86 Cal. App. 4th 970, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 809 (2001)
Refugio Anthony Sanchez was driving a car with three passengers late at night on March 1, 1998, when Officer John Morris observed the vehicle run a stop sign and two red lights at speeds of 35 to 55 miles per hour.1 Morris activated his patrol car's red lights and siren and began a pursuit, during which the car nearly collided with another vehicle at an intersection.2
The passengers, including Goldie McCowan, urged Sanchez to pull over, but he refused, turned up the music, and accelerated to speeds between 85 and 100 miles per hour through residential streets.3 Unable to complete a 90-degree turn while traveling at approximately 84 miles per hour, Sanchez lost control of the car, which hit a guardrail, flipped over, and crashed into a house.4
One passenger, Lakisha Davis, died in the crash. Goldie McCowan suffered a broken right arm, a fractured collarbone, and hip injuries, while Shanise Shaver received cuts and bruises to her hand, head, and stomach.5 Sanchez, who had a blood alcohol level of .18 percent and a prior conviction for driving under the influence with a suspended license, was extracted from the vehicle by officers.6
Sanchez was charged with multiple offenses, including second degree murder, and convicted after a jury trial. He appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeal, Third District.7
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3 is a felony inherently dangerous to human life supporting a second degree murder conviction under the felony-murder doctrine?8
To qualify as a predicate for the second degree felony-murder doctrine, a felony must be inherently dangerous to human life, meaning it carries a high probability that death will result from its commission.9 In determining whether a felony is inherently dangerous to human life, the court looks to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular facts of the case.10 If dispositive elements of the statute may be established by conduct that does not necessarily pose a high probability of death, the felony is not inherently dangerous to human life.11 It cannot support a second degree felony-murder conviction.12
Yes. The primary element of Vehicle Code section 2800.3 is that while operating a motor vehicle and with the intent to evade, a person willfully flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer's motor vehicle.13 This element can be satisfied without creating a high probability of death.14 The factor elevating the offense to a felony is that the flight proximately causes death or serious bodily injury.15 Because these alternatives are stated in the disjunctive, the statute can be violated by causing serious bodily injury without endangering human life.16
Applying this rule to the established facts. Sanchez's flight from Officer Morris after running a stop sign and red lights at 35 to 55 miles per hour satisfied the elements of section 2800.3.17 His subsequent high-speed driving also satisfied those elements.18 Yet the abstract elements permit violations that do not carry a high probability of death.19
The trial court therefore erred when it instructed the jury that a violation of section 2800.3 is a felony inherently dangerous to human life.20 The jury could convict Sanchez of second degree murder on that basis.21
The trial court erred in instructing the jury that a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3 is a felony inherently dangerous to human life that can support a second degree murder conviction under the felony-murder doctrine.22