34 Cal.4th 1129, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107
In the early morning hours of May 23, 2002, California Highway Patrol Officer Gary Stephany observed defendant driving a Chevrolet Tahoe without a rear license plate and signaled him to stop.1 Defendant initially pulled over but then sped away onto a nearby freeway as the officers approached, leading to a high-speed pursuit reaching 90 miles per hour.2 Defendant exited the freeway, turned off his headlights, ran multiple stop signs and a red light, drove on the wrong side of the road at speeds 15 to 20 miles over the limit, and eventually escaped down a dirt road.3
Subsequently, Officers Anthony Arcelus and Bret Boss, monitoring the radio, spotted the Tahoe and resumed the chase at over 80 miles per hour, during which the vehicle again ran stop signs and traffic lights with headlights off.4 Officer Arcelus discontinued the pursuit upon entering downtown Fresno to avoid potential accidents.5 Approximately one minute later, the Tahoe ran a red light and collided with a vehicle driven by Jeanette Rodriguez, resulting in her death and serious injury to her husband; the Tahoe had been stolen earlier that day, and defendant was arrested at the scene.6
At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from defendant's passenger Laurie Bennett, who admitted begging defendant to stop multiple times, an accident reconstruction expert confirming speeds over 80 miles per hour, and a witness who observed the traffic signal favoring the victims' direction.7 A defense toxicologist testified that defendant had a high amount of methamphetamine in his bloodstream at the time of the accident while the victim had morphine and cocaine metabolites in her bloodstream.8 Defendant himself admitted fleeing due to probation concerns but claimed limited recollection of the events.9 The trial court instructed the jury solely on second degree felony murder based on Vehicle Code section 2800.2 without requiring a finding of malice.10
The jury convicted defendant of murder, causing serious bodily injury while evading, and evading with willful disregard.11 The Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court of California granted review on two specific questions regarding the application of the felony-murder rule.12
Whether the offense of driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) is a felony inherently dangerous to human life for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule?13
The second degree felony-murder rule applies only to felonies inherently dangerous to human life in the abstract.14 This means felonies that by their very nature cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed.15 The court determines this by examining the elements of the felony in the abstract rather than the particular facts of the case.16
No. In determining whether a felony is inherently dangerous under the second degree felony-murder rule, the court looks to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular facts of the case.17 Section 2800.2 was amended by the addition of subdivision (b).18 Subdivision (b) broadly defines willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property to include driving during which three or more traffic violations assigned a point count under section 12810 occur.19 Such violations include driving an unregistered vehicle, driving with a suspended license, driving slightly over 55 miles per hour, failing to stop completely at a stop sign, and making a right turn without signaling for 100 feet.20 All of these can be committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed.21
Although the established facts show the defendant drove at high speeds, ran stop signs and red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road, and collided with another vehicle resulting in death, the rule requires examination of the felony in the abstract rather than the defendant's specific conduct.22 The trial court therefore erred when it instructed the jury that a violation of section 2800.2 is a felony inherently dangerous to human life.23
Section 2800.2 is not an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule.24 Therefore, the rule does not apply when a killing occurs during a violation of that section.25 The judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding the second degree murder conviction must be reversed.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brown concurs in the reversal of the second degree felony-murder conviction.27 She would abrogate the second degree felony-murder rule entirely.28 The rule is a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code.29
Its constitutionality has been questioned.30 Its application incorporates an artificial concept of strict criminal liability that erodes the relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability.31 The rule remains irredeemably arbitrary as demonstrated by the fact that reasonable judges can and do disagree about whether a violation of section 2800.2 should be deemed inherently dangerous.32
Justice Baxter dissents from the holding that section 2800.2 is not inherently dangerous.33 Subdivision (a) gives clear and specific notice that one who, to elude police pursuit, drives with reckless indifference to safety is guilty of a felony.34 Such reckless driving is inherently dangerous by definition because it creates a substantial risk that someone will be killed.35
The jury convicted defendant based solely on proof that he fled police pursuit by driving with reckless indifference to safety under subdivision (a) without any reference to the points violations in subdivision (b).36
Whether the offense of proximately causing death or serious bodily injury by willful flight from a pursuing police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.3) is a more specific offense precluding application of the second degree felony-murder rule where death occurs during a violation of section 2800.2?37
A special statute defining an offense preempts a more general statute encompassing the same conduct when each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the special statute.38 It also preempts when it appears from the statutory context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute.39
No. The court did not reach or resolve this issue.40 Its conclusion that the second degree felony-murder rule does not apply to violations of section 2800.2 rendered it unnecessary to decide whether section 2800.3 is a more specific offense.41 Such an offense would preclude application of the rule to a killing during a violation of section 2800.2.42
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Baxter addresses the second issue in dissent.45 He concludes that section 2800.3 does not preclude prosecution for felony murder under section 2800.2.46 The facial elements of the two statutes differ.47
Section 2800.3 sanctions a homicide regardless of the fleeing motorist's degree of driving care.48 Felony murder under section 2800.2 requires that the motorist have driven with willful or wanton disregard for safety.49 A fatality punishable under section 2800.3 will not necessarily or commonly constitute a felony murder under section 2800.2.50