and requiring the race-neutral explanation to be plausible?10
Under the three-step Batson framework, once a prima facie case of racial discrimination is shown at step one, the proponent at step two must articulate a race-neutral explanation.11 The facial validity of that explanation is assessed without regard to persuasiveness or plausibility.12 Only at step three does the trial court determine whether the opponent has proved purposeful discrimination by assessing the genuineness of the proffered reason.13
Yes. Respondent Elem was convicted of second-degree robbery in a Missouri court. During jury selection, he objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike two black men from the jury panel. The prosecutor explained that he struck juror number twenty-two because of his long curly unkempt hair, mustache, and goatee. The prosecutor further explained that he struck juror number twenty-four for similar facial hair and because the juror had been the victim of a supermarket robbery involving a sawed-off shotgun. The state trial court overruled the objection without explanation.
On direct appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the explanation constituted a legitimate hunch and that the circumstances failed to raise an inference of racial discrimination. Elem filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition, concluding that the state courts' determination of no purposeful discrimination was a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.
The Eighth Circuit erred by requiring at step two that the explanation be plausible and related to the juror's ability to serve rather than merely race neutral on its face.14 The established facts show the prosecutor offered reasons based on appearance that do not reference race, satisfying the minimal burden of production at step two.15 The persuasiveness inquiry belongs exclusively at step three, where the state courts credited the explanation as a legitimate hunch and the ultimate burden of persuasion never shifted from the defendant.16 The Court of Appeals improperly collapsed the steps and overturned the state finding without determining that it lacked fair support in the record.17
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit erred by combining Batson's second and third steps into one and requiring the race-neutral explanation to be plausible.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the majority improperly relaxed the Batson standard by accepting any facially neutral explanation at step two even if implausible or unrelated to the case.19 He maintained that Batson requires the prosecutor to articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried, and that neither a mere denial of motive nor an incredible explanation suffices.20
In his view the prosecutor's volunteered reasons here—that he did not like the way the juror looked and that the facial hair looked suspicious—were just as evasive as a statement that he had a hunch.21 Such an explanation should have been rejected at step two or held pretextual as a matter of law.22 Stevens argued that the Court's new tolerance of silly or fantastic explanations demeans the values protected by Batson and turns appellate review into a meaningless charade when trial courts fail to make findings at step one.23
Whether the prosecutor's explanation for striking the jurors satisfied the second step of the Batson inquiry?24
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that the prosecutor explained the strikes solely by reference to the jurors' long unkempt hair, mustaches, goatees, and one juror's prior robbery experience with a sawed-off shotgun.27 These characteristics are not peculiar to any race and therefore do not reveal discriminatory intent on their face.28 The inquiry therefore properly proceeded to step three, where the state courts found the reasons constituted a legitimate hunch and that no inference of racial discrimination arose.29
Because the explanation satisfied the minimal production requirement of step two, the prosecutor's burden was met regardless of later assessments of plausibility.30
The prosecutor's explanation for striking the jurors satisfied the second step of the Batson inquiry.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens maintained that the prosecutor's explanation failed step two because it was not related to the particular case to be tried.32 He noted that the prosecutor merely stated he did not like the way the juror looked and that the facial hair looked suspicious, without identifying any concern that the juror's appearance would affect his ability to serve.33
In Stevens's view such an explanation was just as evasive as saying he had a hunch and therefore did not rebut the prima facie case under the standard articulated in Batson.34
Whether the state court's finding of no purposeful discrimination was entitled to a presumption of correctness in federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254?35
State-court factual findings on the issue of purposeful discrimination are presumed correct in federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and may be set aside only if not fairly supported by the record.36
Yes. The established facts show that the state trial court overruled the Batson objection.37 The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed after finding the prosecutor's explanation constituted a legitimate hunch and that the circumstances failed to raise an inference of racial discrimination.38 The district court correctly treated this determination as a factual finding entitled to the statutory presumption.39
The Eighth Circuit did not conclude or attempt to conclude that the state finding lacked fair support in the record; instead it focused on the reasonableness of the nonracial motive rather than its genuineness.40 Because the state finding turned primarily on credibility and was supported by the record, it was entitled to deference in the habeas proceeding.41
The state court's finding of no purposeful discrimination was entitled to a presumption of correctness in federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.42
Whether the Court of Appeals had a proper basis for overturning the state court's finding of no racial motive?43
No. The established facts reveal that the Eighth Circuit's entire focus was on the reasonableness of the asserted nonracial motive rather than the genuineness of the motive or whether the state finding lacked fair record support.46 The state courts had credited the prosecutor's explanation after hearing the voir dire and observing demeanor, and the record contained the detailed description of the jurors' hair and facial hair.47
Because the Court of Appeals gave no proper basis for overturning the credibility-based state finding, its reversal was erroneous.48
The Court of Appeals lacked a proper basis for overturning the state court's finding of no racial motive.49