63 N.Y. 88 (1875)
The defendants served as commissioners of charities for the county of Kings.1 They faced an indictment containing eleven counts charging official misconduct.2 The indictment included eleven alternating counts for conspiracy.3 Each conspiracy count alleged that the defendants conspired to omit, refuse, and willfully neglect to advertise for proposals for the specific articles mentioned in the preceding misconduct count.4
The statute required the board to advertise in the corporation papers of Brooklyn for not less than ten days for proposals for necessary supplies.5 It also required awarding contracts to the lowest bidder providing adequate security.6 An exception existed for perishable articles.7 The prosecution established that the defendants purchased the described articles in the open market without prior advertisement.8 The defendants offered evidence indicating they lacked knowledge of the statute.9 They believed they were following the prior practice of the department in good faith.10
During the trial, the court charged the jury that an agreement or understanding among the defendants not to advertise for the articles constituted the conspiracy.11 This was if it was carried into execution by purchases.12 The court refused the defendants' request to instruct the jury that a corrupt intent was necessary for conviction.13 It also refused to instruct that an honest belief that the law did not require advertising would preclude conviction.14 The defendants were acquitted on all official misconduct counts but convicted on the conspiracy counts.15
The General Term reversed the convictions.16 The People then sued out a writ of error to challenge the reversal.17
Whether proof that the defendants agreed to omit advertising for proposals as required by statute, followed by overt acts, is sufficient to establish criminal conspiracy without a showing of corrupt intent or knowledge of the law?18
To constitute the crime of conspiracy there must not only be the act but also the criminal intention.19 These must concur. To make an agreement between two or more persons to do an act innocent in itself a criminal conspiracy it is not enough that the act was prohibited by statute.20 The confederation must be corrupt.21 The agreement must have been entered into with an evil purpose.22 This is distinguished from a purpose simply to do the act in ignorance of the prohibition.23
No. The rule requires that the actual criminal intention belong to the definition of the offence.24 It must be shown to justify a conviction.25 Persons who agree in good faith to do an act innocent in itself are not converted into conspirators merely because the act turns out to be prohibited.26
The defendants served as commissioners of charities for the county of Kings. They faced an indictment with alternating counts for official misconduct and conspiracy arising from purchases of supplies without prior advertisement under chapter 491 of the Laws of 1871.27 The prosecution proved the purchases occurred in the open market.28 The defendants introduced evidence that they lacked knowledge of the statute.29 They acted in good faith under prior departmental practice.30 The trial court charged that an agreement not to advertise followed by purchases was sufficient for conspiracy.31 The court refused to instruct the jury that corrupt intent or an honest belief the law did not require advertising would preclude conviction.32
Applying the rule to these facts, the bare agreement and overt acts do not establish criminal conspiracy.33 The evidence permitted the jury to find that no criminal intention existed.34 The presumption that the defendants knew the law was not conclusive.35 The charge therefore contained reversible error.36
Proof that the defendants agreed to omit advertising for proposals as required by statute, followed by overt acts, is not sufficient to establish criminal conspiracy without a showing of corrupt intent or knowledge of the law.37